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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The objective of this study is to analyse the impact of decentralisation on the 
relationship between local governments and small businesses in Bantul, the province 
of Yogyakarta and Gianyar, the province of Bali in Indonesia. It presents three 
research questions: Firstly, to what extent does decentralisation give more power to 
the local governments to serve and control small businesses?; Secondly, can political 
decentralisation drive district heads and political parties to be closer to small 
businesses owners?; Finally, does political decentralisation create opportunities for 
small business owners to be involved in the process of decision making at district 
level?  
 
This study is based on qualitative and quantitative evidence. Data was collected by 
interviews, documentation and survey. Then, it was analysed by qualitative and 
quantitative analysis.   
 
Theoretically, the relationship between local government and small businesses can 
be examined from three aspects: Firstly, the regulations aspect, which is to analyse 
the extent to which the regulations facilitate or obstruct small businesses; Secondly, 
promotion policy, with the aim of assessing local governments’ actions in  
promoting small businesses; Thirdly, the political influence aspect that explores how 
local authorities influence small businesses and the extent to which small businesses 
can be involved in the process of decision making at the local level.       
 
This study found that local regulation on levies cannot be implemented effectively 
because of economic and political reasons. Small business activities are relatively 
independent from the district government policies. Thus, district governments cannot 
use local regulations to control small businesses.  
 
In relation to promotion policy on small business, the district head of Bantul more 
intensively promoted small businesses than the Gianyar district. The district head of 
Bantul is known as a populist leader and close to small businesses but neither in 
Gianyar. The relationship between local government of Bantul and small business is 
characterised by supportive relationship. However, decentralisation cannot 
encourage local politicians to be close to small business owners. Therefore, they use 
money and materials to influence voter behaviour of small business owners.  
 
In the case of Bantul, political parties developed networks with business associations 
but not so in Gianyar. Therefore, small businesses have more power to make bargain 
with local government and participate in the process of decision making at the 
district level. Both in Bantul and Gianyar, small business owners are not interested 
being involved in political parties and activities because they cannot conceive this 
providing a benefit to them.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In most market economies, small businesses are sometimes given special support on 
the grounds that these enterprises are inherently disadvantaged by the free operation 
of markets. Government usually helps small businesses by providing financial 
assistance, technical assistance and other proportional benefits. Small businesses in 
Indonesia are particularly important as this sector represents 97 percent of the total 
number of enterprises and therefore accounts for a primary component in 
understanding Indonesia’s industrialisation. For this reason the Indonesian 
government has given priority to the sector over other sectors with the aim to protect 
and promote this sector. 
 
Small businesses have become an even more important subject of study and policy 
analysis as authorities in Jakarta have implemented decentralisation measures since 
2001. Although some practical reports and evaluation studies on the impact of 
decentralisation reform are available to practitioners such as policy makers and 
bureaucrats at the local level, the relationships between local authorities and small 
businesses have remained largely unexplored in the literature. Historically, there had 
been a dynamic and close relationship between small businesses and the national 
authorities. The national authorities in Jakarta still continue to extend material 
benefits to small businesses for maintaining their political legitimacy. In return, 
small businesses have contributed to the political stability in Indonesia.  
 
Since implementation of decentralisation measures in 2001, the Indonesian political 
structure has changed, with closer political ties between local authorities and small 
businesses. Local governments have more authorities to regulate small business 
sector. In contrast, small business owners have a large opportunity to participate in 
the process of decision making. 
 
Political decentralisation involves the delegation of decision-making powers from 
the national government to sub-national governments. This provides a basis for self-
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government which leaves local governments free to make major decisions. In the 
process of decentralisation, local government bureaucrats and politicians may gain 
more power and resources over the local populace. Nonetheless, they must also 
depend on public support from local people and businesses for the successful 
implementation of their decision-making. This dissertation will examine the impact 
of Indonesia’s decentralisation on the relationship between local authorities and 
small businesses during 2001– 2009. It will investigate whether decentralisation 
policy in fact provides more power to district governments to control small 
businesses and whether decentralisation provides more opportunity for small 
business owners to participate in the process of decision making at local level. 
 
1. Background of the Study 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have emerged as an engine of growth in 
several developed and developing economies of the world (Prasad, 2004, p. v). In 
developed countries of Europe and America, SMEs contribute to economic 
development. SMEs comprise well over 90 percent of all enterprises in the Asia-
Pacific region. Additionally, they have an important economic role in the individual 
economies of East and Southeast Asia (Berry & Mazumdar, 1991). This is vital to 
creating employment, generating exporting opportunities, and as the source of future 
successful SMEs (Harvie, 2002a; Charles Harvie & Boon-Chye Lee, 2002).  In  
countries of East Asia, such as China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam, SME’s employment ranges from 
approximately 40 percent to 80 percent of the workforce. They also contribute 
around 50 percent of the region’s GDP and about 30 percent of direct exports 
(Charles Harvie & Boon-Chye Lee, 2002, p. 6). 
 
Although SMEs are important across the regions, there are differences in the role of 
SME’s in the various economies. For instance, SME’s play a larger structural role in 
South Korea, Taiwan, China, Japan, Thailand and Vietnam, where they contribute 
over 70 percent of employment. In Indonesia they contribute to around 40 percent. In 
addition, the contribution of SMEs to exports also varies. SMEs are more export 
oriented in China, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand than in Japan and Indonesia 
(Charles Harvie & Boo-Chye Lee, 2002). 
  
3 
 
 
 
Before further discussion of small businesses, it is important to try to define small 
business with the aim to provide the same concept and avoid ambiguity. There is no 
consensus on definition of SMEs. Definitions of SMEs differ widely among the East 
Asian economies, APEC and countries of the world, depending on the phase of 
economic development as well as social conditions. A number of indexes are utilized 
to define SMEs, such as number of employees, invested capital, total amount of 
assets, sales volume, and production capability. The most commonly used index, 
however, is the number of employees (Charles Harvie & Boon-Chye Lee, 2002). 
This study will use the number of employee and size of capital in defining small 
businesses because the data related small businesses in Indonesia is based on these 
criteria.  
 
In Indonesia, there are many definitions regarding small business. Different 
institutions adopt different definitions according to their respective purposes.  For 
instance, Law No. 20/2008 uses size of capital in defining small business. This 
criteria for defining small business equates to capital above 50 million rupiah up to 
500 million rupiah. Medium business is categorized as capital above 500 million 
rupiah up to 2.5 billion rupiah. These criteria are simple because they only use a 
single defining factor. A different definition of small business is proposed by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), which uses the number of employees.  Small 
business is thus defined according to this criteria as a business unit which has 
numbers of employees from 6 up to 19, while medium business has numbers of 
employees from 20 to 100. This criteria is also simple because it is only based on the 
number of employees. Like Law 20/2008, Bank Indonesia (B.I) uses the criteria of 
capital in defining small business. According to B.I. small business is characterised 
by capital less than Rp 600 million, excluding land and buildings. The Department of 
Industry and Trade uses capital in defining small business. Its’ criterion for defining  
small business refers to capital less than Rp 200 million excluding land and building 
(Kepmenperindag No. 254/MPP/Kep/7/1997). 
 
 I use combined criteria of capital and number of employee in defining small 
business, drawn from the criteria of capital based on Law No. 20/2008 and the 
criteria of the number of employee based on BPS.  These two criteria were issued by 
the Indonesian government when this study was commenced in 2008. I suggest that 
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combining two criteria is better than using just one. These dual criteria for SMEs 
will be used throughout this paper.  
 
The number of employees and size of capital is also used by developing economies 
countries in defining small business. Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Vietnam and 
Indonesia use those criteria. Japan, Korea and the Philippines slightly differ by using 
number of employees and assets criteria (Charles Harvie & Boon-Chye Lee, 2002, 
pp. 4-5).  
 
In Indonesia, the number of SMEs are around 97 percent of total enterprises,  
provided employment for 42 percent of the workforce and accounting for 10.6 
percent of total exports in 1999 (Charles Harvie & Boon-Chye Lee, 2002, p. 6). 
During 2005-2009, the Department of Cooperatives and SMEs reported that the 
number of SMEs continuously increased. In Indonesia, SMEs play important roles at 
least in three areas: Firstly, SMEs become the backbone in industrial development; 
secondly, they create many employment opportunities for local people, and thirdly 
they contribute to central and local government revenue from exported products.  
 
Business historically has played an important role in Indonesian political movements 
and economic development. For instance, during the Dutch colonialist period, 
Tirtoadisurjo founded Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Commercial Union) in 1909 
with the aim to promote the interest of indigenous business owners. In 1912 the 
organisation changed its name to Islamic Union, Sarekat Islam (SI) and extended its 
membership beyond the original trading association and Java (Ricklefs, 2001). By 
1920, SI was the largest nationalist organisation in the colony. 
 
In 1912 the Muhammadiyah was founded as a religious movement (rather than a 
political movement) by Haji Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta to reform Islamic 
ideologies and practices (Nakamura, 1976). He attempted to reform religious life in  
the Budi Utomo organisation because Budi Utomo members were priyayi 
(aristocrats) and abangan Moslems
1
(Ricklefs, 2001, p. 207). Although the 
Muhammadiyah was not a political party, many members such as Dahlan were also 
                                                 
1
 A Javanese term used to describe those whose adherence to Islam was seldom more than formal, 
nominal commitments (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 207). 
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involved in political parties such as Budi Utomo and Sarekat Islam (Nakamura, 
1976; Ricklefs, 2001). Muhammadiyah formally had no economic objectives but in 
practice many members of the organisation such as Dahlan had business interests. It 
is clear that Dahlan had commercial as well as religious purposes (Nakamura, 1976, 
p. 110). Even Muhammadiyah’s founders in the city of Kotagede were business 
owners (Nakamura, 1976, pp. 123-145). Many members were business owners and 
played an important role in political movements.  
 
Historically business has had an important role in the Indonesian political 
movements until 1920s. For example, Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah are tokens 
that business was linked with politics. The chairmen of Sarekat Islam and 
Muhammadiyah were involved in political activities. The relationship between 
politics and businesses in Indonesia was also developed in the early years of 
Indonesian independence (1945s). In 1945, the Soekarno government introduced the 
Benteng program that gave privileges to the indigenous business people in acquiring 
import licenses (Denny, 1999; Robison, 1987; Suryadinata, 1992). However, this 
program failed because the pribumi recipients of the Benteng program facilities 
tended not to be established importers, but were nonetheless politically connected 
with power holders and sold their licenses to Chinese importers (Mackie & Coppel, 
1976, p. 13). In contrast, the Chinese big businesses develop rapidly.   
 
When Soeharto came to power in 1967, his regime relied heavily on foreign 
investment and was closely linked to conglomerate businesses. However, after the 
unrest in the early 1970s Soeharto paid more attention to the poor through the 
provision of agricultural credit schemes. In the beginning of the 1980s when the 
government retained the profits from the oil boom, it launched Small Scale 
Investment Credit (Kredit Investasi Kecil or KIK) and Permanent Working Capital 
Credit (Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen or KMKP). However, the program is not 
optimal in achieving the goal of providing access to indigenous small businesses 
because small businesses often did not have sufficient collateral to obtain 
commercial loans  (Pagestu, 1996). When oil prices collapsed in the mid-1980s, the 
government introduced the ‘foster-parent program’ where large businesses were 
supposed to sub-contract a part of their work to small businesses. However, this 
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program failed because the small businesses produced low quality products and these 
products were subsequently rejected by the ‘foster’ businesses (Husaini, 1996).  
 
During both Soekarno’s and Soeharto’s regimes (1945-1997), a few programs that 
were introduced by the government were able to develop small businesses, but the 
large businesses fast became larger because they operated more efficiently. Other 
views have indicated that large business, especially Chinese business had tight 
family relationships. They grew well due to integration of firms with tightly knit 
family structure into well-developed credit and distribution networks, both in 
Indonesia and overseas (Robison, 1987). In contrast, Suryadinata (1992) argued that 
they could develop well because they collaborated effectively with power holders. 
 
The need for knowledge of small-scale enterprises in Indonesia has increased 
following the economic crisis in 1997 and socio-political upheavals in the years after 
Suharto’s resignation in 1998. Following the collapse of many large enterprises, the 
Indonesian government started to show increasing interest in the small-scale 
economic sector. They often viewed the sector as a ‘safety net’, generating 
employment for vulnerable groups by creating new opportunities for the working 
class and entrepreneurs in small towns and rural areas (Rutten, 2003). Yet 
information about the impact of the crisis on the small-scale enterprise sector was 
scattered and diverse. Some studies indicate that medium and small firms lost much 
of their market and reduced their workers (Rodriguez, 2002; Rutten, 2005). Yet other 
studies indicate that micro enterprise employment in Indonesia expanded 
immediately after the crisis (Berry, Rodrigues, & Sandee, 2001; Sandee & Lamotte, 
2002). Studies conducted on various sub-sectors such as food processing, garment 
industry, wooden furniture and business services in Java point out that some small-
scale firms were still able to boost their sales in both domestic and foreign markets 
(Akatiga, 2002). 
 
Generally, these studies suggest the strength of the small-scale sector in a time of 
crisis. During the economic crisis, small and medium businesses were able to 
survive. They point to the resilience and flexibility of medium and small enterprise, 
providing employment and income to the poor who lack sufficient means to cope 
with the crisis (Sandee & Lamotte, 2002, p. 25). On the whole, these studies indicate 
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that medium and small-scale enterprises have proven to be stronger in weathering the 
crisis than large companies. In particular, the small-scale firms operating in export 
markets benefited greatly during the economic crisis, not because of any real 
increase in productivity, but because the fall in the value of the rupiah caused 
production cost to fall (or at least not to rise) while income from export sales rose 
substantially (Akatiga, 2002; Sandee & Van Dierman, 2004). Thus, most small 
business exporters could survive during the economic crisis because they obtained 
benefit from exported products.  
 
Moreover, small businesses play an important role in daily economic activities at the 
local level by providing goods and services for local people. The majority of small 
businesses use local raw materials as input for their production (Akatiga, 2002, p. 
42). Therefore, local governments can help small businesses by facilitating the 
supply of local raw materials such as woods or leather. Local governments can also 
promote small businesses by providing financial assistance.  
 
After the Reformasi in 1998, the Central Government gave more power to local 
governments in managing many development sectors as well as in developing local 
autonomy. The shift of power from the central to local governments has the potential 
to promote democratization by allowing for greater responsiveness, 
representativeness and accountability in the processes of government (Antlov, 2003). 
Thus, local governments become closer to local communities. Presently, district 
heads are directly elected by local people. In this context, local politicians will look 
for support from the local voters to promote their political position. Owners and 
workers of small businesses in Indonesia are potential voters for the candidate 
running in elections for district head. Local politicians pay attention to the need of 
small businesses and open opportunity for them to participate in the process of 
decision making. 
 
Before the Reformasi period (1968-1998), the political system was centralized and 
authoritarian. The district heads (Bupati) were elected by local legislature members 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD) from 3 to 5 candidates, who would be 
nominated by the DPRD to the central government. The candidate who won a 
majority in election was not always appointed by the central government to be 
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district head (Law No.5 of 1974). In addition, local people did not directly elect 
DPRD, but elected a political party who then selected the district head. The election 
determined what percentage of the parliamentary seat each party would be allocated. 
Political party leaders would choose who will be put into the legislative assembly 
from the list of legislative candidates. Under the next president B.J. Habibie, there 
was change of the district head election system. The election system became more 
democratic.  
 
President Suharto was toppled on 21 May 1998 and replaced by B.J. Habibie, vice 
president. He carried out political reform due to public demands for democracy. 
Under Habibie’s regime, most of the governmental functions were delegated to local 
governments except for monetary and fiscal, securities affairs, foreign policies, 
justice, religious affairs and other strategic and national policies (Law 22/1999). 
According to this Law, the district heads were elected by the DPRD without 
intervention from the central government. Article 132 of Law 22/1999 on district 
head election became effective in 2001. 
 
President Habibie was replaced by Abdurrahman Wahid in 1999 who ruled 
Indonesia for just two years (1999-2001). The successor of Wahid as president was 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was a vice president under the Wahid government. At 
that time, there were public demands to revise Law No. 22 of 1999. As a result, 
President Megawati replaced Law 22/1999 by Law No. 32 of 2004 that became 
effective in 2005. According to this new law, the district head and mayor are directly 
elected by local people. In other words, the Indonesian government has operated 
under the crucial reform of political decentralisation since 2005.  
 
Moreover, the 2009 general election for national and local parliament members was 
based partly on a system of district elections in which candidates for parliament 
members should be known by the public. Politicians and political parties approached 
voters, including the owners and workers of local small businesses and generally 
made promises to help local small businesses. In this context, the local small 
business owners could use political parties and politicians to articulate their interests 
such as to promote local regulations that could support small businesses. In turn, 
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these developments expanded the political sphere such that local small business 
owners could participate in the process of political decision making. 
 
Administrative, fiscal and political decentralisation drives local government to seek 
new sources for supporting decentralisation. The local governments are required to 
increase their revenue generating capacity to implement local autonomy and to cope 
with decreasing subsidies previously granted by the central government. In general, 
locally derived revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah or PAD) was low in related to 
total district government’s income. As an example, in 87 percent of local 
governments, the PAD income contributed less than 10 percent of their total budget 
in 2002. In contrast, the PAD income contributed more than 50 percent of total 
district budgets for only 0.3 percent of local governments (Brojonegoro, 2004, p. 
136). Until 2009 data showed that local governments’ budgets were still highly 
dependent on central government subsidies. Therefore the question arises, can fiscal 
decentralisation drive local governments to generate locally owned revenue?   
 
The central government gives grants in form of specific grants and general grants to 
local governments, which have increased considerably in recent decades. The local 
governments now have greater discretionary power to use general grants. In addition, 
local governments have discretionary power to spend local tax incomes and levy 
incomes. However, the use of general grants, local taxes and levy incomes should be 
approved by local parliaments. And it is an open question whether local governments 
support local business sufficiently.  
 
Decentralisation does give more opportunities for local governments to use local 
potential resources in local economic development. Small business sector is one of 
potential resources at the local level. There are many small businesses both in the 
Bantul district (Central Java) and Gianyar districts (Bali) that act as local potential 
resources in generating district revenue. The local governments can obtain revenue 
from local levies or license fees from small business owners.  
 
However, during the decentralisation era, some scholars found that many regions 
developed new taxes as instruments to increase district government income. These 
created financial burdens and had other  harmful effects for the business sector 
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(Collongon, 2003; SMERU, 2002). Increasing taxes makes it difficult to imagine 
that local businesses could flourish. Some local bureaucracies also were not sensitive 
to the long term needs of local businesses. Colongon (2003), Sandee and Dierman 
(2004) both note that local governments lack the institutional capacity to develop 
policies for small businesses which led to inappropriate policies for local small 
businesses.  
 
Developing local businesses requires a politically stable climate, including clear 
regulation of labour and taxes. A survey conducted on 60 local governments in 20 
provinces by the Economic and Management Research Institute (LPEM), Faculty of 
Economics, University of Indonesia in 2002 found that only 10 local governments 
were supportive in promoting a productive local business climate through such 
initiatives a low tax/fee rate and simplify licensing for businesses (Brojonegoro, 
2004, p. 131). In fact the majority of local governments provided less support for the 
developing business sector.   
 
The role of local governments in developing small businesses increased as a result of 
decentralisation. Local governments have more power to promote and to facilitate 
small businesses. The relationship between local governments and local small 
business draws even closer under decentralisation policy. Small business owners 
hope to obtain financial and material assistance as well as lighter fees levies. The 
critical issue lies in whether local governments can in fact control small businesses. 
Another important issue is whether decentralisation does in fact provide more access 
for small businesses in the process of decision making. This relationship between 
local authorities and small business is not extensively explored in the literature.  
 
The relationship between state and business at national level in the case of Indonesia 
has been studied by scholars such as Robison (1987) and MacIntyre (1991). As an 
example, Robison (1987) found that the state facilitated the development of domestic 
business groups, which were encouraged to develop into big business groups and 
were subsequently able to influence the authoritarian centralized state structure 
during Suharto’s regime. In another study, MacIntyre (1991) found that the textile 
association was able to influence state policy. For an example, the Department of 
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Trade grants a monopoly to the association in import raw materials used by the 
spinning industry.  
 
This study focuses on the relationship between local government and business at 
local level. Two key questions arise here:  
(1) Can local governments develop and protect small business sector?; and  
(2) Are local business associations able to play an important role in the process 
of decision making? 
 
3. Significance of the Study 
This study seeks to fill the gaps in existing studies. Until recently, there have been 
two types of research on business-government relations at local level in Indonesia. 
One focuses on the dynamics of small business and the other focuses on government 
policies towards this sector. Studies on their dynamics have often been local studies 
from a bottom-up perspective, and have dealt with aspects of entrepreneurship and 
labour relations (I. Abdullah, 1994; Purwanto, 2004; Rutten, 2003; Tambunan, 
1994). Studies on government policies towards small business have focused mostly 
on policies at the national level, and employ a top-down perspective (Pagestu, 1996; 
Schiller & Schiller, 1997; Tambunan, 2000).  
 
During the decentralisation era, most studies of local development focused on 
political aspects: the development of civil society (Bruinessen, 2004; H.S. Nordholt, 
2003; Wiloso, 2004) or of local democracy (Hidayat & Antlov, 2004; Schiller, 
2003). Yet few studies have focused on the relationship between local government 
policy and small businesses. For instance, Marijan (2006) studied decentralisation 
and cluster industry policy in Indonesia with case studies in Sidoarjo and Pasuruhan, 
East Java. Pramusinto (2005) studied the dynamics of change in decentralisation and 
its implications for local government-business relations with focus on local 
corruption. He found that decentralisation cannot reduce corruption in the 
relationship between local government and the business sector. The studies 
mentioned above did not focus on the relationship between local government and 
small businesses as a result of decentralisation policy.   
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This study focuses on the impact of decentralisation on the relationship between 
local government and small business. It will examine the extent to which local 
government allocates its budget to assist and improve public services for small 
businesses and how far small businesses contribute to district government revenue. 
Furthermore, it will explore the extent to which political decentralisation policy 
creates opportunities for small business owners and business associations to be 
involved in the process of decision making as well as in political activities and 
whether small businesses are politicized by local authorities. By discussing these 
hopefully we will obtain a better understanding of the relationship between local 
government and small businesses. This study will also hopefully be valuable in 
assessing the implementation of decentralisation policy.  
 
4. Objective of the Study 
The objective of this research is to examine the impact of Indonesia’s 
decentralisation on the relationship between local government and small business 
from 2001 until 2009, with a focus on 2005-2009. This period is considered because 
Law 22/1999 commenced operation effectively in 2001. This law provided 
administrative and fiscal decentralisation to the district governments. This study 
seeks to examine the extent to which administrative and fiscal decentralisation give 
more power to local government in providing better public services for small 
businesses. 
 
Six years later this law was replaced by Law 32/2004, which was implemented in 
2005. This law provided political decentralisation to district governments through 
direct election for district heads (pilkada). Starting in 2005, political decentralisation 
changed the nature of relationship between the central and local government as well 
as the relationship between the local governments and local small businesses. Thus, 
this study seeks also to examine the extent to which small businesses owners can 
participate in the process of decision making and political activities. 
 
5. Research Questions 
The main issue of this research concerns how the decentralisation policy changes the 
relationship between district governments and small businesses. Based on this, 
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several research questions will be explored further in order to obtain a better 
understanding of the relationship between local government and small businesses.  
(1) To what extent does Indonesia’s decentralisation give more power to the local 
governments to serve and control small businesses?  
(a) To what extent do the district governments carry out local regulation reform 
to promote small businesses? 
(b) Can the district governments use regulations on local levies to control small 
businesses? 
(c) To what extent do district governments develop small business promotion 
policy?   
(2) Can political decentralisation drive district heads and political parties to be 
closer to small business owners and help them?  
(a) Have district heads responded the needs and interests of small business 
owners? 
(b) In what ways do local politicians approach small business owners with the 
aim to obtain votes in election of district head and local legislative member? 
(3) To what extent does political decentralisation create opportunities for small 
business owners to be involved in the process of decision making at district level 
thus they can articulate their interests? 
(a) Have business associations involved themselves in the process of decision 
making at district government level? 
(b) To what extent do small business owners participate in political parties as 
well as political activities? 
 
6. Organisation of Thesis  
Chapter One will discuss a theoretical framework on the relationship between local 
governments and small businesses. In the beginning of this chapter, it discusses the 
concepts of decentralisation. Then, it explores the typology of decentralisation and 
its impacts. Finally, it examines the potential impact of decentralisation on the 
relationship between local government and small businesses.  
 
Chapter Two will present a discussion on the social, economic and political setting 
of Bantul, a district within the major city of Yogyakarta in Central Java. This chapter 
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shows that the existing social, economic and political structures can influence the 
implementation of decentralisation and the dynamics of local political activities. 
 
Chapter Three provides an investigation of the social, economic and political setting 
of Gianyar. A district where there are many small businesses in province of Bali. 
This investigation examines how existing social, economic and political structures 
influence the dynamics of local political activities and the implementation of 
decentralisation. Gianyar is supported by trade, hotel and restaurant sector. 
Politically, in Gianyar local legislative members consists of nationalist parties.   
 
Chapter Four examines the impact of decentralisation on small businesses in Bantul 
district. This chapter explores the extent to which the district government regulates 
small businesses by developing policies on business license, local tax/levy and 
protection policies for small businesses. Furthermore, this chapter discusses how the 
local government promotes small businesses by providing financial assistance, 
training programs, technological assistance as well as infrastructure facilities. 
Finally, this chapter examines political influence of local authorities and politicians 
over small business owners as well as their participation in the process of decision 
making and political parties.  
 
Chapter Five explores the impact of decentralisation on small businesses in Gianyar. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, it discusses how the Gianyar 
district government regulates small businesses by revising business license permits 
policy and local tax/levy policy. Secondly, it examines how the district government 
promotes small businesses through providing financial assistance, training programs, 
material assistance as well as infrastructure facilities and market development. 
Thirdly, it explores political influence of local politicians on small businesses and 
examines the extent to which business associations participate in the process of 
decision making and the participation of small business owners in political party.  
 
Chapter Six presents the conclusions of this research. It discusses the comparison of 
the case studies of small business of Bantul and Gianyar, identifying similarities and 
differences as a result of the implementation of decentralisation policy.  
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7. Limitation of the Study 
There is one limitation of this study. The study only relates to small businesses 
owners chosen as sample in this survey. In Bantul district this survey took 60 small 
business owners (30 percent), whereas in Gianyar district, the survey focused on 
woodcraft small businesses and took 100 business owners (22 percent) as samples.  
 
8. Research Methodology 
It was not easy to investigate the relationship between local bureaucrats and small 
business owners by using questionnaires because respondents cannot deeply express 
their views. Therefore, the information of relationship is studied from in-depth- 
interview. By interviewing, a researcher could investigate the reason of each answer 
from respondents. In addition, a researcher could obtain detailed information from 
respondents regarding a certain case and their view of local government policy in 
relation to small businesses.   
 
8.1. Case Study Research 
A case study approach was chosen because this study will answer “how” and “why” 
questions as Yin  (2003)  argues. The question of how and why can lead a researcher 
to provide argumentative answer in detail. Moreover, case studies also emphasize 
detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events (Soy, 1997, p. 1). 
 
Several cases can provide description and comparisons  regarding small businesses-
local government relations as well as small businesses-political parties relations. The 
researcher recorded testimonies, stories, and illustrations which can be used in 
analysis. For instance, a story of financial and technological assistance from local 
government can be used to identify the relationship between local government and 
small busnesses owners.  
 
This research focuses on two districts rather than surveying many districts with the 
aim to examine whether decentralisation policy has different impact on different 
localities. On the outset the Bantul district is different from the Gianyar district in 
terms of social, economics and political settings. So, the important question is, 
whether the impact of decentralisation in Bantul is different from Gianyar. 
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8.2. Research Location  
This research was done in the Bantul district in province of Yogyakarta and Gianyar 
district in province of Bali. The characteristics of these locations are different. Bantul 
is different from Gianyar in terms of its politics, society and local economy. Political 
parties in Bantul are pluralist in nature. Some political parties are based on religious 
affiliation and others are based on secular nationalism. There are also local NGOs as 
well as local business associations. In Gianyar there are only two large secular 
nationalist parties, the Golkar party and the Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle 
(PDI-P party). In addition, the society of Gianyar is primarily homogenous in terms 
of religion and ethnicity. The structure of economy of Bantul is supported by 
agricultural sector (24 percent) whereas the structure of the economics of Gianyar 
depends on trade and the hotel and restaurant sectors (30 percent). The different 
social, economic and political aspect of these locations assists in the examination of 
whether decentralisation policy has different impact on different localities. 
 
Both Yogyakarta and Denpasar are famous tourism destinations in Indonesia. Many 
foreign and domestic tourists visit both cities because of their many famous 
attraction and beautiful places. There are average 5,751,080 tourists per year visit to 
Bali while the number of Bali population only 3.6 million in 2010 whereas the 
number of tourist who visited to Yogyakarta was 1,456, 980 in 2010. I argue that 
small businesses can play a vital role in promoting tourist destinations because they 
can offer various products for tourists.  
 
In addition, these two regions have adopted a patrimonialistic political culture in 
which personal connections predominate in local politics. For instance, in Gianyar, 
the district head comes from Puri (Royal House) who has strong political influence 
to Balinese people. The members of Gianyar Puri are an aristocratic family included 
in the Kshatriya caste. In Bali, the Kshatriya caste has high social status and is highly 
influential in Balinese society and towards the head of Desa Pakraman and Banjar. 
In Yogyakarta, the head of the Yogyakarta Special Province is a king called Sultan. 
Bantul is a district of Special Province of Yogyakarta which is influenced by 
patrimonialistic political culture. The Bantul district head, Idham Samawi is close to 
the Sultan and supports patrimonialistic culture. In addition, he developed a political 
dynasty in Bantul district. For instance, he supported his wife to be involved in 
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electing the Bantul district head in 2000. It is important to understand whether in two 
areas, Denpasar and Yogyakarta, with similar patrimonialistic political cultures, will 
have the influence on small businesses. 
 
Why was the Bantul District Chosen? 
There are three aspects which justify the research on the Bantul District. Firstly, 
Bantul district is one of five districts in the province of Yogyakarta occupied by 
17,911 small businesses with approximately 79,904 workers in 2007. Therefore, 
there is abundant information regarding small businesses in this region which can be 
studied. 
 
Secondly, since the promulgation of local autonomy, the local government of Bantul 
has paid much attention to small businesses, as for example through the 
establishment of the Gabusan Art Market with the aim of promoting small business 
owners. The local government has also helped small businesses by providing 
financial and material assistance, as well as market development. Thus, several types 
of assistances can be used to analyse local government policy in relation to small 
businesses. 
 
Thirdly, at the same time, political decentralisation has progressed rapidly in the 
region. Since Reformasi, the position of district head in Bantul has been filled by 
businessmen. This is significantly different from the previous New Order 
Government period (1968-1998) when the district heads of Bantul were all from 
military backgrounds. During the decentralisation era, the district head has become 
more responsive to the needs of small businesses especially in comparison to 
previous regime. The current district head of Bantul is from a journalistic, mass 
media background and son of the owner of the prominent Kedaulatan Rakyat daily 
newspaper in Yogyakarta.  
 
Why was the Gianyar District Chosen? 
The second location of research is Gianyar district in Bali. There are three reasons 
which justify my choice of the Gianyar district. Gianyar is one of nine districts of 
Bali, located about 30 kilometres north east of Denpasar city with a population of 
390,698 in 2008. Over 50 percent of the Gianyar population works in industries and 
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various trade sectors, and particularly small business sector. Most of small 
businesses of Bali were located in Gianyar, comprising 22,144 small businesses, 
which employed approximately 656,800 workers in 2008. Most of small businesses 
in Gianyar are concentrated on woodcraft in Tegallalang sub-district. Further, the 
growth of small business in Gianyar has been faster than other districts. Thus, much 
information of small businesses is available in Gianyar. This information is valuable 
to this study. 
 
Secondly, the district head of Gianyar gives his political attention to small-business 
by making a memorandum of understanding with the BNI Bank, which facilitates 
credit without collateral with low interest (Daily-newspaper-Bali-Pos, 9-7-2008; 
Daily-newspaper-Bisnis-Bali, 9-7-2008). The local government of Gianyar has also 
helped small businesses by providing training, developing markets and providing 
financial assistance for small business owners. The district head of Gianyar also had 
a business background experience. Types of policies regarding small businesses can 
be used to analyse the relationship between local government and small businesses. 
 
8.3. Data Collection Methods and Source of Data  
This study is based on qualitative and quantitative evidences. As suggested by Yin 
(2003, p. 15), case studies can mix two methods, yielding both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence. Data was gathered from the local bureaucracy, politicians and 
small business owners both in Bantul and Gianyar. Qualitative data was collected 
through in-depth interviews and documented methods whereas quantitative data was 
collected by survey and documented methods.  
 
8.3.1. Documentation Method 
The documentation method was used to collect data from national and local 
government. At national level, the relevant regulations include Law No. 20/2008 on 
Micro, Small, and Medium Scale Business (Undang-Undang tentang Usaha Mikro, 
Kecil, dan Menengah), Law 22/1999, Law 25/1999, Law 32/2004 and Law 33/2004. 
At the local level, the researcher studied local regulations (Peraturan Daerah, 
Perda) and Decrees of District Head (Keputusan Bupati) related to business sector. 
Documents were collected from the secretariat of the district governments, local 
government agencies and secretariat of local parliaments. 
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8.3.2. In-Depth Interview 
I prepared interview guides before going to field work in 2009. The field work was 
conducted from April to June 2009. Yin (2003:89) argues that the interviews are 
guided rather than structured conversations. The interview can be further developed 
during the process of fieldwork. The case study interviews were thus likely to be 
fluid rather than rigid. Interviews were conducted with local bureaucrats, local 
politicians, local small business owners, head of business association, heads of local 
communities, scholars and journalists who expert in small business. 
 
Local bureaucrats to be interviewed were selected according to structural position 
and function. In Bantul, the local bureaucrats interviewed included the District Head 
(Bupati), Vice District Head (Wakil Bupati), Secretary of District Government 
(Sekretaris Daerah), Head of Local Agency for Industry, Trade, and Cooperative 
(Dinas Industri, Perdagangan, dan Koperasi), Head of Local Board for Regional 
Development Planning (Bappeda), Head of Local Agency for Service of Licenses  
(Dinas Perijinan), and Head of Local Agency for Manpower (Dinas Tenaga Keja), 
Head of Local Agency for Law (Bagian Hukum) and Head of Agency for Local 
Finance and Assets (Dinas Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Aset Daerah). A list of 
interviewees can be seen in Appendix 3 
 
In Gianyar, local bureaucrats interviewed included the District Head, Vice District 
Head, Head of Local Agency of Industry and Trade, Head of Local Agency of 
Cooperative, Small and Medium Businesses (Dinas Koperasi, Usaha Kecil dan 
Menengah), Head of Local Board for Regional Development Planning  (Bappeda),  
Head of Local Board for Integrated Permit Services (Badan Pelayanan Perijinan 
Terpadu), and Head of Local Agency of Manpower (Dinas Tenaga Keja), Head of 
Local Agency of Law (Bagian Hukum), Head of Local Agency for District 
Government Revenue (Dinas Pendapatan Daerah) (Appendix 4).  
 
There are different names for similar local agencies between Bantul and Gianyar. As  
In Bantul for example, small businesses are serviced by the Local Agency for 
Industry, Trade, and Cooperatives, while in Gianyar they are serviced by the Local 
Agency of Cooperative, Small and Medium Businesses. Moreover, in Bantul, types 
of licences are issued by the Local Agency for Service of Licenses, whereas in 
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Gianyar they are issued by the Local Board for Integrated Permit Services. Finally, 
in Bantul, district government revenues and expenditure are serviced by the Agency 
for Local Finance and Assets, while in Gianyar they are managed by the Local 
Agency for District Government Revenue. 
 
The local politicians of Bantul who were interviewed included the heads of district 
parliament and of the industry and trade committee of local legislature. Chairpersons  
of five large political parties of Bantul were also interviewed, namely: Chairperson 
of the Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan (PDI-P); Chairperson of the Golkar Party, Partai Golkar; Chairperson of 
the Democrat Party, Partai Demokrat (PD), Chairperson of the National Mandate 
Party, Partai Amanat National (PAN), Chairperson of the Justice and Welfare Party, 
Partai Keadilan dan Sejahtera (PKS) (Appendix 3).  
 
In Gianyar there are two large political parties: Golkar party and PDI-P party. 
Therefore, the Chairperson of Golkar party and Chairperson of PDI-P party were 
interviewed for this research. The head of the local parliament and head of the 
industry and trade committee of the local parliament were also interviewed with the 
aim to explore the extent to which local legislature facilitated regulations to promote 
and assist small businesses (Appendix 4). 
The researcher interviewed some small businesses owners with the aim to 
understand the perception of small business owners on the district government policy 
and local regulations on small businesses. Beyond small business owners, the 
researcher also interviewed the chairperson of small business cooperatives and the 
chairperson of business associations (Appendix 4).. 
 
In Bantul,the researcher interviewed the Chairperson of Small Business Cooperative, 
Chairman of Bantul Craft Association, the Chairperson of Handicraft Local Board 
(Dekranas or Dewan Kerajinan Nasional), the Chairperson of Local Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (Kadinda or Kamar Dagang dan Industri Daerah),  the 
Chairperson of Indonesia Furniture Industry and Handicraft (Asmindo or Asosiasi 
Industri Permebelan dan Kerajinan Indonesia) and the Head of Export and 
Handicraft Association (ASEPHI) (Appendix 3). 
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In Gianyar, the researcher interviewed the Chairperson of Wood Association and 
Chairman of  Local Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadinda). The researcher 
also interviewed selected local small business owners to gain information regarding 
their businesses, their view of the role of local government in promoting small 
businesses and their view of the role of political parties in promoting small 
businesses (Appendix 4).  
 
In addition, the researcher interviewed scholars and journalists to obtain their 
perspectives on the relationship between small businesses and local government. In 
the Bantul district, the researcher interviewed: (1) W.U., a senior lecturer of Gadjah 
Mada University and an expert in local government; (2) P, the Dean of Faculty of 
Social and Political Sciences, Gadjah Mada University and an expert in local 
government and business affairs (Appendix 3). In the Gianyar district, the researcher 
interviewed: (1) D.A., the Director of Bali International Institute of Tourism 
Management and an expert in small businesses; and (2) M.Y., senior lecturer and an 
expert in small business at Faculty of Economics, Udayana University, Denpasar 
(Appendix 4). 
 
In regards to local media, in Bantul district, the researcher interviewed B.S., a senior 
journalist of Kompas daily, the largest national daily newspaper and N.H., a senior 
journalist of the largest local daily newspaper, Kedaulatan Rakyat to gain their 
perception on the relationship between local government and small business 
(Appendix 3). In the Gianyar, the researcher interviewed two journalists of Bisnis 
Bali daily newspaper, the largest local (Appendix 4).  
 
In Bantul, the Dukuh (head of hamlet) and Heads of RT (Head of neighbourhood 
association) were interviewed (Appendix 3). In the case of Gianyar, the researcher 
interviewed the Kelian
2
 (Heads of Banjar or Association of local customary 
community) and the Bandese (Head of Desa Pakraman or Head of Customary 
Village) (Appendix 4). 
 
                                                 
2
 Head of local customary community is called Kelian. There are two types of Kelian. Kelian Adat 
and Kelian Dinas. Kelian Adat serves the needs of customary community such as funeral and 
wedding ceremonies, whereas Kelian Dinas serves official duties such as Resident Identity Card. 
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8.3.3. Survey methods 
The researcher used a survey method for collecting data with the aim of gaining a 
better understanding of the responses of small business owners to the local 
government policy and political parties. However, due to difficulties in obtaining 
precise data on total number of small businesses both in Bantul and Gianyar, it was 
difficult to determine the exact total number of the sample, in order to representative. 
Dinas Industri, Perdagangan dan Koperasi or Diperindagkop (Local Agency of 
Industry, Trade, and Cooperative) of Bantul, was supposed to responsible for data on 
the number of small business owners, but the local agency did not separate between 
the total number of micro and small businesses unit. Dinas Koperasi, Usaha Kecil 
dan Menengah (Local Agency of Cooperative, Small and Medium Businesses) of 
Gianyar also combined the number of micro and small businesses units. Therefore, 
total small businesses could not be identified precisely.   
 
Based on secondary data and interview results with local bureaucrats, it was seen 
that small businesses of Bantul were concentrated on ceramics and woodcraft. 
However, in Gianyar most of the small businesses were concentrated on woodcraft. 
This study is focused on ceramic and woodcraft small businesses of Bantul and 
woodcraft small businesses of Gianyar as the unit analysis.  
 
Most small businesses of Bantul were located in Kasihan and Imogiri sub-districts 
and most small businesses of Gianyar were concentrated in Tegallalang sub-district. 
Therefore, the survey was focused on Kasihan and Imogiri sub-districts in Bantul 
and Tegallalang sub-district in Gianyar. Respondents were selected by random 
sampling, where each unit in the population to be covered has a calculable 
probability of being selected. As discussed above, the local governments had only 
data which was the combined total of micro and small businesses. However, 
according to secondary data from Bantul and Gianyar, the total of micro and small 
businesses in Kasihan and Imogiri was 397 in 2008. The total for micro and small 
businesses in Tegallalang was 450 in 2008. Based on my observations during 
fieldwork in 2009, the total of micro businesses was larger than that of small 
businesses.  Therefore, it can be argued that the total of small businesses of Kasihan 
less than 200 and the total of small businesses of Tegallalang was also less than 225. 
The surveys involved 60 small business owners (30 percent) in Kasihan and Imogiri 
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sub-district in Bantul (Appendix 5) and 100 small business owners (22 percent) in 
Tegallalang sub-district of Gianyar (Appendix 6). The sample size over 20 percent of 
total population is accurate. In the case studies, the focus is more on depth and 
intensity rather than sample size (Gilbert, 1993, p. 155). I argue that respondents can 
provide accurate information on the relationship between local government and 
small business in this study. It may be concluded that data collection method can be 
instrument to obtain accurate data for answering the research question as discussed 
above. 
 
8.4. Method of Data Analysis 
Collected data was analysed by qualitative and quantitative analysis. The researcher 
used a combined socio-economic and socio-political approach in analysing data. 
Data collected by interviews was analysed by qualitative method by presenting 
interview results related to the certain case. Survey and document data are analysed 
by quantitative methods such as cross tabulation and percentage.  The next chapter 
discusses theoretical framework with the aim to theoretically answer the research 
questions.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:  
DECENTRALISATION AND SMALL BUSINESS 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to identify analytical frameworks for explaining the causal 
relationships between decentralisation measures and small business activities. 
Decentralisation can cause local governments to have more power over 
administrative functions as well as over fiscal policy and political processes. With 
administrative decentralisation, local governments can have more discretionary 
functions to improve public services and develop specific local agencies to help 
small businesses. With fiscal decentralisation, districts governments have 
discretionary policy to provide financial and infrastructure assistance for them. With 
political decentralisation, elected local officials can make policy independent of the 
national government and local residents are able to hold elected local officials to be 
accountable for their performance.         
 
The layer of government closest to the people, namely the local government system, 
helps shape the wave of decentralisation around the globe. With more than three 
quarters of world’s countries already proceeding with some form of power 
delegation to sub-national government by the mid-1990s (Beall, 2005, p. 30), this 
upsurge of decentralisation has given rise to the search for new dynamic roles of sub-
national governments in efficient and fair governance. If political resources and 
opportunities are in the hands of the central government, national authority would be 
less likely to be responsive and accountable for locally specific needs. But, if 
decision-making powers and fiscal capacity is delegated from national to sub-
national levels, sub-national government will be potentially capable of responding to, 
and being accountable for the needs of local community. The transfer of authority 
and responsibility from the central government to lower levels of governments is a 
core part of the decentralisation process (Richard M.  Bird & Vaillancourt, 2008; De 
Vries, 2000; Eaton, 2001). Decentralisation policy provides local government with 
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more discretionary power to meet the needs of local communities. As a result, the 
local government becomes closer to local communities and local businesses.  
 
The decentralisation policy is likely to cause a significant change in the relationship 
between local government and small businesses. As the central government transfers 
functions to local governments, local governments’ functions will increase. 
Decentralisation functions allows local government to become a direct service 
provider to the local communities including small businesses and helps to increase 
opportunities for small businesses to participate in policy making at a local level. 
Decentralisation policy may also bring small businesses under regulatory control by 
local government.   
 
The main question of this research is: how does decentralisation policy change the 
relationship between local government and small businesses? Here I will break it 
into more detailed questions such as: Whether the district governments can control 
small businesses. To what extent do district governments improve public services for 
small businesses? Do local authorities have political influence over small 
businesses? To what extent does decentralisation empower small businesses to 
influence local authorities through participating in the process of decision-making at 
the local level? 
 
This chapter focuses on the theories of decentralisation that are used to explain the 
impact of decentralisation on small businesses. The impact of decentralisation will 
be analysed by three types of decentralisation: administrative, fiscal and political 
decentralisation as proposed by World Bank (1999) and Falleti (2005). Using one 
type of decentralisation is not sufficient to explain the relationship between local 
government and small business in the context of decentralisation because each type 
provides partial explanation in relation to the decentralisation. Therefore, this study 
combines three types of decentralisation with the aim to better understand the impact 
of decentralisation. I believe that this study differs from previous studies on 
Indonesian decentralisation because in previous studies by Bruinessen (2004); 
Hidayat & Antlov  (2004); Wiloso (2004) only focused on political decentralisation. 
Dwiyanto (2002, 2003) only emphasized administrative and political 
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decentralisation, whereas Marijan (2006), Pramusinto (2005) and SMERU (2002) 
explored only administrative and fiscal decentralisation.   
 
This chapter consists of six sections. The first section reviews the concept of 
decentralisation. Discussing the concept of decentralisation is important to ensure 
consistency in the use of this concept because decentralisation is an ambiguous word 
with many different meanings. The second explores the typology of decentralisation 
with the aim of looking at the patterns and scope of that phenomenon. The third 
section examines the implementation of administrative decentralisation.  This section 
is intended to promote better understanding of how functions/tasks are delegated by 
a central government to sub-national governments. The fourth examines the 
implementation of fiscal decentralisation with the aim of exploring the extent to 
which fiscal decentralisation increases local governments’ financial discretion and 
increases the efficiency and equity of public services. The fifth explores the 
implementation of political decentralisation for local policy-making processes. This 
section will discuss the possibility of public participation in local agenda-setting, 
policy formation and implementation. It also examines the emergence of 
politicization in local community affairs as a result of political decentralisation. The 
sixth section examines the implementation of administrative, fiscal and political 
decentralisation specifically with regard to the relationship between local 
government and local small businesses, proposing an alternative model which differs 
with previous studies. My contribution is to study the relationships between local 
government and small businesses in the two different regions of Gianyar and Bantul  
to obtain a more comprehensive analysis. For researchers, this study sheds light on 
the neglected areas in studies of Indonesia’s decentralisation and provides a new 
perspective in understanding the impact of decentralisation on small business. 
 
1.2. Understanding the Concept of Decentralisation 
Decentralisation has been assigned many different meanings and definitions in 
studies of public administration and politics. It is an ambiguous word. It is important 
to present the terminology of decentralisation which in turn can facilitate comparing 
the different meanings of decentralisation (Dubois & Fattore, 2009)). In a political 
sense, decentralisation is a devolution of autonomous political and fiscal power from 
the central government to lower levels of government (O' Nell, 2003, p. 1070). 
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Decentralisation can be defined broadly not only as a type of organisational 
relationships within the public sector but also that between the public sector and 
private sector (Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983, p. 18).   
Decentralisation is the transfer of planning, decision making, or administrative 
authority from the central government to its field organisations, local 
administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organisations, local 
governments, or non-governmental organisations. 
 
From this perspective, decentralisation is not only a transfer of authority from central 
to local government, but also a transfer of authority from national government to 
organisations beyond government, such as semi-autonomous and private 
organisations. 
 
This study will follow Crook and Mannor (1998, p. 6) who define decentralisation 
more narrowly as the transfer of power by the central government to different sub-
national levels of government. That definition is clear and relevant to my study, as 
my focus is only on government organisation. In this study, I refer to decentralisation 
as a transfer of power from the central government to the district governments – the 
regencies and municipalities (kabupaten and kota). The case studies in this thesis 
will explore the transfer of power from the central government to two district 
governments in Bantul and Gianyar, with the aim to account for the similarities and 
differences of the impact of decentralisation on small business.  
 
But why do modern nation-states delegate decision-making authority to lower levels 
of government? In the early 1950s, newly independent countries in the Third World 
such as Indonesia, Philippines and India began to build modern nation-states. State-
led development in most Third World countries was initially intended to gain 
momentum through top-down national leadership. The modernization drive of 
nation-building and economic development in Asia-African countries was thus led 
by central control in accordance with the economic growth theory of economic 
development
3
 in the late 1940s. The ultimate objective of these late-developers was 
to maximize their gross national product by shifting from labour intensive to capital 
intensive industrialization. The policy was prescribed by the World Bank to promote 
                                                 
3
 For instance, Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurkse argues that industrialization and mobilization of 
international capital is necessary to raise income in under-developed countries (Hunt, 1989).  
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modernization and accelerate social and political change (Rondinelli & Cheema, 
1983, p. 12). 
   
By the end of the 1960s, however, the state-led economies had largely failed to 
achieve the expected goals as economic growth remained sluggish in most Third 
World countries during that decade. Equally important, income disparities between 
the rich and poor in developing countries widened and developmental gaps among 
regions worsened. This was not only because state intervention was ineffective, but 
also because it was in capable of promoting equitable growth among communities 
within developing countries. In the patterns of recent development, policy decision-
making related with the needs of local communities is uniformly defined by the 
central government. As a result, local governments had difficulty in implementing 
the decisions because of a lack of support for locally specific needs. The centrally 
defined policies were not necessarily in accordance with the needs of local 
communities. In turn, the uniformly imposed policies had little positive impact on 
regional development. Subsequently, in the early 1970s, policy makers in many 
developing countries, such as the Philippines (1967),
4
 China (1980),
5
Chile (1974)
6
 
and Mexico (1976)
7
 began to adopt a decentralisation system to achieve equitable 
growth. Decentralisation allows sub-national governments to make development 
planning based on local needs and resources. In addition, it opens up more political 
opportunities for local citizens to participate in decision making process. The 
decentralisation policy in Indonesia is expected to provide district governments with 
more structures to play an important role in local developmental planning and 
provide more opportunities for local citizens to be involved in decision making 
process.  
 
The important question is: what factors simply drive the emergence of 
decentralisation? The literature identifies a set of determinants for the adoption of 
                                                 
4
 In 1967, President Marcos enacted Republic Act No. 5185 regarding decentralization act.  
5
 Fiscal decentralization in China started in 1980 but fiscal decentralization reduces provincial 
economic growth as found by (Zhang & Zou, 1998).  
6
 In 1974, the Chile government enacted Law No. 573. According this Law, municipalities were 
considered territorially decentralized units in terms of the formal sense, but still influenced strongly 
from the central government. 
7
The government of Mexico introduced decentralization policy under President José López Portillo 
(1976-1982). Then, a series of political and administrative reforms was continued by President 
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988). 
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decentralisation measures. These determinants will be discussed in this section. After 
discussing these we will understand which determinants are relevant to the 
emergence of decentralisation in Indonesia. However, there is a possibility that the 
emergence of decentralisation may be caused by combined many determinants 
because decentralisation is multi-dimensional and complex.  
 
Possible determinants for adopting decentralisation are as follows: Firstly, 
decentralisation can be understood as the outcome of a political bargaining between 
national politicians – presidents and legislators - and sub-national politicians, each 
having somewhat conflicting preferences. Political parties provide the medium 
through which such bargaining takes place among them (Willis, Garman, & 
Haggard, 1999). Decentralisation results from bargaining amongst politicians at 
different levels of government to obtain power and financial benefits. It can be 
adopted because of strong demand from political parties at local levels. It may be 
thus designed to ease challenges emanating from the lower levels of government. 
 
Secondly, decentralisation is seen as the consequences of strategic electoral 
calculation by political parties. Political parties and individual party politicians tend 
to prefer decentralisation if they predict their future electoral success to be better at 
the sub-national level than the national level. In contrast, they tend to choose a 
centralised system if they predict that they will be able to control power at the 
national level (O' Nell, 2003). By gaining an electoral victory at the sub-national 
level, parties will be able to hold power in both the executive and legislative sectors. 
That being the case, political parties will have better access to public resources to be 
used as material incentives to the local constituencies. In this example the main 
factor of decentralisation derives from the political opportunities for political parties 
to hold real power at sub-national levels, even though they may lose control at the 
national level.  
 
Thirdly, according to Eaton (2001), decentralisation is adopted because 
democratically elected officials at lower levels of government demand 
decentralisation measures as a means to increase their decision-making authority.  
However, Bird and Vaillancourt (2008) argue that the success of such sub-national 
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demand is less likely in authoritarian systems such as in China, because the central 
government is weakly responsive to sub-national pressure.  
 
Fourthly, decentralisation could occur as a result of a legitimacy crisis. Based on 
comparisons of decentralisation in Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela, it was argued 
that decentralisation was driven by the elite recognition that the political system had 
been in danger of collapse and thus required decentralisation for the solution 
(Gonzalez, 2008). In this sense, decentralisation can be seen as a way to restore 
citizens’ trust in government by building greater participation and accountability 
(Gonzalez, 2008). By decentralizing power to local governments, a policy to meet 
the needs and preferences of local citizens is to be in the hands of local governments. 
Policy makers who are closer to local citizens can better understand their needs and 
preferences than the central government. Political decentralisation also opens greater 
opportunities for local citizens to be involved in the process of decision making and 
can thus increase the trust local citizens have in the government. In the Philippines 
and Indonesia, decentralisation was adopted following the sudden collapse of 
authoritarian regimes, such as that of Marcos in 1986 and of Soeharto in 1997 
(World-Bank, 2005).  
 
Fifthly, decentralisation may result from pressure from international agencies such as 
the World Bank. The World Bank, for example, played an important role in 
promoting decentralisation in Latin American countries, especially during the 1990s 
(Stalling, 1992, 1995). The World Bank believes that sub-national governments’ 
investment will significantly contribute to growth in per capita income in developing 
countries. Fiscal decentralisation will then be required to provide sub-national 
authorities with fiscal capacity for their investment. Increased per capita income of 
people in regions of developing countries will create a potential market for products 
from capitalist developed countries such as the US and West European countries.   
 
After discussing possible determinants of decentralisation above, I try to identify 
what determinants apply with regard to emerging decentralisation in Indonesia. I 
argue that decentralisation was caused by a legitimacy crisis of the Soeharto regime 
in 1997 (World-Bank, 2005). Following the economic crisis in 1997, the Indonesian 
government faced political crisis in 1998, then the successor, Habibie carried out 
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decentralisation policy in 1999 by introducing Law 22/1999. Besides that, 
decentralisation policy was also driven by pressure from international agencies such 
as the World Bank. International donors have recently shifted to supporting better 
governance and with it, greater local participation and autonomy (Asian-
Development-Bank, 2001). 
 
Decentralisation policy can create a greater opportunity for local citizens and local 
social and business groups to participate in the process of decision making. Local 
decisions can thus be accordance with their needs. If decision-making powers and 
fiscal capacity is delegated from the central government to sub-national level, sub-
national governments will be potentially capable of being responsive to, and 
accountable for the needs of local citizens, local social and business groups.   
 
A nationwide political crisis tends to create popular pressure for the delegation of 
power to localities. Based on political experiences in many countries, such as the 
Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea, Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela, I believe 
that the emergence of decentralisation is largely driven by political crises at the 
national level. The political elites at the national level had no other way but to seek 
to restore order and respond to societal demands for delegating power to local 
governments. In relation to small business, the important question is how 
decentralisation policy can be made relevant. As discussed above, one of reasons for 
decentralisation derives from citizen demands for the delegation of power to their 
local authorities and communities. Once decision-making authority is delegated to 
sub-national levels of government, a number of sub-national actors, including small 
businesses, put pressure on sub-national governments to meet each of their different 
preference and needs. This raises several questions. Does local government provide 
access for local citizens to participate in the process of decision making? In the case 
studies, does decentralisation policy increase small businesses’ ability to petition or 
lobby elected district heads and local legislators for protecting and promoting their 
interest? Does decentralisation policy really provide much benefit for local citizens 
including small businesses? 
 
In this context of decentralisation that drives the Third World, there are two relevant 
schools of thought regarding the benefits of decentralisation, name the economic 
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approach that emphasizes administrative efficiency, and the political approach that 
aims to ensure social equity (Smith, 1985, p. 4). Schönwälder (1997, p. 757) uses the 
terms “pragmatic approach” and “political approach”- parallel to those two different 
efficiency vs equity approaches. The pragmatic approach is synonymous with the 
economic approach, which draws heavily on the theory of fiscal federalism (Hayek, 
1945; Oats, 1972, 1999; Tiebout, 1956) and is supported by economists and 
specialists in the field of public administration. According to this approach, 
decentralisation is a strategy to increase the efficiency of service delivery. Its 
proponents argue that people’s interest and needs vary from one part of a country to 
another so that local officials must know more about what local community needs 
rather than national officials.  
 
Hayek (1945) discusses the use of local knowledge to support the decision making 
process. Local governments have better access to local information, so that they can 
provide better public goods and services which are in accordance with local 
preferences and needs. Tiebout (1956) argues that under fiscal decentralisation and 
inter-jurisdiction competition in minimizing local taxes and maximizing public 
services, citizens can vote to stay in a region which provides better public services. 
Different local governments can offer different public tax-expenditure bundles, and 
citizens can exit from local governments that provide unsatisfactory services and 
taxes, and then move to another region which provides better welfare and public 
services. Oats (1972) developed a theory of fiscal federalism, stressing the capacity 
of a decentralised government to improve resource allocation in the public sector 
through the diversification of public outputs in accordance with local needs. Through 
the appropriate assignment of taxes and expenditures by the various levels of 
governments, community welfare can be improved.  
 
In contrast, proponents of the political approach argue that the principal goal of 
decentralisation is not to increase administrative efficiency, but to provide broader 
opportunities for public participation, thus ensuring social equity (Crook & Mannor, 
1998; Nzouankeu, 1994; Smith, 1985). They accept the economists’ argument that 
autonomous local governments are more able to deliver services efficiently than a 
centralized government, but they criticize the economic approach for diverting 
attention away from the issues of political participation (Malley, 2003, p. 102).    
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In practice, administrative efficiency and participatory democracy are often 
diametrically opposed. Efforts to achieve efficiency often impede participation and 
efforts to encourage participation often compromise efficiency. The ideal goal of 
decentralisation is to provide benefits by increasing both efficiency of public 
services and public participation simultaneously. Public services provided by local 
government can reflect local communities’ needs, as local community members are 
able to have access to participate in decision making processes. So, it is important to 
create political institutions based on democratic elections that facilitate the process 
of political participation (Malley, 2003, p. 104). 
 
As discussed above, decentralisation is a transfer of authority and power from the 
central government to sub-national governments.
8
 The next question is, to what 
extent authority is delegated by the central government to sub-national governments. 
According to Bailey (1999) and Cheema & Rondinelli (1983),  national government 
can devolve responsibility to sub-national government with or without decision 
making powers. The former is called devolution in which local government has the 
ability to make operational decisions within set policy parameters. The latter is 
deconcentration which is a transfer of function to lower levels of government 
without delegation of decision-making power. 
 
Devolution involves the transfer of functions and decision-making from the central 
government to local governments. Thus, sub-national government officials have 
authority to make decisions, which can reflect local people’s preferences since local 
governments are closer to people and more responsive to various demands. Locally 
elected council persons hold chief executives and their local administration 
accountable for their decision-making. Deconcentration involves the redistribution of 
responsibility from the central government to sub-national governments without 
transferring the authority to make decisions or exercise discretion. The local 
government officials merely implement what has been decided by the central 
government officials. Therefore, officials at the local level neither have access to 
decision-making nor learn much about policy-making. The decision-making might 
                                                 
8
 Authority is a power based upon certain legitimacy, justification, and the right to exercise it. 
Authority is often used interchangeably with the term of "power", but power simply refers to the 
ability to achieve certain ends with or without justification or rights. 
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not reflect preferences of local people because it had been made by the central 
government officials. Deconcentration is the weakest form of decentralisation 
whereas devolution is a strong form of decentralisation from the view point of local 
accountability. However, degree of decentralisation will be an approximation to the 
ideal type of deconcentration or to the ideal type of devolution. 
 
Based on the discussion above, I would expect that devolution provides greater roles 
for local government to make decisions in accordance with the needs of local small 
businesses. However, policies undertaken by local governments toward the same 
policy areas will be quite different across regions, since local capacity varies under 
the same measure of devolution. In my study for instance, local government policies 
to promote small businesses are expected to be different between the two research 
sites, Bantul and Gianyar, because of differences in the capacity of local resources 
and the capacity of small business’ needs. The relationships between decentralisation 
and small businesses activities will be discussed in section number of 1.7 in this 
chapter. 
 
To articulate the patterns and nature of both devolution and deconcentration, we 
need to further discuss the discrete types of decentralisation. The following section 
will discuss a typology of decentralisation as a base in analysing the impact of 
decentralisation. Based on the typology we can systematically classify various 
impacts of decentralisations in the next section.   
 
1.3. Typology of Decentralisation 
The conventional World Bank analysis of decentralisation focuses on its 
administrative, fiscal, and political dimensions (World-Bank, 1999, p. 108). 
Following this convention, Falleti (2005, p. 329) suggests that there are three types 
of decentralisation: administrative decentralisation, fiscal decentralisation and 
political decentralisation. By using three types of decentralisation, it easily identifies 
the impact of decentralisation on small businesses. However, in a practical sense the 
impact of each of type decentralisation overlaps each other.       
 
In practice, the degree of implementation of administrative, financial and political 
decentralisation can be different according to the capacity of each region. This is 
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called asymmetric decentralisation. The number of decentralised functions that are 
given to the local governments may be different among regions due to different 
financial capacity of each region, and refers to an asymmetric administrative 
decentralisation (Richard M. Bird, 2003, p. 9). Moreover, asymmetric fiscal 
decentralisation is related to authority of local government that given by central 
government in tax policy. As an example, Basque and Namara regions in Spain were 
given authority to administer taxes locally such as income, corporate and inheritance 
and wealth taxes (Garcia-Mila & McGuire, 2002, p. 5). Asymmetric political 
decentralisation is relation to degree of opportunity for local community to elect 
district head. In China, as an example, sub-national government were given authority 
in administrative and fiscal discretion but head of local government was appointed 
by Communist Party (Chien, 2008, 2010).  
 
These three types of decentralisation will nevertheless be used as an analytical 
framework to look at the efficiency and equity of decentralisation-driven practices in 
the Bantul and Gianyar districts, with the aim to understand why the similarities and 
differences exist between the two districts in terms of the impact of decentralisation 
on small business. The following section is to examine the typology and to identify 
the relevance of each type of decentralisation to its impact on small business. 
 
1.3.1. Administrative Decentralisation 
Administrative decentralisation involves the sharing of responsibilities between 
central and sub-national governments. It comprises a set of policies that transfer the 
administration and delivery of public services such as health, education, public work 
and social welfare to lower levels of government (Falleti, 2005, p. 329). This is a 
linkage process in which the national government increases the ability and discretion 
of local administration for service delivery. In other words, administrative 
decentralisation is the transfer of functional responsibilities from the central 
government to local governments. It can be measured by the extent to which sub-
national government has functional responsibilities.  
 
The implications of administrative decentralisation for administrative efficiency and 
social equity are as follows: firstly, sub-national governments become functionally 
autonomous and central authorities are normally unable to exercise direct control 
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over the implementation of service delivery. Secondly, local governments need to 
secure financial resources to perform their functions. Thirdly, local governments 
must build its policy capacity to provide services to local citizens. Finally, the central 
government depends on local government for the successful implementation of 
national policy (Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983, p. 22). Administrative decentralisation 
can be understood as the pure form of deconcentration. That being the case, while 
the way of providing public services is nationally defined, sub-national authorities 
may have some functional discretion to the extent that national government is unable 
to monitor the sub-national performance. Although they may not have sufficient 
independent fiscal capacity to provide services, they have some functional discretion 
to meet locally specific needs that called devolution.  
 
Administrative decentralisation is a necessary condition for sub-national 
governments to learn to translate policy objectives into practice and turn practice into 
desired outcomes. However, this is not sufficient to achieve the efficiency and social 
equity of decentralisation goals without subsequent fiscal decentralisation. The 
following section will discuss fiscal decentralisation.      
 
1.3.2. Fiscal Decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation refers to a set of policies designed to increase the financial 
discretion or fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments. This is a linkage process 
that relates the national treasury to increased autonomy and capacity of local finance 
(Falleti, 2005). Degrees of fiscal decentralisation can be measured by the extent to 
which sub-national governments have discretion to make decisions related to local 
taxes/levies rising. According to  Bahl (1999), if the items and rates of local taxes are 
decided by local authorities, they are more likely to reflect the financial capacity of 
local communities to pay and the local tax payers are more willing to meet the fiscal 
need. In relation to local public spending, local governments are responsible for 
allocating public resources equitably as well as efficiently (Zhang, 2006), 
 
However, to ensure social equity, fiscal equalization is required across a wide range 
of sub-national governments. This equalization arrangement has the potential for 
undermining the fiscal discretion that decentralisation measures wish to increase. 
Here it is necessary to develop an appropriate arrangement for national transfer 
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payments to lower levels of government because it can assure adequate revenue for 
sub-national governments to provide more and better services to their residents. In 
general the forms of intergovernmental fiscal transfer include general purpose 
transfers and specific purpose transfers. General transfer payments carry fewer 
national requirements than specific transfer payments. General or block payments, 
thus allows localities greater discretion to advance local autonomy. 
 
The aims of the fiscal transfer are to bridge the vertical fiscal gaps, improve 
horizontal fiscal balance and fund national priorities. This provides the potential for 
re-centralization to the extent that national transfer payments place sub-national 
authorities in a position to simply implement national policy.  
 
In relation to vertical gaps, transfer payments from the central government to sub-
national governments will reduce the financial capacity of the central government, 
but they can also increase the financial capacity of sub-national governments. 
Transfer payments can also reduce horizontal gaps between rich and poor regions 
because regions with little fiscal capacity to meet their fiscal need may receive 
transfer payments from the central government. Nonetheless, the central government 
can transfer national funds with strings attached as it directs sub-national 
governments to develop a certain sector for national priorities. In this study, the 
district governments of Bantul and Gianyar received transfer payments from the 
central government in the form of a DAU fund (general grants), a DAK fund 
(specifict grants), and shares of tax revenue and natural resources from the national 
government, as it will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.     
 
As highlighted by Bird and Vaillancourt  (2008, p. 3) fiscal decentralisation can 
improve efficiency in the use of public resources because well-informed decisions 
about public expenditure can be taken by a local government to meet locally specific 
needs. But attention needs to be directed to the consequences of fiscal 
decentralisation that different sub-national governments can differ over how much to 
raise their funds and how to spend their revenue. As a result, there will be 
competition among regions in providing the better tax-to-service ratio. Without a 
national transfer to sub-national governments, fiscal decentralisation promotes 
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competition among sub-national governments for limiting taxing power and 
maximizing their service delivery (Tiebout, 1956). 
 
Therefore, fiscal decentralisation in terms of devolution can improve the efficiency 
and quality of public services. On the other hand, fiscal decentralisation can also 
increase fiscal gaps among regions and thus undermine social equity. However, 
competition among regions, as suggested by Tiebout, is less likely to occur in 
Indonesia because local tax items and local tax rates are nationally defined and 
standardized
9
 except for local levy rates which are fixed locally by sub-national 
governments.  
 
There are certain pre-conditions for local governments to implement successful fiscal 
decentralisation. Bahl (1999, p. 61) cites several. First, there need to be elected local 
legislators so that citizens can express their preferences through elections and hold 
legislators accountable. Secondly, local governments must have some significant 
taxing power, so that local governments can set tax rates and adjust both the level of 
the budget and the cost of services. Thirdly, local governments must have a 
significant degree of autonomy in determining service levels. To this end, local 
governments must have freedom to choose how they allocate their revenue resources 
among competing expenditure demands. Fourthly, local governments must have the 
administrative capacity to collect those revenue sources that are assigned to it. In the 
case of Indonesia, district governments have not yet been given their legal authority 
to create a new local tax beyond that stipulated in Law No. 34/2000.    
 
Administrative and political decentralisation is more likely to be implemented 
effectively to achieve the goals of efficiency and equity if local governments have 
sufficient financial capacity. Both administrative decentralisation and political 
decentralisation are interrelated with fiscal decentralisation. With this in mind, I will 
discuss political decentralisation with the aim to look at the relation of increased 
citizen participation to social equity. Political decentralisation provides opportunities 
for local citizens to elect district head and local legislature members as well to 
                                                 
9
 Based on Law No.34/2000 on local taxes and Levies (Pemerintah-Indonesia, 2000b), the central 
government enacted types of local taxes and levies  whereas Peraturan Pemerintah (Government 
Policy) No. 66/2001 on of local levies regulated detailed type of local levies. The local government 
has discretion to enact local levies, but not local taxes. 
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participate in the process of decision making. Through political decentralisation local 
citizens can articulate their needs and policy makers can make decisions in 
accordance with the those needs.   
  
1.3.3. Political decentralisation 
Political decentralisation refers to the distribution of political power between central 
governments and sub-national governments (Fesler, 1965; Gonzalez, 2008; Smith, 
1985). Smith (1985, p. 1) says: “it is concerned with the extent to which power and 
authority are dispersed through the geographical hierarchy of the state and the 
institutions”. This is related to efforts of the national government to increase the 
power and responsibility of sub-national government and reduces the power and 
responsibility of the central government. According to Falleti (2005, p. 329), 
political decentralisation policies are designed to devolve political authority or 
electoral capacity to sub-national governments. This aims to give citizens and their 
elected representatives more power in the formulation and implementation of public 
policy. It is associated with democratization as well as representative government 
because political decentralisation allows local citizens to directly elect district 
leaders and local parliament members who know better the needs and preferences of 
their local constituencies.  
 
Political decentralisation does not only provide political rights for local citizens to 
elect their local chief executives and local parliament members but also opportunities 
to participate in local decision-making process (Hentic & Bernier, 1999; Hutchcroft, 
2001).When local citizens have authority to make decision, this is devolution. 
According to Bernier and Hentic (1999, p. 197), public participation can help to 
develop the autonomy of communities by encouraging people to become more 
creative and more productive in public affairs and thus increases political 
accountability. Political accountability refers to specific conditions within the 
political system which enables citizens to have the ability to demand answers from 
agents within the public sector (Eckard, 2008, p. 5). Since 2005, citizens in Indonesia 
have had the right to directly elect a district government head. This holds the district 
government head to be more responsive and accountable to local needs.  
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In general, a transfer of political power from a central government to sub-national 
governments occurs in a democratic regime. In a democratic regime, decentralisation 
policy is often a result of pressure from democratically elected sub-national officials. 
However, political decentralisation also occurs in a transition of democracy 
(Gonzalez, 2008; Hadiz, 2004a). For instance, in the case of Latin American 
countries, their transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes was 
accompanied with political decentralisation. This is because the transitional period of 
democracy created popular pressure from civil society on the central government to 
decentralize political power to sub-national governments. In a similar way, 
Indonesia’s political decentralisation took place during a democratic transition, 
following the fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998. Under this democratic 
transition, there were public demands to decentralize political power to local 
governments. As a result, the central government stipulated Law No. 22/1999 to 
decentralize power to sub-national governments.   
 
In order for political decentralisation to fully contribute to democratization, 
including ensuring social equity, it must be followed by the expansion of functional 
and fiscal discretion at the local level. Without independent resources and functions, 
political autonomy cannot meet locally specific needs. The three kinds of 
decentralisations - administrative, fiscal and political decentralisation - are thus to be 
implemented simultaneously for democracy-building. However, the experiences of 
development in many countries indicate that national government officials tend to 
have a lack of political commitment to introduce those three kinds of decentralisation 
simultaneously, because they fear losing their power (Bunte, 2009; Olowu, 1989; 
Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). In Indonesia, the central government has transferred 
political power and administrative functions to sub-national governments, but an 
influential part of fiscal authority was still in the hands of the national government 
(Bunte, 2009, p. 108). As a result, sub-national governments face a financial 
constraint in implementing their functions, although sub-national authorities are now 
publicly elected to represent their local interest. In the next section I will examine the 
potential impact of those three types of decentralisation on small business. 
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1.4. Implementation of Administrative Decentralisation 
Administrative decentralisation can be understood as a transfer of functions from the 
central government to sub-national governments. As a result, the responsibility of 
local administration will increase and subsequently requires local capacity-building 
to carry out the increased functions. This section will examine how the increased 
functions and responsibility affect the interests of small business from the viewpoint 
of administrative efficiency and social equity.  
 
1.4.1. Increased Local Functions 
         In Indonesia, most public services are delegated by the national government to 
district governments, except for policy areas such as monetary and fiscal, securities 
affairs, foreign policies, justice, religious affairs and other strategic and national 
policies. Small business was one of the policy areas delegated by the central 
government to the district government in 2001. The district government is now in a 
position to play a primary role in promoting and regulating the practices of small 
business.  
 
Administrative decentralisation enables local governments to make policies in 
accordance with the needs of the local community to the extent that the national 
government delegates not only functions, but also decision-making power, to local 
governments. This is because local policy makers are well informed about local 
community affairs and easily able to identify the needs of local communities (Smith, 
1985, p. 5). Equally important, administrative decentralisation helps to reduce red-
tape and overcome the adversities of highly bureaucratic procedures (Cheema & 
Rondinelli, 1983; Takao, 1999) because tasks are controlled directly by local 
governments without going through different layers of government management.  
 
What kind of functions/tasks can be delegated by the central government to local 
government? Generally, the central government has three exclusive roles in the 
public sector: macroeconomic stabilization policies, redistribution of income and 
allocation of resources (Musgrave & Mugrave, 1989; Oats, 1972, 1999). Economic 
stabilization is aimed to improve the overall economy through fiscal and monetary 
policy. To attain stability functions, the government has responsibility for promoting 
full employment, price stability, economic growth and a stable balance of payments 
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(Hughes, 1998, p. 86). Income redistribution is intended to reduce the degree of 
inequalities in wealth and income among citizens. The major part of redistribution is 
the provision of social welfare, including transfer payments to the poor and 
disadvantaged (Hughes, 1998, p. 86). Resource allocation is related to the provision 
of public goods: what services, how much, and in what ways they should be provide 
publicly (Finot, 2002, p. 135). 
 
In general, under administrative decentralisation, macroeconomic stabilization and 
income redistribution are in the hands of the central government whereas resource 
allocation (or service delivery) can be given to sub-national governments. In this 
context, local governments are expected to increase administrative efficiency to 
allocate public resources to local residents and organisations, including small 
businesses, yet they are not in a strategic position to redistribute income thus 
promoting social equity. To meet the need of administrative efficiency, local 
governments should provide local residents with proper kinds and amounts of public 
services without unnecessary spending or waste. In the policy area of small business, 
Indonesia’s district governments provide access to a number of credit schema funded 
by state agencies and private banks, issue business permits, impose taxes and local 
levies, and offer job training. The key issue is whether a range of those incentives 
and regulations will correct the disadvantages of small business in markets or rather 
impose constraints on small business’ competitiveness. District governments are 
expected not to over protect the special interest of small business (which tends to 
cause small business’ dependence on government help) but to help small business 
without undermining its entrepreneurship.  
 
The kinds and amount of governmental functions delegated by the national 
government to sub-national governments are different across countries because they 
are influenced by many variables such as national government’s interest, fiscal 
capacity of local governments, complexity tasks and others. Given a governmental 
function, sub-national governments are to adapt the sub-national administration to 
this administrative decentralisation. 
 
In a region where there are many small businesses such as Bantul and Gianyar, the 
district government immediately needs to reform local government agencies and 
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implement regulation measures related to small businesses with the aim to help 
inefficient and marginal firms. In Indonesia the adaptation to administrative 
decentralisation has been performed primarily through two ways: first, the district 
governments establish a local government agency given a specific job to promote 
small businesses, and second, they impose regulations on small business by 
integrating variety types of business permits in markets.  
 
The increased tasks for district governments can cause an increased responsibility for 
local bureaucracy. The capacities of local administration need to be enhanced in 
order to successfully implement its tasks. The next section will discuss this increased 
responsibility of local bureaucracy. This section will argue that local bureaucracies 
need to be reformed so they are able to provide better public services in terms of 
responsiveness to small businesses. Administrative decentralisation can cause local 
governments to have more complicated jobs and additional functions. Thus, the local 
governments need to improve the skills of local bureaucrats to implement those jobs 
and functions.       
 
1.4.2. Capacity Building of Local Bureaucracy 
The responsibilities of local bureaucrats increase as a result of tasks/functions 
delegated by the central government to sub-national governments. The sub-national 
governments have more responsibility to provide public services for local 
communities. To fulfil the increased responsibilities, local administration requires 
sufficient financial, jurisdiction and staff resources while functioning under strong 
chief executive’s leadership. Perhaps, one of the most important yet often neglected 
requirements for successful fulfilment of those responsibilities is the capacity of 
local administration: information, expertise and policy innovation in a range of 
policy areas. Poor capacity of local bureaucrats could become a constraint in 
implementing the decentralisation policy. Indeed, implementation of decentralisation 
in  developing countries often faces problems because the transfer of responsibility is 
accompanied by a lack of administrative preparation at the local level  (Hentic & 
Bernier, 1999, p. 202).  
 
In dealing with the issues of the under-developed capacity of local bureaucracy, 
Mardiasmo, Barnes, & Sakurai (2008, p. 17), observe that human resources capacity 
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is one of the strongest impediment variables of regional government in implementing 
decentralisation policy measures. Based on research findings in six districts of 
Indonesia, Kristiansen (2008, p. 82) concluded that during the decentralisation era, 
local public bureaucracy had poor capacity to understand the particulars of budgeting 
techniques and detailed data and thus, there was a lack of financial transparency in 
managing public finance. Brojonegoro & Assanuma (2000, p. 120) argue further that 
many local governments were not ready for fulfilling their responsibilities in an 
autonomous way in terms of planning, programming and executing development 
projects. As a result, the performance of local bureaucracy is far below public 
expectation. The capacity of local bureaucracy needs to be improved via 
organisational learning and capacity-building.         
 
The Government Regulation No. 101/2000 stipulates three kinds of capacity-
building for civil servants: leadership, functional and technical training. The 
leadership training is mandatory for civil servants holding structural positions. The 
functional training is designed to improve the performance of administrative service 
delivery, whereas technical training is aimed to improve the general technical skills, 
such as computer literacy (Turner, Imbanuddin, & Sutiyono, 2009, p. 240). Despite 
such a capacity-building mechanism, Asian Development Bank or ADB (2004) 
found that the content of the leadership training program was too general and 
excessively formal to improve performance and leadership capability. In other 
words, the training programs were yet to be improved to increase the capacity of 
civil servants. 
 
It is important to note that there are indications of conscious efforts to improve the 
capability of public servants by providing training and education. For instance, the 
province of North Sumatra, which was supported by JICA (Japan International 
Cooperation Agency Research Institute), provided a series of training sessions in 
good governance for its district civil servants during 2004-2005. Also, there are 
some efforts to use a strict merit system and a proper test in selecting key senior 
district officials. In many district governments, a master degree qualification is 
required to fulfil the position of a local agency head. 
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Improving the education credentials of public servants is needed because higher 
educational qualifications are more likely to improve the capacity of local 
administration. Beyond a higher degree of education, change in behaviour of public 
servants or a commitment of public servants to capacity-building is necessary in 
order to provide better public services for local citizens. However, Dwiyanto (2002, 
2003) found that there were no significant positive changes in local bureaucracies’ 
attitudes toward performance improvement in the early implementation of 
decentralisation in Indonesia. This study was conducted in 2002, one year after 
implementing decentralisation, in 150 districts of 20 provinces. The low capacity of 
local bureaucrats caused poor performance and thus produced low quality of public 
services. 
 
1.5. Implementation of Fiscal Decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation has a potential to increase local governments’ revenue 
because decentralised fiscal measures could allow sub-national authorities to set up 
their own local taxes and tax rates. Moreover, it may improve efficiency and 
equitability in the use of public resources because decisions about public expenditure 
are made by a local government which is close to its constituents and accountable for 
local needs. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the implementation of fiscal 
decentralisation for district governments’ revenue raising. 
 
1.5.1. District Government Revenue Raising 
In general, there are two types of revenue sources of district governments’: the first 
is revenue from local taxes, local levies and borrowing; the second is transfer 
payment from higher levels of government (Takao, 1999, p. 14). In Indonesia, 
income from local taxes is one of components of the locally derived revenue (the 
PAD income).
10
 The PAD income varies across regions because of differences of 
size of areas and natural resources. For instance, in 2010 the PAD income of the 
Trenggalek district in the Province of East Java was only 6.8 percent of the total 
district government income. In Bantul, the PAD income was 10.3 percent of the total 
district government’s revenue in 2010, whereas in Gianyar, the PAD income was 
13.26 percent in 2009. For the Indonesian case, in 87 percent of local governments 
                                                 
10
 The PAD income consists of local tax income, local levy income, income from local government 
owned enterprises and other legal revenue income.  
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nationwide, the PAD only amounted less than 10 percent of their total budget. The 
PAD contributed more than 50 percent of the total local budget for only 0.3 percent 
of local governments (Brojonegoro, 2004, p. 136). 
 
In other countries, local tax income is often the main source of the local 
government’s revenue. For instance, in 1997 Denmark’s local taxes accounted for  
51 percent of the total district government’s income whereas Sweden’s represents 
sixty one percent (Bailey, 1999, p. 87). However, in Indonesia, income from local 
taxes account for small part of district government’s income. In 2010, Bantul’s local 
taxes income accounted for 1.9 percent of the total district government income, 
whereas its local levies contributed 6.4 percent to the district government income. 
 
Incomes from local taxes consist of various types of tax. The question is: what types 
of local tax provide the largest contribution? The types of local taxes which provide 
the most contributions are different across countries. In France and Britain, for 
instance, a large part of local taxes income derives from levies on the value of 
private land. In France, property tax as a percentage of local tax revenue was 45 
percent in 1984. In Japan and Sweden, the main source of local tax revenue is 
individual and corporate taxable income. In Japan, income tax as a percentage of 
local tax income was 66.8  percent in 1984 and in Sweden the percentage was 93.3 
percent in 1984 (Takao, 1999, p. 14 & p. 41). In Gianyar, local tax on Hotel and 
restaurant account for the most part of total local tax income in 2009. This means 
that the financial capacity of Gianyar was supported by the service sector (hotel and 
restaurants), not the agricultural sector.          
 
Fiscal decentralisation could provide sub-national governments with more discretion 
in determining types of tax and tax rates. However, this generally occurs in federal 
states. In a unitary system, such as in Indonesia, the central government normally 
decides types of tax and tax rates for lower levels of government. The central 
government provides limited fiscal power to local governments. As a result, local 
governments have less opportunity to increase the scope of financial discretion for 
local decision making.  
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The central government provides transfer payments to the district governments to 
equalize the quality of local services across the nation. By transferring payments, the 
central government performs redistribution functions as stated by (Oats, 1972, 1999) 
and (Musgrave & Mugrave, 1989) with the goal to reduce the degree of inequalities 
in wealth and income between citizens and regions.  
 
The transfer payment to sub-national governments can be categorized in two basic 
forms: general purpose transfers or grants and special purpose transfers or grants 
(Krelove, Stotsky, & Verhorn, 1997, p. 214). Bailey (1999, p. 181) and Smith  
(1985, p. 104) use the terms of general grants and specific grants respectively. 
General grants are intended to provide sub-national governments with some financial 
discretional power by not specifying how to use the funds.  Specific grants come 
with strings attached by specifying how to spend the funds. General grants can be 
used to finance the broad range of services provided by local government, whereas 
specific grants are paid in respect to specific services and can only be spent on those 
services. Local governments that received specific grants must normally prepare 
matching funds in certain percentages. The total budgets of general grants are 
usually greater than specific grants. For instance, in the case of Indonesia in 2008, 
the general grant was 179.5 quintillion rupiah and the specific grant was 21.2 
quintillion rupiah. Then in 2009 the general grant increased to 186.4 quintillion 
rupiah and the specific grant became 24.8 quintillion rupiah. Because the general 
grant was higher than the specific grant amounts, the sub-national government had 
discretional policy to spend it. In 2010 the general grant was 195.8 quintillion rupiah 
and specific grant was only 20.5 quintillion rupiah. In 1997, in 13 European 
countries, general grants accounted for at least quarter of municipal revenues 
(Bailey, 1999, p. 183).  
 
Starting in 2001 under 25/1999, the central government provided shares of revenue 
derived from the exploitation of local government’s natural resources income to sub-
national governments:  15 percent of oil revenue income, 30 percent of natural gas 
revenue and 40 percent of reforestation fees compared with zero previously. Then in 
2005 there were small changes amounting to 15.5 percent of oil revenue, 30.5 
percent of natural gas revenue and 40 percent of reforestation fee which were 
distributed to sub-national governments. The local governments also received shares 
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of revenue from geothermal mining revenue, 32 percent with zero previously (Law 
32/2004). 
 
The Revenue Sharing Fund
11
 received by among regions was also different because 
of difference of natural resources among regions. Basically, this fund is general fund 
because the sub-national government has discretional policy to spend it. Local 
governments with rich natural resources and a large area, therefore, will have a large 
transfer payment. For instance, the municipality of Bontang in the Province of East 
Kalimantan obtained a share of revenue from the natural resources and tax income of 
seventy seven percent of total municipality government income in 2009.
12
 In 
contrast, local governments with poor resources and small areas, like Bantul and 
Gianyar, only received small revenue sharing funds from the central government. 
The revenue sharing funds will be discussed in Chapter 2 and 3. 
 
It is most common that transfer payments in the form of grants are also used as 
effective tools of control over local finance. A large scale of national transfer 
payments could cause financial dependency for sub-national governments. As a 
result, local chief executives are less responsive to their constituents (Takao, 1999, p. 
15). In my opinion, if the transfer payment is more than 50 percent of sub-national 
governments’ budget, it may create financial dependency for sub-national 
government to the central government. In contrast, if most parts of the sub-national 
governments revenues derive from local tax incomes, local chief executives will 
become more responsive and accountable to local communities. In Indonesia, almost 
all district governments depend on transfer payments from the central government in 
the form of a general and special grants and a share of revenue from natural 
resources and tax income. As a result, district governments may have difficulty in 
implementing decentralised functions without the central government grants. In 
addition, decentralisation may cause a financial capacity gap between region with 
rich natural resources and regions with poor natural resources. Regions with rich 
natural resources can obtain larger grants in the form of shares of revenue from 
natural resources than those of poor regions.  
 
                                                 
11
 Revenue Sharing Funds sourced from tax income and natural resource income. 
12
Perda Kota Bontang No. 3/2009 concerning of APBD 2009 (Pemerintah-Kota-Bontang, 2009).  
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1.5. 2. District Government’s Discretionary Spending 
Fiscal decentralisation enables sub-national governments to have more discretion in 
adjusting local budgets to local preferences and can better distribute local public 
services for local citizens (Bahl, 1999, p. 4). Fiscal discretion provides local 
governments with freedom in selecting programs that will be financed. These 
selected programs are more likely to be in accordance with the needs of local people 
and promote locally specific economic growth. As mentioned in the previous 
section, if sub-national governments are able to provide better public services and 
minimalize local taxes, businessmen from other regions will come to the region to 
operate their businesses and promote economic growth as stated by Tiebout (1956). 
However, it is still debatable whether Tiebout’s theory can be applied to non-federal 
states.
13
 Equalization payments are cash payments made even in some federal 
systems of government, from the federal government to sub-national governments 
with the objective of offsetting differences in available revenue or in the cost of 
providing services. In this case, Tiebout’s theory is also less relevant. 
 
Does local fiscal discretion drive economic growth at a local level? There are two 
perspectives in the context of relationships between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth. The first perspective argues that fiscal decentralisation is likely to 
cause economic growth at the local level (Akai & Sakata, 2002; Iimi, 2005; J. Jin & 
Zou, 2005; Lin & Liu, 2000), while the second perspective states that the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth is negative  
(Davoodi & Zou, 1998; Im, 2010; Zhang & Zou, 1998).  
 
Lin and Liu (2000, p. 2) claim that empirical evidence from the experience of 
development of China shows decentralisation can increase economic growth. Before 
1980, the Chinese central government collected all revenues and prepared a 
consolidated budget for governments at all administrative levels. But in 1980, the 
central government enacted an arrangement of source of local government revenues. 
Under this arrangement, revenues were classified into central fixed revenues 
(including customs duties and revenues remitted by centrally owned state 
enterprises), local fixed revenues (including agricultural taxes, revenues remitted by 
                                                 
13
As discussed in section number of 1.3.2 in this chapter. 
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locally owned state enterprises and other taxes and levies of local nature), and 
central-local shared revenue (including profits of large-scale enterprises under dual 
leadership by the central and local government). As a result, this can increase 
economic growth at local level. The economic growth can be seen from growth rate 
of output per capita.       
 
Moreover, Akai & Sakata (2002) found that in the United States, fiscal 
decentralisation contributed to economic growth because the local income elasticity 
allowed the provision of infrastructure as well as human capital that was formulated 
by local government to be more sensitive to local needs and more effective in 
encouraging economic development than centralized policies that ignored 
geographical differences and local resources. Jin, Qian & Weingast (2005) found 
that decentralisation is not only good for economic growth but also for social equity 
based on data 1982-1992 in China. This research indicates that fiscal decentralisation 
allows sub-national governments to support local businesses, especially non-state 
enterprises. As a result, local economic growth increased. Based on studies of 51 
countries - 7 low income countries, 10 lower-middle income countries, 12 upper-
middle countries, and 22 high income countries – used with data for the period from 
1997 to 2001, Iimi (2005) found that fiscal decentralisation had a significant positive 
impact on per capita GDP growth.   
 
On the contrary, other studies found that fiscal decentralisation had a negative 
relationship on economic growth. For instance, Davoodi and Zou (1998), using data 
for 46 developing and developed countries during the 1970-1989 period, found that  
the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth was negative in 
developing countries, but null in developed countries. Fiscal decentralisation is 
defined as the spending by sub-national governments as a fraction of total 
government spending. Fiscal decentralisation increased if spending by state and local 
governments rises relative to spending by the federal government. There are two 
reasons why the aforementioned relationship was negative: firstly, it did not 
distinguish between current spending (wage and salaries) and capital spending; nor 
did it distinguish spending on welfare and social security from infrastructure 
spending. Excessive spending by sub-national government on the wrong expenditure 
items can lead to lower growth. Secondly, lower growth can result from the wrong 
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revenue assignment. Sub-national government might have been raising revenue 
using a tax instrument which should have been used by the central government 
(Davoodi & Zou, 1998, p. 254).      
 
Based on his study in 63 countries
14
, Im (2010:518) found that there was no 
significant relationship between fiscal decentralisation and GDP growth in 17 
developed countries whose GDP per capita was over 30,000 US dollars. In his study 
of 15 semi-developed countries, the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
GDP growth was negative. In the remaining 31 developing countries, there was no 
significant relationship between fiscal decentralisation and GDP growth. Thus, fiscal 
decentralisation could not be considered a formula for GDP growth for all countries.  
 
Zhang & Zou (1998) also found that a higher degree of fiscal decentralisation was 
associated with lower regional growth in China. Based on annual data on 28 
provinces in China during period 1986-1992, the coefficient of fiscal 
decentralisation, which is measured by the rate of per capita provincial budgetary 
spending to per capita central budgetary spending was negative. This means that an 
increase in subnational government level expenditure caused a decline in the real 
growth rate of regional income. 
 
Beyond efficiency and economic growth, fiscal decentralisation is seen as a means to 
promote equitable distribution of goods and services with the aim to meet social 
equity and welfare (Lindaman & Thurmaier, 2002; Oats, 1972). By increasing local 
expenditure, local governments can increase the physical infrastructures and 
financial assistance for promoting business sector.  
 
Given the mixed results of the findings on the impact of decentralisation on 
development, some scholars suggest that the important issue is how to arrange the 
central and local government relationship to stimulate economic development at 
local level (Marijan, 2006, p. 31). Although sub-national governments applied 
decentralisation policy, the central government still provides transfer payment to 
                                                 
14
 The 63 countries are categorized into three groups. Countries whose GDP per capita is less than 
10,000 US dollar are categorized as developing countries. Countries which have a GDP per capita 
between 10,000 US dollars and 30.000 US dollars are classified as semi-developed countries; and 
more than 30.000 US dollar as developed countries.  
52 
 
 
 
sub-national government with the aim to meet social equity, welfare as well as 
promote local small businesses. Without transfer payments from the central 
government, there may be a financial capacity gap among poor and rich regions.  
 
My study will not simply focus on the relationship between decentralisation and 
economic growth, but more specifically examine the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and small businesses productivity/competitiveness. In relation to 
district government’s spending I will examine the extent to which the district 
government allocates district government budgets to help small businesses by 
providing financial and training assistance as well as physical infrastructures. In 
general, small businesses lack financial capacity, use traditional technology in the 
process of production and have limited skills in managing their business. Financial 
assistance may increase capital and upgrade of technology, whereas training 
programs may improve skill and management for small businesses. Physical 
infrastructures such as roads, market buildings and Automatic Teller Machines 
(ATM) may also facilitate their operations.  
 
1.6. Implementation of Political Decentralisation 
Political decentralisation is expected to contribute decisively to popular participation 
(Agrawal & Gupta, 2005; Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Crook & Mannor, 1998; Finot, 
2002; Lindaman & Thurmaier, 2002; O' Nell, 2003) and to provide more access for  
political party members to be elected in public officials (O' Nell, 2003; Sabatini, 
2003) at the sub-national level. This section will discuss the implications of political 
decentralisation for localities in three affected areas: political participation, 
responsiveness and accountability, and party politics. Firstly, let us look at its 
implication on political participation by local communities. The degree of 
participatory autonomy can be measured by how the chief executives and 
representative bodies are selected at the sub-national level. In Indonesia, all local 
chief executives and all local council members are publicly elected. The local 
residents thus directly participate in the choice of their local representatives.  
Secondly, increased popular participation in the decision-making process can 
increase acceptability and responsiveness of elected local officials to the public. A 
direct public election increases residents’ ability to determine the scale and scope of 
local services. Thirdly, political decentralisation tends to cause partisan politicization 
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of local government services and thus serves to clarify the different points of local 
policy at issue. Due to more resources at the local authorities’ disposal, political 
decentralisation can cause political parties to increasingly engage in a struggle over 
the increased resources at the local level. 
 
1.6.1. Participation of Local Communities  
Decentralisation has emerged as a major strategy for many nation states to achieve 
development goals, improve the quality of public services and increase public 
participation (Agrawal & Gupta, 2005; Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Carrel, 1969; 
Crook & Mannor, 1998; Hentic & Bernier, 1999; Lindaman & Thurmaier, 2002). 
Some empirical studies confirm this to be the case, Crook and Mannor (1998, p. 
271), for instance, investigated the impact of decentralisation on public participation 
in two Asian and two African countries. They found that in all the four countries – 
India, Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ghana – the popular participation, both direct 
(electoral) and indirect (non-electoral) forms, increased. Although there was some 
variation across the cases, the overall rating of participation experienced a rise in all 
cases. Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) studied two cases of forest management in India 
and two cases in Nepal, concluding that the decentralisation policy caused increased 
participation of community Forestry in India and Nepal. Local groups actively have 
to pursue opportunities opened up by decentralised reforms.     
 
It is important to note that there are different types of public participation. 
Huntington & Nelson (1976, p. 12)  distinguished political participation as follows: 
(1) electoral activities, voting, campaign contributions, working in election, and 
proselytizing on behalf of candidate;  
(2) lobbying that includes individual or group efforts to contact governmental 
officials and political leaders with a view to influence their decision;  
(3) organizing activity that involves participation as a member or officer in an 
organisation that has as its primary and explicit goal of influencing government 
decision making;  
(4) contacting that is an individual action directed to government officials and 
normally designed to produce benefits for small number of people; and  
(5) violence that influences governmental decision making by doing physical 
damage to a person or property.  
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Decentralisation can enhance the opportunities local people have to participate in the 
local decision-making process. Involving more people in the process of decision- 
making can lead to more people benefitting from the outcome (Lindaman & 
Thurmaier, 2002, p. 931). Local people can articulate their preferences when they 
participate in the decision-making process. As a result, this can improve the quality 
of local policy and improve the allocation of services toward equitable distribution 
services and goods. Participation can also avoid an authoritarian system in the 
decision-making process and increase accountability. In term of politics, 
participation can be defined as activity by private citizens designed to influence 
governmental decision making (Hutington & Nelson, 1976, p. 4). 
 
By participating, on the one hand, local communities have more opportunities to 
influence the content of decisions in accordance with their preferences. On the other 
hand, local officials can catch a wide range of interests within a civil society (those 
of cultural, economic, social and political groups, and those of business people, trade 
unions, community groups and the media) (Hentic & Bernier, 1999, p. 204). 
Thereby, it enables a compromise between the ideas from local people and ideas 
from local officials in formulating a policy. By participating, citizens can 
communicate and discuss certain issues - political, business-related, social, and 
environmental - which will enhance a better understanding of the issues. 
Participation also leads to greater articulation about political choices (Ikeda, 
Kobayashi, & Hoshimoto, 2008).  
 
Local governments should provide institutional mechanisms that enable local people 
to participate in the process of governance as well as a framework for allowing the 
community’s interests to be represented in government decision-making structures 
(Hentic & Bernier, 1999). The institutional mechanism and framework that enables 
people to participate could be different across regions. The participation of local 
communities can be done through local parliament, political parties, meeting with 
local officials at districts, sub-districts and village levels. 
 
To enable participation in the process of decision making, local citizens must be 
informed regarding public issues, so that they are able to provide input in the process 
of decision making. In Japan, for instance, since 1980 the local authorities have 
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guaranteed local citizens the right to information in the form of local government 
ordinances (Takao, 1998, p. 954). In the Indonesian case, since 2008 citizens have 
had the right to obtain public information regarding the process of policy making and 
the government programs with the aim to increase public participation (Law No 
14/2008).
15
 
 
By opening access to public information, citizens can have information regarding 
certain issues, enabling them to criticize the process of decision making in order to 
provide input. It is believed that participation of local citizens in the process of 
decision making does not only increase the quality of decisions but also increases 
acceptability of the decision. However, in practice, it is not easy for one to obtain 
public information because of the low commitment of public officials. For instance, 
local bureaucrats in several district governments in Indonesia conceive that the 
annual official district government budget is a confidential document.
16
 Therefore, 
the preparation of the district government budget, involves only the local elites 
(Dwiyanto, 2003, p. 130).  
 
Although local communities articulate their preferences through the process of 
political decentralisation, the local officials may be not able to meet the needs of 
local communities because of limited fiscal capacity (insufficient fiscal 
decentralisation) and a lack of functional discretion in decision making (limited 
administrative decentralisation) (Takao, 1999). As a result, local officials may less 
responsive to local communities’ needs and it could decrease the degree of local 
community’s participation. In other words, increased participation of local 
communities will be meaningful if local governments have the fiscal and functional 
capacities to respond it.       
 
1.6.2. Elected Local Officials 
In Indonesia, elected local officials consist of district heads and local legislators. 
Under the decentralisation system, district heads are popularly elected by local 
                                                 
15
 Law No.14/2008 regarding Openness of Public Information (Keterbukaan Informasi Publik) which 
was enacted  in April 2008, but started effectively in 2010  (Pemerintah-Indonesia, 2008). 
16
 Some local bureaucrats and local legislators conceive that the district government budget is secret 
document. As a result, access for local citizens to obtain public information and to be involved in the 
process of decision making is intentionally limited. 
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citizens. On the contrary, under the old centralized policy, district heads were 
appointed by the national government or by elected local legislators. Some local 
legislators were also appointed by the national government. For instance, based on 
the Indonesian experience, under the Soeharto’s authoritarian regime (1967-1998), a 
part of the national and local legislator members were appointed by the government. 
 
When the central government devolves authority to local governments, the local 
legislators have more responsibility to make and implement policies than ever. 
Innovative policy making by local legislators is expected to meet their local need 
(Takao, 1998, p. 957). The direct elections also serve to make local legislators more 
accountable to local citizens (Sabatini, 2003, p. 139). This enables elected local 
legislators produce local policies and regulations in accordance with the preferences 
and needs of local citizens. To understand the preferences and needs of local 
citizens, local legislator members must communicate to local citizens and provide 
the opportunity for local citizens to present their needs and interests.  
 
The direct elections also make elected district heads more accountable and 
responsive to local citizens’ preferences. In addition, local citizens’ direct 
participation in electing district heads and local legislators provide opportunities for 
local communities to become acquainted with the process of democratic building at 
the local level (Takao, 1999, p. 10).   
 
The direct elections of mayors and regents are usually accompanied by the increased 
transfer of resources and responsibilities from the central government to local 
governments. The district governments have more complex tasks/functions as a 
result of decentralisation policy. Therefore, district heads need a high capacity to 
manage local public resources and implement complex tasks. The district head also 
must be able to respond to the local communities’ preferences and needs, and then 
formulate these into local policies. Studies on leadership indicate that district leader 
needs to have the characteristics of political entrepreneurs who are political activists 
adept at accumulating a variety of political resources and using them to gain 
influence and additional resources (Pressman, 1972). 
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According to Pressman (1972, p. 512), the success of district government leader 
depends on: (1) the political structure of the district (electoral system, political 
parties). (2) Governmental structure (sufficient staff, financial resources). (3) 
Personality of the district head himself. Therefore, the three factors simultaneously 
contribute to the success of district government head. 
 
In the case of Indonesia, for instance, the success of Syaukani as district head of 
Kutai Kartanegara in the Province of East Kalimantan was found to be influenced by 
three factors, namely possessing a strong personality of leadership, supported by a 
strong political party and supported by financial resources (Evaquarta, 2008). Firstly, 
in relation to a strong personality, beyond a district head, Syaukani was also the 
chairman of the Association of the District Government in Indonesia (APKASI) and 
the chairperson of the Eastern Kalimantan Golkar party as well as other various 
associations. Secondly, Syaukani was supported by Golkar party that occupied more 
than half of the local legislator membership. As a result, the district head’s policies 
were supported by local parliament members. Thirdly, the district government of 
Kutai Kartanegara was one of richest district governments in Indonesia due to 
income from natural resources. Therefore, the district government was able to 
increase salaries for local public servants and deliver village funds as high as 2 
billion rupiah per village every year via the Gerbang Dayaku Program in 2006. In 
other words, decentralisation measures are not sufficient to ensure the goals of 
decentralisation. Chief executives’ leadership and entrepreneurship are also required. 
 
However, the implementation of decentralisation in Kutai Kartanegara under 
Syaukani’s regime was followed by corruption. Decentralisation can cause the 
district government to have much grant in form of share of revenue from natural 
resources. Then, Syaukani made policy that provided financial benefits for himself.
17
 
Local legislature members were also involved in case of corruption in Kutai 
Kartanegara.
18
 
 
                                                 
17
In 14 December 2007, the Corruption Court (Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi) punished 
Syaukani with 2 years in jail because of corruption amounting to 113 billion rupiah of district 
government funds. 
18
 All local legislature members were suspected in corruption of as much as 2.6 billion rupiah 
(Kompas daily, 24 November 2010). 
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1.6.3. Party Politics  
The devolution of political power from the central government to sub-national 
governments has made local politics more competitive and political positions are 
more attractive (Ufen, 2009, p. 167). During the centralization era, local public 
resources were in the hand of the central government. Decentralisation policy means 
a transfer of resources from the central government to local governments (Sabatini, 
2003, p. 139).  As a result, local public resources are under control by local 
governments. Therefore, political parties will compete to pursue political positions in 
both executive and legislative office in order to control and obtain local resources. 
Political decentralisation does not only provide a greater opportunity for political 
parties to engage in local politics but also increases their participation in local 
decision making (Hutchcroft, 2001)). For local politicians, political decentralisation 
also provides political education because they can learn much about political affairs 
at a local level. In several countries, career paths for national politicians started from 
local levels as local politicians (Smith, 1985).  
 
Political parties can effectively carry out these functions if they are well 
institutionalized and have strong roots in society (Ufen, 2009, p. 154). The 
institutionalization of a party is indicated by the stability of party and whether there 
is a sharing of similar values among party members and society. The party has roots 
in society when the party has links to civil society organisations.  
 
The effectiveness of political parties under decentralisation measures depends on 
their intra-party structure. The centralized system of political parties can be 
measured by the degree to which the national political party leaders control party 
members at the local level (Smith, 1985, p. 89). If the system of political parties is 
centralized, the elites of local political parties may be less responsive to local 
communities’ preferences because they are controlled from the headquarters of 
political parties. In contrast, if the political party system is decentralised, political 
parties may be braver to presents and articulate local communities’ preferences. In 
turn, for example, they are able to represent the preferences and interests of small 
businesses at a local level with the aim to promote small businesses.   
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Furthermore, political devolution can also cause political parties to become closer to 
local citizens because party-affiliated district heads and local legislators are directly 
elected by local citizens. Thus, district head and local legislator candidates approach 
local citizens with the aim to obtain political support in elections. The important 
question is whether the implementation of political decentralisation in Indonesia can 
in fact cause a political party to become close to local citizens.   
 
We can see that the political party system in Indonesia remains highly centralized, 
although political decentralisation was introduced since 2001. For instance, the 
national leaders of political parties have the authority to dismiss party leaders and 
control the nomination of party members at a local level (Malley, 2003, p. 105). The 
candidate for a district government head proposed by local political parties must also 
be approved by political party headquarters. As a result, the behaviour of political 
parties has not yet changed since the implementation of decentralisation (Legowo, 
2003, p. 79). Implementation of political decentralisation in Indonesia caused 
political party to be involved in money politics. In the case of North Sumatra, for 
instance,  PDI-P party charged potential candidates between 200 million and 300 
million rupiah to be included in its official list of contestants for provincial 
legislature members and 400 million rupiah for national legislature members (Hadiz, 
2004, 2004a). 
 
Political parties are managed by a centralised system. Thus, political party elites at 
the district regions prefer to develop networks with political party elites at the 
national level rather than with the local community at the grassroots level. Local 
parliament candidates and district head candidates from political parties approach 
local communities by providing incentives such as money and material. Therefore, 
candidates for local parliament membership or district head positions need to 
generate funds to support themselves in the election. The candidates generally 
provide money to parties in order to be nominated as official candidates and provide 
money to local communities for buying votes.  
 
In addition, in Gianyar, patrimonialistic political culture still prevails. The local 
parliament candidates and district head candidates develop networks with local 
traditional leaders (tokoh adat) to influence the constituency in electing local 
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parliament members and district heads. The traditional leaders play an important role 
in influencing behaviour of the constituencies in traditional political culture.  For 
instance, in Bali local parliament candidates and district head candidates generally 
developed network with the heads of Banjar and heads of Desa Pakraman with the 
aim to obtain votes in election.  Because there are no Banjar and Desa Pakraman in 
Yogyakarta, the candidates generally developed networks with heads of villages, 
heads of hamlets and social organisations at grass root level. The candidates thus 
expected to obtain many votes in elections because they believed that the heads of 
villages, heads of hamlets and heads of social organisations would be able to 
influence the local community’s behaviour in elections.   
 
In the discussion on Indonesian politics today, it is important to ask whether or not 
politik aliran (political and/or philosophical streams of thought) still exist. The 
concept of politik aliran was advanced by Geertz (1963) that is based on his research 
in a region in Java in 1950s. The politik aliran is often used in explaining political 
behaviour especially regarding results of elections in Indonesian. The political 
support from santri went to the right wing of NU and Masyumi party while the 
political support from abangan went to left wing of PNI and PKI party in 1955 
election.   
 
The New Order regime (1965-1998) under Suharto started to depoliticise society and 
set to erase politik aliran. The party official hierarchy only applies until the district 
level. There is no party official at sub-district and village level. The New Order 
government developed politic of floating mass at sub-district and village level. 
Nowadays, political parties are not rooted at the grass roots level. It is different from 
the 1950s, when political parties were deeply rooted at the grass root level. In 
addition, primordial loyalties are weaker now than in the 1950s due to socio-
economic progress, the improvement of educational facilities, urbanization and the 
impact of the mass media. In the 1950’s ethnic or religious affiliation largely 
determined partisan loyalties and voting behaviour, but the relationship nowadays is 
much more complex (Ufen, 2009, p. 13). The Islamic parties did not gain majority 
vote in 2009 election although the majority of the Indonesian population are Muslim. 
The total votes of the Islamic parties was only 24.15 percent consisting of the PPP 
party (5.32 per cent), PKS party (7.88 per cent), PAN party (6.01 per cent) and PKB 
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party (4.94 per cent) compared with the higher results of secular parties such as the 
Democratic party (20.85 per cent), PDI-P Party (14.03 per cent) and Golkar party 
(14.45 per cent). Therefore, I argue that presently politics of aliran does not exist in 
Indonesia. 
 
According to Robison and Hadiz (2004, p. 258), politics in Indonesia today is driven 
increasingly by the logic of money politics. Candidates for local parliament and 
district heads need funds in order to be nominated in election. In addition, they need 
funds to support   their campaigns during campaign election. The majority of 
candidates give money or material to their constituencies to influence political 
behaviour. The important question is how they generate funds. They can raise funds 
in two ways. Firstly, the candidates generally use their saving and sell their 
properties to generate funds. Secondly, the district head candidates not only use their 
savings but also gain donations from private entrepreneurs or big businessmen. 
Consequently, businessmen will be able to influence political decisions when the 
candidate is successful in holding power. For instance, in the province of Banten, a 
big businessman played an important role in provincial government, especially in 
terms of the economy (Hidayat, 2009, p. 135).  
 
It could be concluded that presently the politics of aliran does not exist in Indonesia, 
and the relationship between politicians and constituency at the grass root level is 
determined by money politics. In addition, politicians usually used local 
organisations to influence political behaviour of constituency. Type of local 
organisations might be different for each region. Therefore, each region has specific 
local organisation which can influence local policy making. For instance, in Gianyar 
politicians use head of Banjar and Desa Pakraman, while in Bantul they use heads 
of hamlets and social organisations at grass root level.  
 
In addition, the local elites of political parties have established networks with the 
national elites of political parties to gain political support in pursuing positions in 
local legislative and executive institutions. For instance, it is no secret that the 
candidate for a district government head has to develop a network with political 
party headquarters to obtain approval through providing money. Based on the 
discussion above, it can be concluded that the implementation of decentralisation can 
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be adopted simultaneously. However, the degree of decentralisation of each types of 
decentralisation may be different. The following section will discuss in detail the 
relationship between local government and small businesses.  
 
1.7. The Potential Impact of Decentralisation on the Relationship between Local 
Government and Small Business   
In this section, the consequence of decentralisation will be put in the context of 
relationships between central and sub-national governments. The degree of 
decentralisation or centralization can be measured by the extent to which sub-
national governments have discretion to make decisions. In relations to small 
businesses, the degree of decentralisation is related to the ability of district 
governments to regulate or promote small businesses at the local level. As discussed 
before, there are three types of decentralisation: administrative, fiscal and political 
decentralisation. Each type of decentralisation is linked to the capacity of district 
government to constrain or support small businesses development.  
 
Administrative decentralisation can be understood as a transfer of functional 
responsibilities from the central government to sub-national governments. As a 
result, the responsibility of local bureaucracy increases and subsequently requires 
local capacity to carry out the increased functions. In relation to small businesses, as 
responsibility of local administration increases, local authorities have more 
administrative discretion to control small business activities by providing a range of 
public services, such as regulatory functions and promotion measures. As a result, 
small business may either enhance their productivity and competitiveness or receive 
restrictive rules and regulations.  
 
In relation to fiscal decentralisation, the central government allows sub-national 
governments to set up their own local taxes/levies and tax/levy rates for small 
businesses. Local governments may create new local taxes/levies and increase 
taxes/levies rate with the aim to increase their revenue. Increased tax/levy rate may 
increase local governments’ revenue, but also may increase financial burden on 
small businesses in paying taxes/levies or receive more material benefits and 
incentives than before. If increased local tax/levy causes financial burden on small 
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business owners, it can be called an exploitative relationship between local 
government and small business. 
 
Increased local government revenue can be used to increase financial and 
technological assistances as well as infrastructure facilities for small businesses. As a 
result, it may increase capital and improve technology in the process of production 
for small businesses. Then, it can increase productivity and profits for small 
businesses. If local small businesses can receive potential benefit and incentive from 
local government, it can be called a supportive relationship between local 
government and small business.   
 In political terms, however, if local authorities are corrupted by clientelism, local 
government will have difficulty in providing financial and technological assistance 
as well as infrastructure facilities for small businesses. Subsequently, they may have 
difficulty in improving their productivity and competitiveness under fiscal 
decentralisation. This means, if local government revenues are corrupted by local 
bureaucrats, they are not supportive to small businesses.  
 
If the central government delegates limited discretion in fiscal policy to sub-national 
governments, the local governments may have their limited capacity to raise their tax 
revenue. As a result, they cannot provide adequate financial and technological 
assistances as well as infrastructure facility for small businesses. To overcome the 
weakness of local fiscal, the central government normally provides local authorities 
with general and specific grants for them.  
 
Political decentralisation is expected to provide small businesses with access to 
participate in the allocation of resources at the local level. Subsequently, the 
decisions regarding resource allocation can be made in accordance with the needs 
and preferences of small businesses. Political decentralisation also creates political 
opportunities for small businesses to elect their preferred local officials. As a result 
local officials may be responsive and accountable to the needs of small businesses. 
However, small businesses must be well informed about the political process of local 
communities and local affairs. They may not participate in the process of local 
decision making if local governments do not provide public information regarding 
the process of policy making.  
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Based on discussion above, decentralisation policy may not automatically increase 
public services or provide favourable material benefits for small businesses. Local 
authorities have more functional responsibilities and administrative discretion; 
however, the increased local tasks need to be supported by the increased fiscal 
capacity and discretion. If they have no sufficient funds to meet the fiscal need, the 
central government will have to provide grants/transfer payments for them. Increased 
public services, financial and technological assistances as well as improved 
infrastructure facilities may accordingly support small businesses in improving their 
productivity as well as increasing their benefit. As a result, prosperous small 
business may contribute to local government revenue by paying more taxes and 
levies. The success of small businesses may further encourage them to become 
politically involved in the process of decision making at the local level. Thus, in the 
context of decentralisation, there is a possible relationship between local government 
and small businesses.  
 
There are two different views in assessing at the relationships between local 
government and the growth of small business. Some scholars argue that local 
governments play an important role in promoting small businesses called supportive 
relationships (Best, 1990; Brusco, 1992; Brusco & Righi, 1989; Trigilia, 1986; 
Wilson, 1995). Support for small businesses is generally based on three reasons. 
Firstly, there are benefits for the country as a whole from having a strong small 
business sector because the sector creates a large proportion of employment in most 
countries. Secondly, a strong small business sector will not emerge without support 
from the state because of failures to provide fair market places to this sector, in 
relation to big business’ competitiveness. This sector suffers disadvantages in the 
markets because of their size of businesses. Thirdly, programs aimed at supporting a 
small business sector have been justified more in terms of their welfare impact than 
economic efficiency because support for this sector is seen as a way to help the poor 
(Humphrey & Schmitz, 1996, p. 1859). 
 
Other scholars, such as Schmitz and Musyck (1994), Humphrey and Schmitz (1996) 
and Rabelloti  (1995), argue that the role of local governments in supporting small 
businesses is less important. For instance, in the cases of European industrial 
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districts such as those in Italy, Southern German, Denmark and Belgium, the 
emergence of the industrial districts did not result from the government’s strategy. 
The district government generally does not play any important role in the early phase 
of growth of industrial districts, but takes a role in the later stage of growth of 
industrial districts (Humphrey & Schmitz, 1996; Schmitz & Musyck, 1994). Based 
on a case study in two clusters of footwear industries in Italy and two cluster 
enterprises in Mexico, Rabelloti (1995, p. 39) found that local governments did not 
play any active role in industrial policy at all. Based on those cases, the relationship 
is called by un-supportive relationship.  
 
Based on the case study in Italy, local trade unions and small firms employers’ 
organisation had a potential power to bargain with local policy maker in order to 
have policy in accordance with the interests of small businesses (Pyke, 1992, p. 29). 
In another case in Thailand, business associations had power to bargain in reducing a 
variety of transaction costs for small businesses (Brimble, Oldfield, & Monsakul, 
2002, p. 226). It indicates that business associations can have power to bargain with 
policy makers to make policy in accordance with the interests of small businesses. In 
this context, it is called a bargaining relationship between district government and 
small businesses.  
 
The role of district government in promoting small businesses has been much 
discussed by many scholars. According to Trigilia (1986) and Wilson (1995), as a 
result of decentralisation policy, the district government has two roles in promoting 
small businesses: the role associated with regulator to small businesses such as 
business license regulation and protection regulation; and the role dealing with 
promotion to small businesses such as financial, training and technological 
assistance as well as infrastructure facilities.  
 
In practice, the extent to which local governments provide public services for small 
businesses may be different from each other. In Modena, Italy, for instance, local 
government supports small businesses through three kinds of intervention: policy of 
land use and construction, financial assistance and creation of “real service centre”, 
which is directed to supply information, technology and market (Brusco & Righi, 
1989). According to Brusco (1992, p. 187), “The provision of real services involves 
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supplying companies, in return for payment, with those goods or services that they 
require instead of giving them the money that they need to go out and buy these 
goods or services on the market.” The provision of information regarding technical 
standard of products in various foreign countries and services regarding the test of 
products of small businesses are such cases in point.  
 
In the case of the Canadian small business, local government promotes small 
business through the creation of broad networks with production companies, service 
firms as well as local institutions (Julien, 1992). Beyond the role of local 
government, social and political environment can affect local administration in 
developing small businesses. In some countries like Italy, German and Japan, as will 
be discussed below, political parties can influence industrial policy at the local level.    
 
In relation to politics, political parties usually use small businesses to obtain votes in 
elections (Patterson, 1994, p. 430). On the other hand, small businesses can use 
political parties to support their interests (Schmitz & Musyck, 1994, p. 904).  In 
Japan, a political party also played an important role in promoting small businesses. 
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians politicized small businesses with the 
aim to electoral purpose (Patterson, 1994, p. 430). The electoral support obtained 
from small businesses may affect the amount of financial aid extended through 
government institutions to small businesses (Patterson, 1994, p. 442). In other words, 
the government’s policy on small business was driven by politicians’ interest to 
obtain votes in elections. In another case in Baden-Wurttemberg, German, the local 
government is led by the Christian Democrat party that took the lead in shaking off 
simplistic neo-liberal prescriptions about industrial policy (Schmitz & Musyck, 
1994, p. 904).  
 
Small business development in Italy in the decade of 1980s was a result of the 
process of adjustment of economic and social tension. Political parties and interest 
groups in Italy played an important role in the process (Trigilia, 1986). In responding 
the development of capitalism and the creation of the nation-state at the end of 
nineteenth centuries, the parties established socialism and Catholicism in local areas. 
In the areas where socialist party was predominant, this process involved unions, 
labour organisations, friendly societies, cooperatives and communes, whereas in the 
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areas where Catholic party was predominant, it involved a network of rural savings 
and other banks, agricultural organisations, cooperatives and friendly societies 
(Trigilia, 1986, p. 165).    
 
Does central government still play an important role in developing small businesses 
under decentralisation era? Based on development experience in many countries, 
central governments were still involved in promoting small businesses. In the case of 
small businesses in South Korea, for instance, the central government was quite 
influential to provide financial loans to small businesses. Even, under Chun Doo 
Hwan’s authoritarian regime (1980-1988), the government gave small businesses 
better access to bank loans than large firms (Park, 2001, p. 851). Under the 
democratic regime, starting in 1997, the South Korean government was more 
focused on helping small businesses by increasing the total loans ceiling to US $6.3 
billion in 1998 from the US $ 3 billion one year before (Gregory, 2002, p. 249).   
 
In Japan, both central and local governments play a vital role in promoting small 
businesses. The central government was active in developing small businesses 
through developing financial institutions given tasks to distribute loans and 
providing technological and infrastructure assistance for small businesses (Park, 
2001; Patterson, 1994). At the same time, local governments were actively involved 
in facilitating, physically housing and providing services for small businesses. For 
instance, a number of technical centres known as kohsetushi, are scattered across 
Japan for making technical assistance and management advice to many small 
businesses at local level (Aoyama, 2000, p. 55).  
 
In Malaysia, the central government policy supported small business started in 1960s 
when the Malaysian government established the First Five Year National 
Development Plan (1966-1970). This national policy was restated under the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 and reaffirmed in the following Five Year National 
Development Plan (M. A. Abdullah, 1999; Lim, 1986). The national government 
program offered to small businesses could be classified into six targets: financial and 
credit assistance, entrepreneur development, business management and human 
resources management, consultancy and marketing services, technical and vocational 
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programs, locational and infrastructural facilities and fiscal incentives (M. A. 
Abdullah, 2002, p. 196).  
Based on experiences of development in Italy, Canada and Japan, the local 
government plays an important role in supporting small businesses by improving 
regulations and promoting financial, technological assistances as well as 
infrastructure facilities. On the other hand, other cases such as those in South Korea, 
Japan and Malaysia indicate that their central governments still heavily engage in 
supporting and promoting small businesses. The important question is: how the 
Indonesian government policy has developed in the area of small businesses? 
   
Both the central and local governments in Indonesia play an important role in 
promoting small businesses. The Indonesian national government introduced three 
groups of policies to help small businesses: financial policy, technical assistance, and 
regulation (Hill, 2001, p. 250). Firstly, the financial assistance policy involved 
subsidized credits and a requirement that banks should allocate a certain percentage 
of their portfolio to small businesses. This policy reached a peak during the oil boom 
period 1973-1982. Secondly, technical assistance involving training schemes, 
industrial extension services, specialized vocational programs, and domestic and 
international marketing advisory services started in 1969. Thirdly, regulations 
referred to various policies intended to promote small businesses such as program 
bapak angkat (foster-parent program) where large businesses were supposed to sub-
contract a part of work to small businesses, reservation schemes in which only firms 
of a certain size are permitted to produce some goods, preferential government 
procurement programs and regulation reform for business permits. This policy 
started in 1980s when the Indonesian government introduced regulation reform on 
business sector. However, in 2001 the Indonesian national government devolved 
small business development to the district governments as a result of decentralisation 
policy. Subsequently, the central government plays a less important role while the 
district governments assume a more responsibility in developing small businesses. 
As a result, the relationship between district governments and small businesses is 
expected to change significantly.  
 
However, during the decentralisation era, many regions developed new taxes as 
instruments to increase district government income. They caused increased financial 
69 
 
 
 
burden and other harmful effects for business sector (Collongon, 2003; SMERU, 
2002). By increasing taxes, it was hard to imagine that local businesses could 
flourish in local regions. This indicates that relation between district government and 
small business which is called an exploitative relationship. 
 
Based on the discussion above, relationships between local government and small 
business can be analysed from three aspects. The first is a regulatory aspect. 
Regulations deal with the rules of business licensing, local policy on taxes/levies and 
protection policy (Trigilia, 1986; Wilson, 1995). Second is the promotional aspect 
that is associated with financial, training and technological assistance and 
infrastructure facilities (Brusco, 1992; Brusco & Righi, 1989; Julien, 1992). Third is 
a political influence with the aim to analyse the political influence of local 
authorities over small businesses and participation of small businesses in the process 
of decision making (Patterson, 1994; Schmitz & Musyck, 1994; Trigilia, 1986). Each 
aspect will be discussed from three types of relationship (Table 1.1). 
 
Relationships between local government and small business can be examined from 
the three types of supportive relationship (Aoyama, 2000; Best, 1990; Brusco, 1992; 
Brusco & Righi, 1989; Trigilia, 1986; Wilson, 1995); bargaining relationship 
(Brimble et al., 2002; Patterson, 1994; Pyke, 1992) and exploitative relationship 
(Collongon, 2003; SMERU, 2002).  Each aspect and type of relationship will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
1.7.1. Regulation for Small Businesses 
As discussed above regarding administrative decentralisation, decentralisation aims 
to reach efficiency in public services. In relation to efficiency of public services for 
small businesses, district governments need to carry out regulation reforms regarding 
business licenses, local levies and protection policies for small businesses.  
 
Local regulations mean using laws made by local government to affect the business 
sector. Transparent and clear regulations can promote the business sector but 
complicated regulations can hinder the progress of this sector. Local regulations 
involve allowing or prohibiting activities in the business sector through the legal 
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system such as licenses, taxes, levies, and protection (Hughes, 1998, p. 89) that will 
be discussed in the next section.  
 
1.7.1.1. Business License Policy 
Regulation can be divided into economic and social regulations. The former aims at 
encouraging business and other economic actors to undertake certain activities and to 
avoid other activities. The social regulation is understood as attempting to protect the 
interests of citizens and consumers (Hughes, 1998, p. 89). In practice, a regulation 
may include economic and social rules. For instance, business license rules may not 
only aim to promote business sector but also to protect the public from the dangers 
of pollution. The regulations concerning business licenses need to be transparent 
with clear mention the cost of each type of business license as well as duration of 
time of the process of business licenses. 
 
However, a World Bank study (World-Bank, 2005, p. 244) found that in the 
Indonesian case, license regulations are complex and cause many policy 
uncertainties. As a result, the business sector has been constrained rather than 
promoted in this sense. Complex rules and uncertainty policies can cause black 
market and illegal fees in the process of business license. This indicates that the local 
government does not support small businesses. It is called an unsupportive 
relationship between local government and small business.  
 
1.7.1.2. Tax and Levy Policy for Small Businesses 
As discussed before, fiscal decentralisation provides more opportunities for local 
governments to create types of local taxes/levies and change local tax rates with the 
aim to increase their fiscal capacity. In contrast, local government can minimize 
local tax rates and provide better public services to attract new investors. In practice, 
different countries have different policies on taxation. In Sweden, the constitution 
allows local governments to raise taxes independently thus creating a great deal of 
administrative autonomy, whereas in Japan, local taxes are centrally regulated 
(Takao, 1999, p. 16). In Indonesia, all local regulations on local taxes must be 
approved by the central government and the central government has identified kinds 
of permissible local taxes as stipulated in Law No. 34/2000.   
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Local taxes need to meet the criteria as good taxes. According to Bailey (1999, p. 
154),  the criteria for taxation efficiency are as follows:  
(1) equity in horizontal and vertical terms for which taxpayers in similar 
financial situations should pay similar amounts of tax and taxes and should 
not take higher proportions of income from low-income groups than from 
high-income groups;  
(2) allocative efficiency that local taxes should promote;  
(3) economy that local taxes should achieve in order not to be so costly to collect 
and to be simple to understand and easy to comply with;  
(4) accountability to taxpayers who should know exactly how much and why 
they are paying taxes;  
(5) revenue sufficiency for which the tax yields should be sufficient to finance 
the levels of services for local people; and  
(6) local autonomy to the extent which local government and their taxpayers are 
free to determine the kinds and rates of taxes. 
Therefore, district governments need to use these criteria above to stipulate new 
local taxes in order to increase economic efficiency and social equity.  
 
Taxes can be used by local government to encourage the business sector. Local 
government can promote the business sector by adopting low taxes/levies rates. As a 
result, the business sector will grow as suggested by Tiebout (1956). According to 
Tiebout (1956, p. 418), fiscal decentralisation can promote competition among sub-
national governments for limiting their taxing power and maximizing their service 
delivery. Citizens can exit from local governments providing unsatisfactory services 
and taxes, moving to those providing their welfare and cheap tax rate. Therefore, 
businessmen will move to localities where public services and taxes are acceptable 
and in favour of their business activities.  
 
I argue that Tiebout’s theory is less relevant in the case of Indonesia because local 
taxes are stipulated by the central government. Types of local taxes and tax rate 
among regions are the same, so that taxes are not influential in competing among 
regions to promote the business sector. This is different from the Federal state, where 
a sub-national government has authority to decide types of taxes and tax rates. In 
Indonesia, local governments have limited authority to decide types of local taxes, 
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but the local governments have more discretion in local levies because local 
governments have authority to enact the local levies rate. Thus, local levies could 
cause competition between regions to attract investors or promote the businesses 
sector.  
 
In contrast, if local governments have small revenue, they may increase their revenue 
by developing heavy taxes/levies for small businesses called an exploitative 
relationship between local government and small businesses. However, heavy local 
tax can cause difficulty for small businesses to develop. In turn, a majority of small 
business owners might disobey local regulations on business permits and operate 
without licenses. As a result, local government might not be able to control small 
businesses. 
 
1.7.1.3. Protection Policy for Small Businesses 
Do local governments stipulate protection policy to small businesses? In a market 
economy such as in the United States, small businesses have difficulty in competing 
with big businesses because they of lack of capital,  networks and access to market. 
Without protection policies, small businesses may be unable to compete in market 
places with large businesses. In a state in which developmental orientation 
predominates such as South Korea,
19
 state authority also plays an important role in 
protecting small businesses sector because the failure of market to support financial 
and technical assistance to this sector.  
 
Under decentralisation, local regulations are expected to meet the needs of small 
businesses because local policy makers – executive and legislative – are now 
popularly elected by local communities. If small business is a primary source of their 
tax revenue and if employees represent a large proportion of their constituency, then 
elected local officials need political support from the small business sector. Local 
policy makers are thus likely to formulate and implement protection policies for 
small businesses. 
                                                 
19
 In the process of industrialization, the state historically carried out economic functions in which 
there are two different orientations of national economy: market economy driven by market 
rationality or regulatory orientation (for example: the United States) and state-led economy 
(developmental functions).  
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In the Indonesian experience, during the centralized political system (1968-1998), 
the policy on trade and investment promotion as well as monetary policy provided 
more benefits to the large industries, and they did not preferentially protect small 
businesses (Hill, 2001; Sandee & Van Dierman, 2004). Started in 2001 the 
Indonesian government implemented decentralisation, so the policy on trade and 
industry including small business was delegated to sub-national governments. As a 
result, the role of central government in developing small businesses became less 
important. In contrast, the role of district governments became more influential. In 
this context, district governments were able to make specific policies with the aim to 
protect small businesses against big businesses. The next section will discuss the role 
of local government in promoting small businesses. 
 
1.7.2. Promotion Policy for Small Businesses 
As discussed in administrative decentralisation before, district governments have 
more functions as a result of decentralisation policy. One of the functions of district 
government is to promote the business sector. In relations to small business 
development, district governments are legally in a position to provide financial and 
technological assistance as well as infrastructure facilities for small businesses as 
carried out by local governments in Italy (Brusco, 1992). In contrast, if local 
governments have limited financial resources, they may less provide financial 
assistance and infrastructure facilities for small businesses. The next section will 
explore financial assistance from local government and financial institutions to small 
businesses.    
 
1.7.2.1. Financial Assistance for Small Businesses 
The sources of fund raising for small businesses are classified into many types: state-
owned banks, private banks, leasing companies, other non-bank financial 
institutions, money lenders, family and relations. For small businesses, access to 
credit is essential to finance the upgrade of technology, to expand production 
capacity and to purchase larger inputs and better material. However, small-scale 
businesses generally have difficulty in obtaining credits from formal financial 
institutions due to collateral and administrative requirements, while credits from 
non-financial institutions impose very high interest on small business (Bannock, 
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2005; Freeeman, 2004; Liedholm & Mead, 1999; Lim, 1992a). As a result, small 
businesses have difficulty in increasing their productivity and competitiveness.  
 
By implementing fiscal decentralisation, local governments have more power to 
allocate local budgets in providing financial assistance for small businesses. There 
are two ways to help small business in relation to financial assistance. Firstly, local 
government can establish its public institution for job creation in the small business 
sector. Secondly, local governments can develop a network with state/private banks 
and village financial institutions in order to provide credits to small businesses. The 
local government can deposit funds to financial institutions, so that the financial 
institutions will have greater funds to be distributed to small businesses. The 
financial assistance is extended to increase capital or to upgrade technology of small 
businesses. Based on the experience in the case of Italy and Denmark, the local 
financial institutions or local banks played a vital role in promoting small businesses.  
According to Becattini (2004, p. 29), at the local level in Italy, the main reason for 
small businesses being at a disadvantage compared to large ones, was because of 
difficult access to credits. He suggests that establishing local commercial bank is the 
best way to help small businesses because it is very closely linked with local small 
businesses and knows the needs of them.  In the case of Staling district, Denmark, 
Kristensen (1992) describes the importance of local banks during the setting up of 
the businesses: 
….many furniture makers have traditionally used skills as carpenters and 
cabinet-makers to start up in the building and construction industry during 
boom periods in local industry……. In such initial periods, the small local 
savings banks have been able to use their detailed local knowledge as a basis 
for providing loans for the creation of new building and construction 
businesses (Kristensen, 1992, p. 149). 
 
It is clear that local banks can be responsive to the needs of local small businesses 
because they are closely positioned to them and involved in the local life of small 
businesses. 
 
1.7.2.2. Training and Technological Assistance 
The success of small businesses is not only dependent on small business 
entrepreneurs but also on workers. Unfortunately, most workers have low levels of 
formal education or no practical training. Small businesses generally do not have the 
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resources to provide training programs for improving the quality of workers. There is 
no doubt that small businesses do carry out less training for employees and managers 
than large businesses  (Bannock, 2005, p. 147). As a result, small businesses produce 
a low quality of products and have a limited market. 
 
The low education and lack of skill of small business workers can be overcome by 
providing training programs (Freeeman, 2004, p. 228). Local government can also 
cooperate with non-government organisations or state-owned enterprises to provide 
training to small businesses. By providing training to small businesses, it will 
improve the quality of productivity.    
 
Further, technology can provide small businesses with an opportunity to increase 
their efficiency and productivity with tools to better manage their business. For an 
example, Malaysian government provides technological assistance to small 
businesses by issuing matching grants (Saleh & Ndubisi, 2008, p. 289).  
 
In a market economy such as in the United States, small businesses have to compete 
with big businesses which have huge capital, extensive business networks and are 
supported by high technology. Although adopting a free market policy, the US 
government has a long history of government help for small businesses. The Small 
Business Administration (SBA), established in 1953 to champion small business, 
provides them with financial, technical and management assistances  
(Shanmugaratnam, 2004, p. xix). The technical assistance includes training and 
marketing advice services. It is clear that government intervention is necessary in 
developing small businesses by facilitating training, infrastructure and technological 
assistance for the small business.  
 
1.7.2.3. Infrastructure Facilities 
As discussed before, in fiscal decentralisation the district government has fiscal 
discretion to allocate its funds in improving physical infrastructure facilities for 
small businesses, such as roads, markets building, electricity and telephone networks 
or what Brusco calls “real service” (Brusco, 1992). For instance, if the district 
government can improve roads between city centre and small business villages, the 
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buyers can easily come to these villages for shopping. Developing market buildings 
is important to facilitate small businesses in selling their products.   
Developing physical infrastructure is influenced by the financial capacity of local 
governments. If the local government has a lack of financial capacity, as a result of 
poor local resources, the central government needs to provide grants for them. As 
discussed above, the experience of development in Japan indicates that the central 
government plays an important role in promoting small businesses while at the same 
time local governments also promote them by providing housing and technical 
assistance as well as management advice (Aoyama, 2000, p. 55). 
 
1.7.3. Political Influence over Small Businesses  
Political decentralisation can change the relationship between local government and 
small businesses. Firstly, elected public officials and political parties attempt to 
approach small businesses with the aim to gain good will for electoral and political 
purposes. As mentioned above, Italian political parties in the decade of 1980s played 
an important role in developing small businesses (Trigilia, 1986). In the case of 
Japan, politicians influence bureaucrats in providing financial assistance to small 
businesses based on political support obtained from them (Patterson, 1994). In 
another case in Baden-Wurttemberg in German, the Christian Democrat party 
influenced the local government in policy-making on industrial districts (Schmitz & 
Musyck, 1994). In this context, the activities of small businesses may be politicized 
by local politicians and authorities because there are many potential voters from the 
small business sector. It can be concluded that bureaucrats and politicians can 
promote small businesses by providing financial assistance and support regulation. It 
can be called a supportive relationship between local government and small 
businesses.  
 
Secondly, decentralisation policy creates a greater opportunity for small businesses 
to participate in the process of decision making. Therefore, they can articulate their 
interest and preferences. As a result, local policy may be made in accordance with 
the needs of small businesses. Participation of small businesses in the process of 
decision making can be classified into two levels: Individual and organisational. At 
the individual level, small businesses can be involved in the process of decision- 
making in local government and participate in a political party. As discussed in 
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beginning this chapter, political decentralisation is designed to devolve political 
authority or electoral capacity to sub-national governments. This means political 
decentralisation allows local citizens and small businesses to directly elect local 
leader and local parliament members as well as participate in local policy making. 
Thus, political decentralisation provides political space for small to be active in 
political activities and decision making process.  
At the organisational level, small business can use business associations to influence 
local policy. Business associations have voices and potential power to influential 
local government policy. In the case of Italy, for instance, local trade unions and 
small firms employers’ organisation have helped to persuade local governments to 
become more responsive to needs of local small businesses (Pyke, 1992, p. 29). 
Another case, for an example, in Thailand, business association can reduce a variety 
of transaction costs for small businesses by helping pool resources and disseminate 
information to its members. Additionally, business associations can foster linkages 
within an industry between the various producers and suppliers in the value chain 
(Brimble et al., 2002, p. 226). It indicates that business associations have power to 
make a bargain with policy makers with the aim to produce suitable policy for the 
interests of small businesses. In the case of Indonesia, it is important to explore 
whether business associations at the local level such as Kadinda and Dekranas are 
able to influence district government policy regarding the business sector.     
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Table 1.1 
Type of Relationship between Local Government and Small Business 
 
Aspects Typology of Relationship  
 
Supportive 
 
Bargaining Exploitative 
1. Regulation 1. Transparent and clear 
procedure for 
obtaining business 
licenses. 
2. Light tax/levy on small 
businesses  
3. Protection policy for 
small businesses 
Small businesses and 
business associations are 
involved in the process 
of local regulation 
making 
 
1. Heavy tax/levy 
on business 
licenses 
 
2. Punishment for 
small businesses 
without license  
2, Promotion Local governments 
provide:  
1.  Financial assistance,  
2. Training and 
technological 
assistances  
3. Infrastructure 
facilities to small 
businesses  
 
1. There is a sharing of 
the cost of 
organizing the 
exhibition business 
between small 
business owners and 
local government 
2. Business 
associations can 
pressure local  
government to 
reduce a variety of 
transaction cost for 
small businesses 
 
Local governments 
set up loans with 
high interest for 
small businesses 
 
3. Politics Local bureaucrats and 
politicians respond the 
needs and interests of 
small business owners 
1. Business 
associations have 
network with 
political parties or 
district head 
 
2. Business 
associations can 
pressure policy 
makers to make 
policy in accordance 
with the interests of 
small businesses. 
 
3. Small businesses 
can influence 
political parties.  
Politicians use small 
business owners to 
support their 
political position, 
but they are not able 
to help small 
businesses.  
 
  
 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
Based on the discussion above, the impact of decentralisation on the relationship 
between local government and small businesses will be analysed from three aspects:  
regulation, promotion and political influence. The regulation aspect attempts to 
analyse the relationships between local government and small business from 
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business licenses, tax/levy and protection policy, whereas the promotion policy 
aspect examines the extent to which the relationships from policy on financial, 
training and technological assistance as well as infrastructures facilities. Then, the 
political influence aspect explores how local authorities influence small businesses 
and the extent to which small businesses can be involved in the process of decision 
making at the local level.       
 
Further, each aspect above can be categorised into three possible relationships: 
supportive, bargaining and exploitative (Table 1.1). However, each aspect may have 
one or more characteristic of relationships. This is because each aspect consists of 
several sub-aspects or indicators.  
 
A comparative approach will be taken in this study to examine the impact of 
decentralisation on the relationships between local government and small businesses 
in two different sites, Bantul and Gianyar districts. As discussed before, the social, 
economic and political settings of Bantul and Gianyar are different with each other. 
Socially, Bantul is heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and religion, but Gianyar is 
homogenous. Economically, Bantul is supported by the agriculture sector with low 
income per capita. On the other hand, Gianyar is supported by the industrial and 
trade sector with high income per capita. Politically, Bantul has multi-political 
parties: political parties based on religions and political parties based on secular 
nationalists, whereas Gianyar has only secular nationalist parties. By comparing the 
two different regions, this project will assess more accurately their similarities and 
differences in the impact of decentralisation policy.  
 
By starting to analyse the impact of decentralisation on the relationships between 
local government and small businesses, the next two chapters examine existing 
social, economic and political structures of Bantul and Gianyar. The objective is to 
provide insights into how decentralisation influences the dynamics of local political 
activities and changes of institutions of local governments to promote small 
businesses. It will indicate that decentralisation policy has different impacts on 
existing social, economic and political structures in the two different districts. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL  
SETTING OF BANTUL  
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a survey of the social, economic and political setting of Bantul 
as a basis for examining the case of Bantul. The survey first describes the existing 
social, economic and political structures that may influence the implementation of 
decentralisation measures. 
 
The economic and political structures are important variables because they can play 
an important role in promoting or preventing the implementation of decentralisation. 
Economic structures such as the level of gross district product and the availability of 
natural resources can determine the fiscal capacity. The implementation of 
decentralisation is influenced by the scope of fiscal decentralisation. Thus, if the 
district government has a high level of fiscal capacity, it may meet the fiscal needs of 
local communities. In contrast, district governments with poor natural resources may 
have limited source of tax revenues. As a result they will face fiscal constraints on 
the delivery of decentralised functions and the provision of public services for small 
businesses. Therefore, implementation of administrative decentralisation is 
influenced by fiscal capacity. The following section discusses the political 
decentralisation in relation to popular participation. 
 
Political decentralisation can provide an opportunity for small business owners to 
participate in electing the district head and local legislature members. A large 
number of small business owners in Bantul may play an important role in the 
election of the district head and local legislature members as well as participate in 
the decision-making process. Business associations such as Dekranas (Bantul 
Handicraft Board), Kandinda (Bantull Chamber of Industry and Trade) and Bantul 
Craft Association can also play an important role in the decision-making process at a 
district level. These associations can persuade district governments to become more 
responsive to the needs of small business. The implementation of decentralisation 
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measures needs to be adopted by the district government with specific demographic 
and socio-economic conditions. The central point is to explore how the specific 
district may promote or constrain the process of decentralisation. 
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section accounts for the impact of 
a geographic and demographic setting on the implementation of decentralisation 
policies. It seeks to examine how geographic factors, such as the location, land area, 
size of population, and availability of natural resources in Bantul promote or prevent 
the implementation of decentralisation measures. The second section concerns the 
economic structure of Bantul. It will explore the extent to which economic factors, 
such as the gross district product, economic growth rates, locally derived revenue, 
the industrial sector and employment trends in Bantul affect the autonomous 
capacity (especially financial capacity) of Bantul district to manage local affairs. The 
third section discusses political institutions such as  political parties and the local 
parliament. It examines the extent to which political parties and local parliament 
have changed since the decentralisation era and whether or not they try to promote 
small businesses. The fourth section concerns local bureaucracy. It discusses how the 
implementation of decentralisation policy influences the local bureaucracy’s 
behaviour and style of district head leadership in providing services for small 
businesses. The fifth section assesses how the social structure of Bantul, such as 
citizens’ groups, business and neighbourhood associations affect the decentralisation 
process. This chapter argues that the social and political factors of Bantul provide a 
positive contribution to the implementation of decentralisation, while economic 
factors provide less support.  
 
2.2. The Geographic and Demographic Setting 
The location, size of the area, natural resources and the size of the population of 
Bantul district may influence the implementation of decentralisation policy. For 
instance, natural resources influence the district government’s income. In turn, the 
district government income may influence the implementation of administrative and 
political decentralisation. The district government needs the financial capacity to 
implement decentralised functions as a result of administrative decentralisation. 
Besides that, the district government needs financial support for implementing 
elections of the district head and local legislature members.  
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2.2.1. The  Location, Area and Natural Resources. 
Bantul is a district of the Special Province of Yogyakarta, located about 25 km south 
of Yogyakarta city. Administratively the territory of Bantul consists of 17 kecamatan 
(sub-districts). There are 75 villages that are distributed into 17 sub-districts within 
an area of 506.85 square kilometers. The territory of Bantul is bordered by 
Yogyakarta city and the district of Sleman to the north, Gunungkidul in the east, 
Kulonprogo in the west, and the Indonesian ocean in the south (Figure 2.1). 
 
The size of the Bantul district is smaller than that of other districts outside Java. In 
comparison, the district of Kutai Kartanegara in the province of East Kalimantan has 
an area 27,263.10 km². The district of Buru in the province of Maluku has an area of 
12,655 km². District of Lahat in the province of the South Sumatera has an area of 
6,618.27 km². The district of Koala in province of the Southeast Sulawesi has an area 
of 6,918.38 km². As expected, small areas can be more easily controlled by a district 
head than larger areas. Thus, Bantul has a significant opportunity to implement 
decentralisation policy effectively because of its small area. The distance between 
the centre of district government and the most remote area of sub-districts is 
approximately 40 km, allowing the district government to efficiently provide better 
public services to small businesses and local citizens. 
 
In recent times, the Bantul district has become known as an important tourist site 
where local people produce ceramics, handicrafts, woodcarvings and other fine arts 
for overseas and domestics markets (Sulistiyanto, 2009, p. 192). The Bantul district 
also has beautiful beaches, such as Parangtritis and Samas, which attract tourists. 
These two beaches play an important role in contributing to locally derived revenue 
because visitors have to buy admission tickets to enter the beach regions. Many 
small businesses also operate on these two beaches. As more tourists come into the 
region, greater opportunities are being created for small businesses to sell their 
products. The Bantul District has also developed market building to promote small 
businesses. In 2004, the Bantul district established the Gabusan Art Market (Pasar 
Seni Gabusan) for developing small businesses, located on the main road between 
Yogyakarta city and Parangtritis beach with the aim at inviting tourists to buy small 
businesses’ products. By facilitating the market, the small businesses are expected to 
develop. Concurrent with Bantul as a tourist destination there are natural resources in 
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Bantul and the extent to which natural resources also support the implementation of 
decentralisation needs to be considered.   
 
    Figure 2.1. 
Map of Bantul District 
 
      Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul, (2008a). 
 
Bantul is different from the local governments outside of Java such as the district of 
Kutai Kartanegara and Bontang East Kalimantan and the municipality of Dumai in 
province of Riau, which are rich in natural resources and have extensive forests. 
Bantul does not have any of those same potential natural resources, such as forestry, 
general mining, oil, natural gas or geothermal mining. Unlike other surrounding 
districts, the government of Bantul cannot rely on natural resources to support the 
infrastructure nor can it support the implementation of decentralisation. In addition, 
some areas in the Bantul region are limestone hills, and thus not fertile for 
agriculture. A lack of agricultural products also limits district government income. 
An examination of the population of Bantul, however, also indicates that there are 
many individuals below the poverty line, as will be discussed below. 
 
2.2.2. The Population 
In 2008, Bantul’s population was 909,812 people, approximately 26 percent of 
Province of Yogyakarta and a population density of around 1,752 persons per km². 
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The high population density in the small area allows local government to easily 
provide physical infrastructures such as roads, school buildings and hospital 
buildings due to the lower level of finance required compared to a larger area. In 
2008, the percentage of population age between 0-14 years old was 22.86 percent, 
15–39 year olds at 41 percent, and 36.07 percent were above the age of 40. This 
means that the majority of population aged between 15-39 and 40-65 which may 
contribute the dynamic of business activities.  
 
The total population below the poverty line was 229,436 people (25 percent 
equalling to 57,539 families). More than 10 percent of the population had never 
attended primary school. These statistics caused a financial burden for local 
government because of the need to provide financial assistance for the poorer 
families. The district government head (Bupati) of Bantul focused on two programs 
to overcome the problem: health and education programs, by providing health 
insurance for poor families and scholarships for less fortunate students. This means 
local government needed to allocate more of the local budget for health and 
education sectors. As a result, there was a limited local budget for developing public 
roads and transportation, and adopting new technologies for supporting services.  
 
Around 25 percent of Bantul’s population work in the agricultural sector. The 
remaining 21 percent are in trade sector, approximately 19 percent in the industrial 
sector and around 16 percent work in the services sector. The rest are distributed in 
building construction, transportation, mining and finance sectors. As indicated 
previously, a large portion of the population work in agriculture and their income is 
generally low. Data shows that the income per capita in 2007 was Rp 3.448.948
20
 or 
approximately US $381 per year. These figures equate to approximately 19 hours of 
paid work (two days work) in Australia. According to the World Bank’s 
measurement, based on US$ 2 per day, the income per capita of population of Bantul 
districts was below the poverty line. Since the implementation of decentralisation 
policy, the income per capita has not changed significantly (Table 2.3). The 
following discusses religion, culture and political party with the aim to explore the 
relationship between religion and political party membership.  
                                                 
20
US $1is equivalent with Rp. 9,050 in 24 September 2011. 
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 Culturally, the people of Bantul are Javanese. According to data from the Bantul 
Statistics Bureau, about 95.12 percent are Muslims with others distributed among 
four other religions:  Catholic 3.18 percent, Protestant 1.58 percent, Hindu 0.08 
percent and Budhist 0.05 percent. Most of the Muslims are related to 
Muhammadiyah (modern Islamic organisation) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or 
traditional Islamic organisation. The Muhammadiyah is associated with National 
Mandate Party, whereas Nahdatul Ulama is associated with the National Awakening 
Party. The differences of political affiliation between Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul 
Ulama potentially contribute to local political dynamics and the implementation of 
decentralisation as the two organisations participate in political arena.    
 
2.3. Economic Structure 
This section will discuss Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), the district 
government’s revenue and industrial sectors in Bantul with the aim to understand the 
extent to which they provide financial capacity for implementing decentralisation 
policy.  
 
2.3.1. The Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) 
The economic structure of Bantul is supported by: the agricultural sector, which 
accounts for around 24 percent of GRDP; the manufacturing industry sector 
contributed around 17 percent; the trade, hotel and restaurant sector which accounted 
for around 19 percent in 2007 and the services sector which contributed 13 percent. 
The remaining 23 percent was distributed across other sectors. During 2005-2007 
almost all sectors were stagnant, except for the construction sector. This sector rose 
around 50 percent due to the increased need for housing in Bantul as a result of 
rising urban to rural migration. Many citizens live in the Bantul and commute to 
work in the city of Yogyakarta (Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1 
Percentage of Distribution of Gross Regional Domestic Product of  
Bantul District at Constant Price 2000, 2005-2007 
 
No. Sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1. Agriculture 27.75 27.16 24.89 24.69 24.31 
2. Minning 1.42 1.61 1.01 1.03 1.02 
3. Manufacturing Industry 18.86 18.87 19.93 17.22 16.88 
4. Electricity, Gas and 
Water Supply 
0.48 0.56 0.90 0.82 0.85 
5. Construction 8.15 7.46 8.54 11.57 11.99 
6. Trade, Hotel and 
Restaurant 
17.39 17.96 18.95 18.92 19.12 
7. Transport and 
Communication 
6.58 7.35 6.88 6.65 6.81 
8. Financial 5.14 5.09 6.34 5.86 5.87 
9. Services 14.23 13.93 12.98 13.24 13.15 
 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2008a, p. 377). 
 
The contribution from the agricultural sector to the GRDP decreased slightly from 27 
percent in 2003 to 24 percent in 2007. This is largely due to the decreasing size of 
the agricultural area, as some farmable land was then used for housing. For instance, 
the size of the agricultural area decreased about 289,335 ha or 0.06 percent during 
2002-2006. At the same time, the share of the manufacturing sector to the GRDP 
also decreased slightly. This means that efforts by the Bantul district to develop the 
industrial sector were unsuccessful. The percentage distribution of trade, hotel and 
restaurant sector increased slowly from 17.39 percent in 2003 to 19.12 percent in 
2007. Thus, it was insignificant for the GRDP. The implementation of 
decentralisation policy may have encountered difficulties for two reasons: Firstly, 
the economic structure of Bantul was dependent on the agricultural sector which was 
limited in future growth. Secondly, the growth of industrial sector was slow and 
provided only a small contribution to GRDP (Table 2.1 and Table 2.10). 
 
Economically, Bantul still depends on the activities of workers who commute to 
Yogyakarta city (Sulistiyanto, 2009). Bantul’s large population also supplies cheap 
labour for Yogyakarta city. In addition, Bantul supplies a variety of agricultural 
products to the markets of Yogyakarta city (Huisman and Stoffer 1998). This means 
that, any increase in demand for agricultural products in Yogyakarta will provide 
more benefit for agricultural suppliers from Bantul. Some products of small 
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businesses in Bantul are also sold in markets of Yogyakarta city. Therefore, the 
dynamics of markets of Yogyakarta city may influence the degree of business 
activities in Bantul.      
 
The economic growth of Bantul averaged 4.29 percent through 2002-2007 and did 
not significantly changed with the exeption of 2004 when the economic growth rate 
increased to 5 percent. This may related to the fact that the District Head (Bupati) of 
Bantul was actively working at the end of his first term to achieve success in order to  
run again as candidate for the district head in the 2005 election. The success of 
economic growth would provide this candidate with a positive image as a successful 
leader which could positively  influence voters.  
 
However, in 2006 economic growth decreased to 1.98 percent when a huge 
earthquake (6.2 Richter) hit the region and destroyed physical infrastructures such as 
roads and housing, markets, small businesses, schools and offices. Remarkably the 
district government of Bantul quickly overcame this damage. Economic growth 
increased again to 4.57 percent in 2007 (Table 2.2) and income per capita also 
increased by 3 percent (Table 2.3). This indicated that the district government had 
effective responsiveness to the needs of the local community. As an example, the 
district government prepared funds to buy agricultural products when the price of 
such products dropped during harvest. Then the district government sold these 
products when the prices subsequently rose to a normal price. The following section 
will further elaborate an income per capita in Bantul.   
 
Table 2.2. 
Growth of GRDP of Bantul at Constant Price 2000 
 2002-2007 
 
No. Year GRDP (Million Rp) Growth Rate of GRDP 
(%) 
1. 2002 2.800.956 4.46 
2. 2003 2.932.377 4.69 
3. 2004 3.080.312 5.04 
4. 2005 3.234.172 4.99 
5. 2006 3.298.366 1.98 
6. 2007 3.448.948 4.57 
  Average 4.29 
       Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2008b, p. 186). 
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The growth of income per capita of Bantul was on the average of 2.2 percent during 
2002–2007. During this period the growth rate of income per capita did not 
significantly change (Table 2.3) with the exception of 2007. In 2007 income per 
capita was Rp 3,845,008
21
 about US $ 424.86 per year, US$1.16 per day, remaining 
below the poverty line by the Word Bank’s criteria. Thus the implementation of 
administrative and fiscal decentralisation had no impact on income per capita (Table 
2.3) nor economic growth (Table 2.2.). The next section will discuss district 
government income with the aim of investigating whether or not total district 
government income could support local autonomy and the implementation of 
decentralisation.  
 
 Table 2.3  
Growth Rate of Income Per Capita at Constant Price 2000 
2002-2007 
No. Year Total (Rp) Growth 
1. 2002 3,432,034 2.0 
2. 2003 3,515,428 2.4 
3. 2004 3,613,252 2.8 
4. 2005 3,712,307 2.7 
5. 2006 3,732,268 0.5 
6. 2007 3,845,008 3.0 
  Average 2.2 
         Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2008b, p. 187). 
 
2.3.2. District Government Income 
According to Law No. 33/2004 regarding Fiscal Balance between the Central 
Government and the Regional Government, the total district government income 
consists of locally derived revenue (PAD income), equalization funds
22
 (Dana 
Perimbangan), and other legal income. In the case of the Bantul district government, 
in 2009 majority of the total district government income was derived from 
equalization funds (79 percent). The second source was from other revenue such as 
income from interest, sales from district government assets and from donations 
(12.85 percent). Lastly, the PAD income contributed 7.96 percent (Chart 2.1). This 
means that the local government of Bantul financially depended on the central 
government subsidy. The small income of the PAD was due to the small amounts 
                                                 
21
 US$ 1 is equivalent with Rp 9,050 in 25 September 2011. 
22
 The Equalization fund is a grant fund from the central government to sub-national governments 
consist of general grant, specific grant and revenue sharing fund. 
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obtained from local taxes. Local tax income thus provided only a small contribution 
to the financial capacity of the district and it could not support the implementation of 
decentralisation policy. I argue there were two reasons why income from local tax 
was low. Firstly, the local government only had authority to manage less potential 
taxes. The potential taxes such as income tax and selling tax were in the hands of the 
central government. Secondly, the district government had not yet effectively 
implemented local regulations on taxes and levies.   
 
Chart 2.1 
Distribution of District Government Revenue, 2009 
 
 
     Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2009). 
 
Details of the district government income that consists of the PAD income, 
equalization funds, and other legal revenue will be discussed below. From that 
discussion we can ascertain which of those provided the greatest contribution to the 
district government revenue.  
 
2.3.2.1. The PAD Income (Locally Derived Revenue) 
The first source of total district government revenue is the PAD income or locally 
derived revenue. In 2009 the PAD income was 65,991.51 million rupiah (7 percent 
of total district government revenue), whereas in 2010 the PAD income was 
90,238.88 million rupiah or 10.30 percent of total district revenue. The PAD income 
is an indicator of the financial capacity of local government. A greater income from 
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PAD is likely to cause a greater financial capacity to implement decentralisation 
policy. The PAD income consists of income from local taxes, local levies, district 
government enterprises and other legal revenues. During 2002-2010, the average of 
growth of the PAD income was 7.91 percent per year. The majority of PAD income 
derived from local tax income. The percentage of local tax income slightly decreased 
from 20 percent in 2009 to 18 percent in 2010 but the percentage of income from 
local levies increased from 58 percent to 63 percent. At the same time, income from 
other legal district revenue decreased from 14 percent to 9 percent (Chart 2.2).  
 
In 2010, the PAD income derived from: (a) Local Tax Income: 16,489.58 million 
rupiah (18.27 percent of total PAD income);  (b) Local Levies Income (retribusi): 
56,473.04 million rupiah (62.58 percent of total PAD income); (c) Proceeds from the 
management of local assets set aside for the purpose (district government’s 
enterprises): 8,573.00 million rupiah (9.5 percent of total PAD income); and (d) 
Other legal revenue: 8,703.26 million rupiah (9.64 percent of total PAD income) 
(Chart 2.2.). 
 
Chart 2.2. 
Distribution of the PAD Income, 2009-2010 
 
 
Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten (2008, 2009). 
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Table 2.4 indicates that in 2007 the PAD income of Bantul increased twice of that in 
2002. In 2009 the PAD income was almost three times of that in 2002. By 2010, the 
PAD income was four times of that in 2002. However, the PAD income still 
remained as a small part of total district income, around 8 percent. The PAD income 
was only sufficient to finance public servants' salaries. In 2010, the PAD income was 
only 90,238.88 million rupiah equivalent to 15 percent of budget for local public 
servants. Due to the PAD income being small, it was not sufficient to finance the 
district government’s spending. As a result, the Bantul district government was 
heavily dependent on the central government’s subsidies. A lack of financial 
capacity was a constraint in implementing decentralisation policy. I suggest that in 
the long term, Bantul district needs to develop local business activities based on 
local potential resources, so that the locally derived revenue can increase. As 
discussed in the Introduction of this thesis there are many small businesses in Bantul 
which export some of their products. Thus, small businesses have the developmental 
potential to increase the district government’s revenue. In addition, the district 
government may develop beach areas on the ocean as tourist attractions as a way to 
return revenue to local government. To date, some beaches along the Indian Ocean 
(see Map of Bantul, Figure 2.1) remain underdeveloped for tourism. In summary: the 
decentralisation policy will not be well implemented unless the Bantul district is able 
to finance its expenditure. 
 
Table 2.4 
Locally Derived Revenue (PAD Income) of Bantul District 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
Locally Derived 
Revenue 
 (PAD Income) 
Percentage of PAD 
Income to Total 
District Income 
1. 2002 336,570,263,783.43 22,425,146,059.70 6.66 
2. 2003 389,393,986,778.40 32,882,358,490.40 8.44 
3. 2004 398,879,892,641.80 30,777,820,174.83 7.72 
4. 2005 442,291,639,792.62 37,683,848,341.38 8.52 
5. 2006 595,956,853,508.79 44,005,310,869.67 7.38 
6. 2007 693,827,536,928.60 57,229,726,493.62 8.25 
7. 2008 995,971,702,905.41 59,069,544,315.41 5.93 
8. 2009 829,474,653,164.38 65,991,513,134.38 7.96 
9. 2010 876,204,469,555.28 90,238,879,583.48 10.30 
  Average  7.91 
    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010). 
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My research findings indicate that income from local levies was higher than income 
from local taxes. For instance, in 2009 income from local taxes only accounted for 
20 percent of the PAD income, whereas income from local levies accounted for 58 
percent of the PAD income (Chart 2.2). The income from local taxes was low 
because there were no large industries such as large foreign companies or 
development of luxury hotels and restaurants in Bantul from 2000 to 2009. Most of 
local levies income was derived from small businesses in local public markets. The 
sellers in the local public markets had to pay a daily local levy to the district 
government. The levy on the stalls was about 175 rupiah per metre per day. Income 
from market levies was 1,210 million rupiah in 2009, and increased 2,270 million 
rupiah in 2011. Additional income from levies on the use of market toilets 
contributed 45.1 million rupiah in 2010. 
 
After discussing locally derived revenue (PAD income) of Bantul, the discussion 
now moves to the equalization funds. These funds are important because they 
provide significant contribution to district government revenues. Although the 
Bantul district adopted a decentralisation policy, the central government still played 
an important role in promoting small businesses at district level through the 
provision of funds. 
 
2.3.2.2. The Equalization Fund (Dana Perimbangan) 
The second source of the district government revenue is a grant or transfer payment 
from the central government, known as an equalization funds in Indonesia. The 
transfer payment contributes the most to its annual revenue. As an example, 
throughout 2002-2010, the average of equalization fund as percentage of total district 
revenue was 82 percent. Financially, the local government of Bantul was heavily 
dependent on the central government (Table 2.5). The Bantul district government 
had difficulty to implement the decentralisation policy without the assistance from 
transfer payments because its locally derived revenue was only on average 7 percent 
of total district government’s budget. 
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Table 2.5 
 Equalization Funds  
 Received by the Bantul District Government, 2002 - 2010 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
Equalization Fund 
(Million rupiah) 
Percentage of the 
Equalization Fund  to 
Total District Income 
1. 2002 336,570.26 271,592.60 80.69 
2. 2003 374,266.60 321,134.45 85.80 
3. 2004 398,879.89 343,129.04 86.02 
4. 2005 432,516.37 361,068.31 83.48 
5. 2006 597,788.83 551,956.19 92.33 
6. 2007 693,827.54 593,244.92 85.50 
7. 2008 995,971.70 674,191.34 67.69 
8. 2009 829,474.65 656,885.49 79.19 
9. 2010 876,204.47 683,081.41 77.96 
  Average  82.07 
     Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul  (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010). 
 
As discussed in Chapter one, the central government can provide grants to local 
governments. The grants consist of a general grant and a specific grant. The 
Indonesian government also adopted these grants.  In Indonesia, the general grant is 
called General Allocation Funds or DAU fund (Dana Alokasi Umum), while the 
specific grant is called Specific Allocation Fund or DAK fund (Dana Alokasi 
Khusus). Beyond these, the central government provides revenue sharing fund or 
Dana Bagi Hasil (DBH Fund). These funds are derived from natural resources and 
tax incomes. The DBH fund is a general grant because the district government has 
discretional power to spend that fund. 
 
In 2010, total equalization funds (central government grants) were 683,081.41 
million rupiah that consists of: 
a. General Allocation Fund (DAU Fund): 573,512.34 million rupiah (83.96 
percent of total equalization funds);  
b. Special Allocation Fund (DAK Fund): 60,565.50 million rupiah (8.87 
percent of total equalization funds) ); 
c. Revenue Sharing Fund (DBH Fund): 49,003.57 million rupiah (7.17 percent 
of total equalization funds). 
The details of each type of equalization fund is analysed in the following section. 
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2.3.2.2.1. The DAU Fund (General Grant) 
The DAU is a general grant from the central government to sub-national 
governments. Before 2001 the DAU grant was called a Subsidy Fund for 
Autonomous Region (Subsidi Daerah Otonomi or SDO) (Marijan, 2006). The DAU 
fund allows more opportunities for local government to use the grant based on their 
needs as well as overcoming fiscal problems among regions. According to the Law 
No. 33/2004 which concerns fiscal balance between the central and regional 
governments, 26 percent of the central government’s domestic revenues must be 
channeled to the DAU fund. 
 
In the case of Bantul, the average of the DAU fund received by the district 
government of Bantul was 71.83 percent of total district government’s budget during 
2002-2010 (Table 2.6). The DAU fund was also used to pay local public servant 
salaries.  
 
Table 2.6 
 General Allocation Fund (DAU Fund)  
 Received by the Bantul District, 2002 - 2009 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
DAU Fund 
(Million rupiah) 
Percentage of the 
DAU Fund  to Total 
District Income 
1. 2002 336,570.26 258,680.00 76.86 
2. 2003 374,266.60 292,700.00 78.21 
3. 2004 398,879.89 292,700.00 73.38 
4. 2005 432,516.37 308,106.00 71.23 
5. 2006 597,788.83 470,847.00 78.76 
6. 2007 693,827.54 524,293.00 75.57 
7. 2008 995,971.70 583,169.35 58.55 
8. 2009 829,474.65 568,510.00 68.54 
9. 2010 876,204.47 573,512.34 65.45 
  Average  71.83 
        Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul  (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010). 
 
2.3.2.2.2. The DAK Fund (Specific Grant) 
The DAK fund is a specific grant intended to finance special needs such as national 
priorities, or needs which are not covered by the DAU fund such as projects that 
have large spill-over effects across regions (Marijan, 2006, p. 50). Local 
governments which receive the DAK fund must match the funds by at least ten 
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percent of the total of DAK fund. However, local governments fitting certain criteria 
as poor regions are not required to do so.  
 
Table 2.7 shows that DAK funds received by Bantul district average of 4.74 percent 
of the total district budget during 2002-2010. In 2009 and 2010, the DAK fund was 
almost 7 percent of total district government income. This means that the central 
government contributed an equal amount of 7 percent to improve development in 
Bantul such as development in health sector and education sector. 
 
Table 2.7 
 Special Allocation Fund (DAK Fund)  
 Received by the Bantul District, 2002–2009 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
DAK Fund 
(Million rupiah) 
Percentage of the 
DAK to Total 
District Income 
1. 2002 336,570.26 n.a. n.a. 
2. 2003 374,266.60 1,000.00 0.27 
3. 2004 398,879.89 11,680.00 2.93 
4. 2005 432,516.37 12,060.00 2.79 
5. 2006 597,788.83 33,890.00 5.67 
6. 2007 693,827.54 47,709.00 6.88 
7. 2008 995,971.70 57,448.00 5.77 
8. 2009 829,474.65 55,635.00 6.71 
9. 2010 876,204.47 60,565.50 6.91 
  Average  4.74 
        Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010). 
 
2.3.2.2.3. The Revenue Sharing Fund (DBH Fund)  
Beyond general and specific grants, the central government provides a Revenue 
Sharing Fund derived from natural resources and tax incomes of the district. 
Theoretically, this fund is classified as general grant as it does not require 
specifications on how to spend the funds. The revenue sharing fund contributed an 
average of 3.88 percent to total district government income during 2002-2010 (Table 
2.8).  A region with rich natural resources will obtain a greater income from the 
revenue sharing fund which consists of a share in revenue from income taxes and 
from natural resource income. 
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The DBH income is sourced from income tax and consists of: 
a. Land and Building Tax Income (PBB). The Revenue Sharing Fund from 
Land and Building income such as 16.2 percent for provincial government, 
64.8 percent for local government (kabupaten/kota), 10 percent for the 
central government, but it should be distributed into all districts and 
municipalities (kabupaten and kota). 
b. Land Rent (BPHTB) income. The income from BPHTP is distributed 80 
percent for local government and 20 percent for the central government 
(Peraturan Menteri Keuangan No. 32/PMK.03/2005).   
c. Personal Income Tax. Income from personal income tax is distributed 20 
percent to local government and 80 percent to the central government 
(Peraturan Pemerintah No. 115/2000). 
According to Article 14 of Law No. 33/2004, revenue sharing fund sourced from 
natural resources consists of income from the following: 
a. Income from forestry. Revenue from Forest Exploitation Rights (HPH) and 
Forest Resource Provision (PSDH) shall be divided by 20 percent for the 
central government and 80 percent for the region concerned. Revenue from 
the Reforestation Fund shall be divided by 60 percent for the central 
government and 40 percent for the region concerned.  
b. Income from general mining. Revenue from general mining shall be divided 
by 20 percent for the central government and 80 percent for the region 
concerned.  
c. Income from fisheries. Revenue from fisheries received on a national basis 
shall be divided by 20 percent for the central government and 80 percent for 
all districts/municipalities. 
d. Income from oil mining. Revenue from Oil Mining shall be divided, after 
tax and other levies in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations, 
be divided by 84.5 percent for the central government and 15.5 percent for 
the region concerned. 
e. Income from natural gas mining. Revenue from natural gas mining, after tax 
and other levies in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations, is 
divided by 69.5 percent for the central government and 30.5 percent for the 
region concerned. 
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f. Income from geothermal mining. For revenue from Geothermal Mining as 
Non-tax State revenue shall be divided by 20 percent for the central 
government and 80 percent for the region concerned. 
 
It can be seen that the central government received larger revenue sharing from 
potential natural resources, such as from income from oil mining and income from 
natural gas mining than local government. As an example, for oil mining the central 
government receives 84.5 percent and local government received 15.5 percent which 
will be distributed into 3 percent for the province concerned, 6 percent for the 
producing district government, and 6 percent for other district governments within 
the province concerned. In the case of Bantul and all of district governments of 
province of Yogyakarta, this is a rarity as oil mining resources are scarce. Thus, the 
Bantul district government got only small income from the Revenue Sharing Fund 
from oil mining. In turn, Bantul did not have the financial capacity to implement 
decentralisation policies.  
 
Table 2.8 
Share of Revenue from Taxes and Natural Resources Income 
 Received by the Bantul District Government, 2002 - 2010 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
Share of Revenue from Taxes 
and Natural Resources Income 
(Million rupiah) 
Percentage  
1. 2002 336,570.26 12,912.60 3.84 
2. 2003 374,266.60 13,307.31 3.55 
3. 2004 398,879.89 17,152.22 4.30 
4. 2005 432,516.37 17,252.22 3.99 
5. 2006 597,788.83 19,349.19 3.24 
6. 2007 693,827.54 21,242.92   3.06 
7. 2008 995,971.70 33,573.99   3.37 
8. 2009 829,474.65 32,740.49   3.95 
9. 2010 876,204.47 49,003.57 5.59 
  Average  3.88 
   Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010). 
 
 
Data in Table 2.8 above shows that income from the share of revenue from taxes and 
natural resources was an average of less than 4 percent during 2002-2010. As a 
result, it provided only a small contribution for the district government’s revenue. 
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Effectively it decreased the support in implementing decentralisation policy. The 
next section will discuss the industrial sector with the aim to show the extent to 
which it contributed to the implementation of local autonomy.  
 
2.3.3. The Industrial Sector 
The industrial sector contributes to the implementation of decentralisation policy in 
two ways: creating job opportunities and providing local taxes/levies. In relation to 
job creation, the manufacturers in Bantul were able to employ up to 79,904 workers 
in 2007. Most of the manufacturers were non-formal or unregistered with no 
business permits. As a result, they did not pay local levies to the district government. 
When the researcher questioned the district head of Bantul his view on unregistered 
manufacturers, he commented that it was not pertinent problem. The district head 
noted it was more important for local people to have business activity regardless of 
having business permits or not, as non-formal manufacturers also contributed to 
absorbing employees and had multiple influences.
23
 For instance, non-formal 
manufacturers provided double employment opportunities compared with formal-
manufactures (Table 2.9).  
 
During 2006-2007, the absorption of labour in the industrial sector only grew to 
1,121 employees (Table 2.9). At same time, the total unemployment in Bantul was 
39,106, meaning that the industrial sector only created a few additional employment 
opportunities. An increase in rates of unemployment could cause social problems 
and further constrain the implementation of decentralisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Interview with District Head of Bantul, 25 June 2009. 
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Table 2.9 
The Number of Small and Medium Businesses (SMB) and Employees by Sub-Sector 
In Bantul District 2007 
 
No. Sub-Sector of 
Industry 
Number of 
Manufactory 
Total Number of 
Employee 
Total 
Formal Non-
Formal 
Formal No-
Formal 
1. Manufacture 
of Food  
259 7,140 7,399 3,841 20,655 24,496 
2. Clothing and 
Leather 
211 477 688 3,620 21,117 5,737 
3. Handicraft 334 5,886 6,220 7,466 14,410 21,876 
4. Chemical and 
Materials 
377 2, 349 2,726 11,400 14,330 25,730 
5. Metal and 
Services 
99 779 878 706 1,359 2,065 
 Total 1,280 16,631 17,911 27,033 52,871 79,904 
 2006 1,250 16,615 17,865 26,054 52,729 78,783 
    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2008a, p. 277).  
 
As discussed in Chapter One, small businesses are expected to provide a financial 
contribution to the district government income by paying local levies. However, in 
case of Bantul, most small businesses owners did not pay local levies as 
demonstrated. The Case of Bantul showed that foreign investment was smaller than 
domestic investment and the growth of investment was slow. In 2007 it decreased 
(Table 2.10). Thus, these investments provided a small contribution in creating 
employment opportunities and district government revenue.   
 
Table 2.10 
Domestic and Foreign Investment in Bantul, 2004-2007 
(In Million Rupiah) 
 
No. Year Domestic Investment 
(DI) 
Growth of 
DI 
Foreign Investment 
(FI) 
Growth 
of FI 
1. 2004 85,460  59,898  
2. 2005 85,463 0.0 59,898 0.0 
3. 2006 86,952 1.7 75,076 25.3 
4. 2007 86,052 -1.0 4,179 -94.4 
      
    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul  (2008b, p. 169) 
 
As depicted in Table 2.10, during 2004-2007, the growth of the industrial sector was 
sluggish and the local government had difficulty in obtaining more income from 
local levies as most of the manufacturers ignored business permits and never paid 
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local levies. The income from local taxes was small as there were no luxury hotels, 
restaurants or a large foreign investment in Bantul. To date, the Bantul district 
government has failed to enhance local financial capacity from the industrial sector.  
 
From the economic structure discussed above, it may be concluded that the 
agricultural sector accounts for the largest contribution of the gross district product. 
However, the Bantul district has difficulty to enhance gross district product from this 
sector because of limited agricultural field area. Until now, the Bantul district 
government is dependent on the central government grants. Without the central 
government grants, decentralisation policy will not be implemented effectively. The 
next section will discuss political institutions with the aim of examining the extent to 
which they play an important role in the dynamics of local political activities.   
 
2.4. Political Institutions 
Political institutions consist of the local parliament and political parties. As 
discussed in Chapter One, decentralisation policy may increase the role of local 
parliament and political parties in local politics. Both local parliament members and 
local political parties may try to pursue public resources because under the 
decentralisation era public resources are in the hand of local government. This 
section will discuss the political dynamics of local parliament as well as political 
parties as a result of decentralisation policy. The analysis questions if political 
parties do in fact become more responsive to the interests and needs of small 
businesses; and the extent to which can they articulate the interests of small 
businesses into local regulations. 
 
2.4.1. Local Parliament 
Under the New Order Government (1967-1998) the Bantul district was controlled by 
the Golkar Party and supported by military power. Other parties such as the 
Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI)) and United Development Party (PPP) always 
followed the path of the Golkar Party. However, following the 1998 reformasi, the 
Indonesian government adopted a decentralisation system in development due to 
public demand. The public demanded the Indonesian government to develop 
democracy and open access for popular participation. At that time many political 
parties emerged to compete for political position both in the executive and legislative 
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institutions with the aim to obtain political and economic resources. Decentralisation 
policy means a transfer of resources from the central government to local 
government. Thus, the dynamics of local politics greatly developed under the 
decentralisation era.   
 
In Bantul district there were 48 political parties involved in the 1999 election for the 
local and national legislature. However, only 10 political parties gained seats in the 
local legislature. In the next election in 2004, 16 political parties participated. 
However, only eight of these obtained seats as local parliament members. The 
Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (PDI-P) obtained the majority of seats 
(35.56 percent). Further, in the 2009 election, the number of political parties 
involved in the election increased to 24, yet only nine gained seats in the local 
parliament (Table 2.11).  In that election, PAN party gained seven seats or 15.56 
percent whereas PKB gained three seats or 6.67 percent in local parliament (Table 
2.11). Both PAN and PKB were born as process of democratic transition in 
Indonesia. The PAN party was established in 1998 while the PKB party was 
developed in 1999. The democratic transition has opened a new climate for the 
emergence new parties. In the previous period under the Suharto regime, the 
Indonesian government only permitted three political parties: Golkar, PDI party and 
PPP party. In addition, the process of democratic transition has encouraged the 
Indonesian people to demand decentralisation policy.     
 
Beyond PAN party and PKB party, there were more two Islamic parties: the Justice 
and Prosperity party (PKS party) obtained five seats and United Development Party 
(PPP party) 4 seats. Thus, Islamic parties occupied 19 seats (42 percent) of 45 seats 
in local parliament membership of Bantul (2009-2014). Previously (2004-2009) the 
Islamic parties occupied 21 seats (47 percent) of 45 seats in local legislature 
members. This means political parties based on Islamic religion are still supported 
by about half of the population of Bantul district. This is different from Gianyar 
district, in which there is no political party present, based on religion, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3.   
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Table 2.11 
Distribution of Seats among Political Parties in Local Parliament of 
Bantul 2004-2009 and 2009-2014 
 
No. Political Parties 2004-2009 2009-2014 
Seat Percentage Seat Percentage 
1. Indonesian Democracy Party of 
Struggle (Partai Demokrasi 
Perjuangan or PDI-P) 
16 35.56 11 24.44 
2. National Mandate Party (Partai 
Amanat Nasional or PAN) 
7 15.56 7 15.56 
3. National Awakening Party 
(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or 
PKB) 
6 13.33 3 6.67 
4. Justice and Prosperity Party 
(Partai Keadilan dan Sejahtera 
or PKS) 
5 11.11 5 11.11 
5. Golkar Party (Partai Golkar) 5 11.11 5 11.11 
6. United Development Party 
(Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan or PPP) 
3 6.67 4 8.89 
7 National hood and Caring Party 
(Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa or 
PKPB) 
2 4.44 2 4.44 
8. Democratic Party (PD) 1 2.22 5 11.11 
9. Gerindra Party - - 3 6.67 
 Total 45 100 45 100 
    Source: KPUD Bantul, 2009. 
 
The Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (PDI-P) was the winner in the 1999, 
2004 and 2009 elections. However, in the 2009 election, the PDI-P party lost four 
seats in local parliament because some voters moved their support to Democratic 
Party and the Gerindra party. This indicated that political parties had become more 
competitive in pursuit of political power in local parliament. Since the 
decentralisation policy was adopted in the Bantul district, the political power in local 
legislature has changed. The PDI-P party occupied the majority of local parliament 
seats during 1999-2004 and 2005-2009 whereas before decentralisation era (1972-
1999), the Golkar party occupied majority of local parliament seats. During the 
decentralisation era, political power in the local legislature was fragmented among 
several political parties, but the PDI-P party was able to control it. The emergence of 
several new political parties in local legislature did not increase the performance of 
the legislature because of low performance of its members as described in the 
following section. 
 
103 
 
 
 
Case 2.1: Low Quality of Local Legislature Members 
Local legislature members were only viewed with one eye
24
 by the district 
head. Most of them did not understand their job, local social and political 
issues. They became local legislature members because of money politics. 
They thought, they would obtain money for approving the annual district 
budget. In addition, they had no innovative policy to carry out the functions 
of local legislature.
25
 
 
The district head of Bantul also stated that the quality of local legislature members 
decreased because the political parties did not select them based on effective criteria. 
In contrast, they proposed them as candidates for the legislature because they 
provided money to their political parties. As a result, the performance of local 
legislature was low.
26
 The majority of them did not understand their functions as 
local legislature members nor the needs of local communities.
27
 
 
Regarding their low performance,  it is important to explore the backgrounds of these 
local legislature members to determine whether or not their background influenced 
them negatively in implementing the legislature’s functions.  Most the local 
parliament members (2004-2009) had previous positions as lecturers and senior high 
school teachers (35 percent). Approximately 31 percent of local parliament members 
were businessmen previously and only about 26 percent of them were political 
activists (Table 2.12). Although the majority of local parliament members had 
previous careers as teachers and businessmen, they had no innovative policy to 
promote the education or the business sector. In fact they only supported the district 
head’s programs. For instance, local legislature members were not motivated to 
protect small businesses, yet the district head issued the district head’s decree 
(Keputusan Bupati) No. 503/5439 to protect small businesses.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Local legislature was viewed 'with only one eye' (dilihat dengan sebelah mata), being the 
Indonesian metaphor to describe that the low capacity of of these local legislators compared with the 
capacity of the district head. 
25
Interview with head of B Committee of Local legislature of Bantul, 15 June 2009. 
26
 Interview with District Head of Bantul 25 June 2009. 
27
Interview with W.U., Senior lecturer at Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Gadjah Mada 
University, 18 June 2009. 
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Table 2.12 
Background of Local Parliament member of Bantul, 2004-2009 
 
Previous Job of Parliament Member Local Parliament Members 
 Number Percentage 
Bureaucrats 1 2.22 
Politicians 12 26.67 
Business persons 14 31.11 
Teachers/Lecturers 16 35.56 
Building Contractor 1 2.22 
Farmers 1 2.22 
Total 45 100.00 
         Source:Field work 2009. 
 
After discussing problems of the local legislature, further discussion examines the 
extent to which political parties had discretional policy and could be responsive to 
the interests of small businesses.    
 
2.4.2. Political Party 
Traditionally, the political parties in Bantul can be classified into those based on 
religion and those based on secular nationalist persuasions. The National Mandate 
Party (PAN party), National Awakening Party (PKB party), Justice and Prosperity 
Party (PKS party), and United Development Party (PPP party) are classified as 
Islamic parties whereas Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P party), 
Golkar party, Democratic party (PD party), Gerindra party and National Hood and 
Caring Party (PKPB party) are categorised as secular nationalist parties.  
 
Political parties in Bantul do not have sufficient financial resources to develop. The 
revenue of political parties derives from local government funds, fees from party 
members who become local parliament member and donors. The local government 
provides funds for political parties based on total seats held in local parliament. For 
each seat, the local government provides 19.5 million rupiah.  The PDI-P party, for 
instance, obtained 312 million rupiah in 2008 from the district government because 
the PDI-P party had 16 seats in local parliament.
28
 Each local parliament member 
also contributes to his/her party based on its party’s decision. For instance, each local 
parliament member from PAN Party has to contribute around 20 percent of his/her 
                                                 
28
Interview with Secretary of the PDI-P Party, Bantul branch, 26 June 2009. 
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salary per month.
29
 However, local parliament members from the PDI-P party are 
obligated to contribute Rp 2.5 million each month, around 25 percent of his/her 
salary.
30
 This indicates that the financial source of a party is derived from the local 
government’s subsidy and the party members who act as a local legislator. The more 
seats obtained in local parliament, the more funds are obtained from the local 
government. Thus, political parties compete intensely in local legislature member 
elections to pursue the financial resources in order to influence political decisions. A 
lack of financial resources for a political party can cause difficulties in making 
innovative policy and developing a viable network with constituents. However, the 
development of a constituent network can be also be carried out by political party 
cadres who have strategic position in other organisations such as a business 
association or a social organisation.     
 
The PDI-P party developed networks with small businesses through the Dekranas, a 
business association because the head of Dekanas was a cadre of this party. The 
local government of Bantul delivered funds to small businesses through the 
Dekranas for helping business exhibition and financial assistance. This means, the 
PDI-P party indirectly obtained political benefits from the Dekranas. In 2010 the 
head of Dekranas competed for the district head election and succeeded as the head 
of Dekranas gained more than 70 percent of total votes. This suggests that the 
Dekranas was used by politician to obtain political position.   
 
Based on the discussion above, it may be concluded that before 2000, local 
legislature was controlled by the Golkar party, but then political power in local 
legislature of Bantul was controlled by the PDI-P party. However, the performance 
of local legislature remained low because of the money politics in elections for local 
legislature candidates. A lack of financial capacity of political parties might have 
caused them to select the local legislature candidates based on money considerations 
and not on the performance of the candidate. As a result, the performance of local 
legislature was low and contributed less to promoting small businesses. The next 
section will discuss local bureaucracy with the aim to explore the behavioural 
changes in providing public services for small businesses.     
                                                 
29
Interview with Chairman of PAN party, Bantul branch, 10 June 2009. 
30
Interview with Secretary of the PDI-P party, Bantul branch, 26 June 2009. 
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2.5. Local Bureaucracy 
This section will answer the question as proposed in Introduction: Have local 
bureaucrats and district heads responded to the needs and interests of small business 
owners? As discussed in Chapter One, decentralisation policy has an impact on local 
bureaucrats and district government leaders, who have more tasks and 
responsibilities as a result of decentralisation. This section will examine the extent to 
which decentralisation policy can influence the behaviour of local bureaucrats and 
district leaders in providing public service to small businesses.  
 
2.5.1. The Behaviour of Local Bureaucrats 
This section explores to what extent the behaviour of local bureaucrats changed as a 
result of decentralisation policy and whether or not they became responsive in 
providing public services. First, in order to understand civil servants, we need to 
explore the number of civil servants of the Bantul district based on their education. 
Did the factor of education influence their behaviour? The total number of civil 
servants in the Bantul district was 12,703 people. Most of them (67.23 percent) were 
employed by the local educational institutions (the first rank). The second rank was 
1,334 people (10.50 percent) who work in the local health agencies. The third rank 
was 484 people (3.81 percent) who worked across 17 sub-districts. The others were 
distributed into 10 Dinas (local government agencies), Badan (local government 
board), and the District Government’s secretariat (Table 2.13). However, the total 
number of public servants should be effective if they were educated. Therefore, it is 
important to classify public servants based on their education level. 
 
Table 2.13 
Civil Servants of the Bantul District Government 
 
No. Location of Work Total Percentage 
1. Local Government: Education 8,540 67.23 
2. Local Government Health Agencies 1,334 10.50 
3. Other 10 Local Government Agencies 1,398 11.00 
4. 17 Sub-District Government  484 3.81 
5. 4 Local Government Boards 244 1.92 
6. District Government Secretariats 385 3.03 
7. Others  318 2.51 
 Total 12,703 100 
          Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2008, pp. 29-30). 
 
107 
 
 
 
Only 8.40 percent of civil servants were university graduates with bachelor degrees, 
and 0.80 percent with masters degree. Around 55.73 percent graduated from senior 
high schools, 3.10 percent graduated from junior high schools and around 1.89 
percent graduated from primary schools. These results indicate that less than 10 
percent of civil servants were university graduates. It appears that the district 
government needed more civil servants educated at university graduate in order to 
perform complex jobs resulting from administrative decentralisation. That is, higher 
education of civil servants might provide better performance. Therefore, in 
decentralisation era, the district government should have facilitated scholarship for 
selected local public servants who wished to pursue higher education. The following 
will discuss the change of political positions of public servants from participant to 
passive/ non-participant in politics.  
 
During the New Order Government (1968-1998), civil servants became the key 
buffer of the Golkar party. The Golkar party controlled civil servants through Civil 
Servants Association (Korpri) and the National Civil Service Agency (BKN: Badan 
Kepegawaian Nasional) as well as all district heads and all governors in Indonesia. 
However, following the fall of Soeharto, the government introduced Law No. 
43/1999, in which the civil servants became non-participant in politics. They were 
not allowed to be a political party member. As a result, civil servants become 
increasingly critical in carrying out their duties. Previously, they were passive and 
did not dare express their opinion. The following case describes the change of local 
bureaucrat’s behaviour toward critical local bureaucrats. Critical local public 
servants can provide better performance in public services. 
Case 2.2: Change of Local Bureaucrat’s behaviour 
The local agency heads, local board heads, and sub-district heads always 
propose their ideas in meetings with Bupati. The Bupati always extended the 
time of the meeting. This condition never occurred before decentralisation era 
when Bantul was controlled by Bupati who were military. Under a military 
regime, the local government agencies heads and local government board and 
sub-district heads were passive and only followed Bupati’s direction.31 
 
According to head of Local Agency for Industry and Trade (Diperindagkop), there 
was paradigmatic change of local bureaucrats from ‘requesting to be served’ (minta 
dilayani) to becoming ‘services providers’ (memberikan pelayanan) because of 
                                                 
31
 Interview with Bupati of Bantul, 25 June 2009. 
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public demand. As a result, local bureaucrats often went to the grassroots level. The 
Head of Diperindagkop also became more open in responding to local people’s 
interests who came to his office.
32
 Furthermore, a journalist commented that during 
decentralisation era the behaviour of bureaucrats changed in regard to local citizens 
and other journalists. They became open and transparent in providing public 
services. They were aware that district government needed support from local 
citizens.
33
 The following case shows that the district government was responsive to 
the needs of small businesses. 
Case 2.3: Local Bureaucrats were responsive to the needs of Small 
Businesses   
 
District government helped small business owners to participate in business 
exhibitions, create markets and infrastructure facilities. The behaviour of 
local bureaucrats has changed under Idham Samawi’s regime. He was 
concerned with small businesses.
34
 
 
Mr. T.M. commented that district government really had provided financial 
assistance and training program to small businesses. He felt that both financial and 
training assistances were useful in promoting his own business.
35
 
 
Indeed, a small business owner recognised that there was a behavioural change of 
local bureaucrats, albeit small. There was less innovation in policy making. In 
contrast, policies were made simply, as they simply copied previous policies.
36
 The 
survey data from 60 small business owners showed 45 percent of respondents 
revealed that the behaviour of local bureaucrat changed under decentralisation era. 
However, 25 percent said that the behaviour of local bureaucrats did not change 
(Chart 2.3). It may be concluded that decentralisation policy tended to cause small 
change of behaviour of local bureaucrats.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Interview with Head of Diperindagkop, 3 June 2009. 
33
 Interview with Mr. B.S., Journalist of Daily Kompas , 7 June 2009. 
34
 Interview with Mr. S.H., Small business owner, 9 July 2009.  
35
 Interview with Mr. T.M., Small business owner, 23 Jenu 2009. 
36
 Interview with Mr. A.T, a businessman, 19 June 2009. 
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Chart 2.3 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Behaviour of Local Bureaucrats 
(N=60) 
 
 
  Source: Survey data, 2009. 
 
The important question is whether or not public services changed during the 
decentralisation era. The findings indicate that 50 percent respondents said that 
public services provided by local government had improved. Twenty seven percent 
commented that public service was the same as before the decentralisation era. Only 
11 percent argued that public services had become less responsive and 12 percent 
were not sure (Chart 2.4). It may be concluded that under decentralisation policy, 
public services for small business tended to improve in comparison to the previous 
administration. For example, the district government built Pasar Seni Gabusan (the 
Gabusan Art Market) as well as three public market buildings in Niten, Imogiri and 
Piyungan with the aim to facilitate small business. 
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Chart 2.4 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Public Services 
(N=60) 
 
 
   Source: Fieldwork, 2009 
 
Based on the research findings above, it may be concluded that the behaviour of 
local bureaucracy in providing public services had changed. As a result, public 
services had been improved. The next important question is, whether the style of the 
district government head leadership had also changed during the decentralisation era.    
 
2.5.2. Style of District Head Leadership 
This section concerns whether the district head leadership of Bantul under 
decentralisation policy was different from that under centralized policy. Following 
reformasi 1998, there was significant political change that provided more power to 
the district head in managing the development sectors as well as in developing the 
local democracy. 
 
Under the centralized political policy which was based on Law 5/1974, district heads 
were elected by local parliament members. However, the candidates had to be 
approved by central government. Starting in 2001, the Indonesian government 
moved toward a democratic transition. Law No. 5/1974 was replaced by Law 
22/1999 whereby district heads were elected by local parliament members without 
intervention from the central government. Five years later Law 22/1999 was replaced 
by Law 32/2004, which provided local people access to involvement in the election 
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of district heads. Then in 2005 district heads were directly elected by local people. In 
this context, local political actors sought support from the local voters to promote 
their political positions. The new system of district head elections caused the 
dynamics of local politics to change because the candidates for district heads and 
political parties had to be active in approaching local citizens to obtain their political 
support. They used many ways in approaching local citizens such as providing 
money to local communities (money politics) and by using the head of hamlet 
(Dukuh) and the head of local community associations (RT) to influence their 
members in electing local legislative members.  
 
Under New Order Government (1967-1998), the Bupati of Bantul always came from 
within the military and the regime was characteristically authoritarian. Following the 
collapse of Soeharto’s regime and the Golkar party, the PDI-P party gained majority 
of seats in local parliament in Bantul district. Since 1999, the Bantul district has been 
controlled by Idham Samawi, from the PDI-P party and son of the owner of 
Kedaulatan Rakyat daily in Yogyakarta. As a former journalist, Idham Samawi had 
strong support from the media community in Bantul and Yogyakarta (Sulistiyanto, 
2009, p. 202) and as a political party member he was strongly supported by the PDI-
P party in the implementation of decentralisation policy. Thus, it was easy for him to 
socialise his programs in mass media and its implementation. District government 
policies were supported by the majority of legislative members who came from the 
PDI-P party and Golkar party. This is because the vice district head came from 
Golkar party.  
 
Under Idham Samawi, this region became more democratic because he opened 
access for local bureaucrats and local people to propose ideas through the local 
community meeting and mass media. Populist policies were introduced to protect 
farmers and small businesses in Bantul. For instance, local government launched soft 
loans program for traditional market sellers to protect them from exploitative 
creditors (known pejoratively as lintah darat). This suggests that based on 
promotional aspect, the relationship between the district head and small business is 
characterised by protective relationship. In addition, he provided health insurance 
program for poor families in Bantul with aim to improve public health. These 
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programs indicated that the district head of Bantul was concerned with the poor 
people, different from those of the previous regime.   
 
In the education sector, the Bupati of Bantul introduced a scholarship program from 
2004 until now for junior and senior high school teachers to take masters degrees 
programs at universities in Yogyakarta. He also provided scholarships for students of 
Bantul who were poor but demonstrated high academic achievement. The Bantul 
district launched financial incentives for all teachers of 250 thousand rupiah per 3 
months. These programs aimed to improve the quality of human resources in the 
education sector. To date approximately 158 of 4,500 teachers of the Bantul district 
graduated from a masters program. 
 
In the agricultural sector, as the district head of Bantul, in 2008 Idham Samawi 
continued to implement populist policies which benefited farmers. The district 
government introduced a scheme to protect farmers by buying agricultural products 
(rice, chilli, shallots and corn) during the harvest season when the prices of these 
products dropped. The district government then would sell these products when 
prices rose again. The district government of Bantul prepared funds of 3.5 billion 
rupiah for this initiative's inception 2001. During the harvest season, the price of 
corn dropped to Rp 900 per kg, despite the local government deciding that the floor 
price of corn was Rp 1800 per kg. Therefore, the local government bought the corn 
from farmers at Rp 1800 per kg.
37
 The case of agricultural sector mentioned suggests 
that the district head of Bantul had a clear protection policy for small farmers.  
 
In addition, in the social and political sectors, during 1999-2004 Idham Samawi was 
active in developing social organisations at the grassroots level. He supported the 
Paguyuban Lurah Tunggul Jati, an association of village bureaucrats consisting of 
village heads and their employers in Bantul district. In 2003, he mobilized thousands 
of villagers and village heads of the Bantul district to support the re-election of the 
Sultan Hamengkubowono The Tenth as the Governor of Special Province of 
Yogyakarta (Sulistiyanto, 2009). The association showed loyalty to Idham Samawi 
by supporting his policies. Further, in accelerating development in sub-districts and 
                                                 
37
 Interview with District Head of Bantul, 25 June 2009. 
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controlling grassroot level demands, the district government head provided 
additional jobs to all local agency heads. Each local agency head was given 
responsibility in each sub-district to identify local demands and needs. Therefore, 
Idham Samawi was able to control all sub-districts of Bantul.  
 
Moreover, the television program, Plengkung Gading was developed in 2007 to 
communicate with local people. This program aimed to introduce the development  
programs and to gain input from local people. Through the television program the 
Bupati could build an image as a good leader, particularly in the first period of his 
position as the Bupati. This program suggests that local government created an 
opportunity for local people to participate in the process of decision making. As 
discussed by Hentic and Bernier (1999) in Chapter One, local government should 
develop a mechanism and framework that enables people to participate in that 
government. The television media was chosen by local government because it could 
disseminate public policy information throughout local people.  This is a similar with 
the case of city Oakland in the United States as stated by Pressman (1972), using 
mass media such television and newspapers could help a leader to obtain political 
support.   
 
Survey data from 60 small business owners indicated that 60 percent of those 
respondents revealed that the behaviour of the district head had become responsive 
and closer to local citizens under decentralisation. Twenty one percent said that there 
was no change. Only 13 percent perceived that district head became less responsive 
(Chart 2.5). This means decentralisation policy tended to cause district heads to 
become close and responsive to small business owners as local citizens. The district 
head actively helped local citizens particularly in the case of buying of agricultural 
products as discussed above.    
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Chart 2.5 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Behaviour of District Head 
(N=60) 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009. 
 
The evidence above suggests that the style of the district head of Bantul had changed 
from an authoritarian style of leadership during New Order Government (1968-1998) 
to a democratic style of leadership during decentralisation era (1999-now). Since 
1999 the district head leadership of Bantul has been characterized by populist 
concerns for poor peoples’ interests. In relation to small businesses, the district head 
of Bantul strongly supported small business development. There were three factors 
that influenced the success of Idham Samawi. First, he was supported by local social 
organisations. Second, he used mass media (both newspaper and television) to 
introduce his programs and develop an image as populist leader. Third, he was able 
to control a big political party, the PDI-P party which occupies majority seats in 
local legislative. After discussing local bureaucrats and local leaders, it is important 
to explore community structure of Bantul. The following section discusses this topic. 
 
2.6. Community Structure 
Decentralisation policy provides greater opportunities for local citizen groups and 
local business groups to participate in the process of decision making. This section 
will discuss to what extent local citizen groups and local business associations are 
involved in the process of decision making at local level. Then it examines the role 
of neighbourhood associations in the dynamics of local politics. It will be shown 
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whether or not they can articulate their preferences to policy makers in both the 
executive and legislative arena. 
 
2.6.1. Citizen’s Group and Business Associations 
In general, we can classify non-government organisations into two types: non-
business organisations or citizen’s groups (Table 2.14) and business organisations 
(Table 2.15). Each group will be discussed in order to explore its role in decision 
making process. 
 
2.6.1.1. Citizen’s Group   
Until 2008 there were 153 non-business organisations (Table 2.14). Most of them 
were social organisations such as Macan Tamil (Tamil Tiger), Garda Nusantara 
(National Fortress), Paserbumi, Brantas, Pordasi and Lappera that were active in 
responding to social and political issues. These organisations always supported 
Idham Samawi (Sulistiyanto, 2009, p. 202). Bureaucratic Associations at village 
level such as APDESI (Asosiasi Pemerintah Desa Indonesia) or the Association of 
Village Administration, AKDESI (Asosiasi Kepala Desa Seluruh Indonesia) or the 
Association of The Village Head, and the Association of The Village Secretary were 
also active in local politics and supported Idham Samawi. For instance, at the end of 
2009 APDESI declared support of Mrs. Sri Suryawidati (Idham Samawi’s wife) to 
become the candidate for district head in 2010 Pilkada. Idham Samawi supervised 
these local organisations to obtain political support during his position as district 
head, particularly in facing critics from the local legislature members. These local 
organisations were often mobilized to support Idham Samawi (Case 2.4).  
 
Table 2.14 
 Non-Business Organisation 
 
No. Name of Organisation Number 
2. Religion Organisation 21 
3. Educational Organisation 9 
4. Youth Organisation 13 
5. Societal Organisation (Organisasi 
Masyarakat) 
100 
6. Professional Organisation 10 
 Total 153 
                Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2008a, p. 1999). 
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Before the elections for district head in 2010, the APDESI was mobilized by local 
politicians to support one of candidate for the district head position (Case 2.4). 
           Case 2.4: Networks between APDESI and Political Party 
 In March 2009, there was a meeting for discussing development called 
Sarasean Pembangunan, organized by APDESI. This meeting suggested that 
members of APDESI should submit a project proposal to the district 
government, and then the district government would respond to it as soon as 
possible. Some local legislature members who are the same party attended to 
this meeting. However, this meeting was criticized by PKS party as hidden 
campaign from PDI-P party.
38
 
 
The next case showed that APDESI strongly supported Idham Samawi. Although 
Law 32/2004 states that one can be the district head maximum two periods (10 
years), the APDESI proposed to central government to provide an exception for 
Idham Samawi (Case 2.5).   
Case 2.5: Networks between APDESI and the District Head  
 The chairman of Bantul branch of APDESI, Jiyono said that Idham proved as 
a leader who was loved by local people and achieved success in leading the 
Bantul district. Based on this reasons, APDESI proposed to central 
government to provide an exception for Idham Samawi to allow him to be re-
elected in the third district head election.
39
 
 
It was clear that citizen group such as APDESI was used by the district government 
head to support his interests. However, they were not involved in the process of 
decision-making. This differed with business associations such as Dekranas which 
was involved in decision-making at district government level. The following section 
will discuss the involvement of business associations.  
 
2.6.1.2. Business Associations: Dekranas  
The discussion of this section focuses on Dewan Kerajinan Nasional or Dekranas 
(Bantul Branch - National Handicraft Board) because this business organisation 
played a more important role than others in promoting small businesses and 
developing its networking with the district government. As we can see in Table 2.15, 
there are eight small business associations. However, the Dekranas is close to the 
local government and was involved in the process of decision-making at the district 
level. This association was more active in promoting small businesses than others.   
                                                 
38
 Daily newspaper Suara Merdeka (7 March 2009)  and   Daily newspaper Harian Jogja (6-3-2009). 
39
(1-7-2008) 
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Table 2.15 
Business Associations in Bantul 
 
No. Name of Association Chairperson 
 
1. Dewan Kerajinan Nasional (National 
Handicraft Board - Branch of Bantul 
District)   
Mrs. Sri Suryawidati  
(Idham Samawi’s wife and 
Candidate for Bupati 2010 
election) 
2. Kamar Dagang dan Industry or Kadinda 
(Bantul Chamber of Industry and Trade) 
Slamet Subagyo  
(Bantul Local Parliament member)  
3. Koperasi Satya Bawana Kasongan, 
Bantul (Kasongan Small business 
Cooperative) 
Dr. Timbul Raharjo 
(Lecturer of ISI) 
4. Bantul Craft Association  Supriaswoto 
5. Paguyuban Karya Sejahtera Mandiri  
(Manding Handicraft Association) 
Sagimin 
6 ASEPHI (Asosiasi Exportir dan 
Handicraft) or Association of Exporters 
and Handicraft) 
Endah Rahayu Murniati, SE 
(Candidate for National parliament 
of Democrat Party in 2009) 
7. ASMINDO (Asosiasi Industri 
Permebelan dan Kerajinan Indonesia) or 
Indonesian Furniture Industry and 
Handicraft Association  
Ambar Tjahjono, SE  
(Candidate for National parliament 
of Democrat Party in 2009) 
8. APIKRI  (Foundation of Indonesian 
People’s Handycraft Development)40 
Amir Pansuri 
       Source: Fieldwork, 2009. 
 
Dekranas was headed by Mrs. Sri Suryawidati, who is Idham Samawi’s wife. He 
was head of the Bantul district government and the deputy of National Board of the 
PDI-P party. Therefore, it is understood that the association is supported by district 
government. Additionally, the association received funding from the Bantul district 
through APBD (District Government Budget) for promoting small businesses. The 
Dekranas program consists of facilitating market promotion, workshops and 
providing loan assistance for small businesses. Dekranas also developed a network 
with the Indonesian University of the Arts (ISI) to introduce new designs of Batik 
and ceramic handicrafts and workshops for small businesses. The programs of 
Dekranas are supported by the Diperindagkop (Local Agency for Trade, Industry 
and Cooperative). As an example, when the researcher was invited by chairman of 
Dekranas to attend in the meeting with small business participants on the 11 June 
2009, the head of Diperidagkop also attended the meeting and supported it. In the 
                                                 
40
Apikri (Asosiasi Pemasaran Industri Kerajinan Rakyat Indonesia) was established by small business 
owners and NGO activists in 1987. The name was changed to Asosiasi Pengembangan Industri 
Kerajinan Rakyat Indonesia in 1989 and In 1990 replaced by Yayasan Pengembangan Industri 
Kerajinan Rakyat Indonesia.     
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practice of the Indonesian bureaucratic culture, the level of official (pejabat) 
attendance at an event is an indicator of the importance of the event (Pramusinto, 
2005, p. 319). In the case of Dekranas, it is clear that the district government 
supported the Dekranas by facilitating funds and infrastructures. In contrast, the 
Dekranas was able to make a bargain with the district government to produce local 
policy in accordance with the needs and interests of small businesses.   
 
Based on discussion above, it can be argued that there is a patronage relationship 
between Dekranas and the district government of Bantul. The district head of Bantul 
helped small business owners through Dekranas with the expectation that the 
Dekranas would become strong and have the power to influence small business 
owners. In local politics of Bantul, kinship played an important role in leadership 
succession. As I have discussed in previous page (117), Sri Suryawidati, chairman of 
Dekranas is the wife of Idham Samawi, District Head of Bantul. This opened a large 
access for the head of Dekranas to be appreciated by public with the expectation she 
would gain many votes in the district head elections in 2010.  It was a remarkable 
result as Sri Suryawidati obtained almost 70 per cent of total votes in those elections. 
Idham Samawi as Bantul district head had prepared his wife to replace his position 
and developed a political dynasty in Bantul district. This is evidence that the 
patrimonial system was adopted in the Bantul district. 
 
However, a patrimonial system is not only adopted by the Bantul district but it is 
also adopted by other districts in Indonesia where kinship and other family ties 
determine the relationship between business and politics such as in the district of 
South Tangerang, where head of district of South Tangerang, Airin Rachmy Diani 
provided facilities to the business man, Tubagus Chaeri Wardhana, the husband of 
South Tangerang district (Tribunnews.com. 14 November 2013).  
 
Other business associations, as an example, Kadinda also received funds from local 
government because the chairman of Kadinda is a Golkar party member and a local 
legislative member. This association received 40 million rupiah from the Bantul 
district government in 2008.
41
 It can be concluded that both the Golkar party and 
                                                 
41
 Interview with Mr. S.B., Chairman of Kadinda, 15 June 2009. 
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PDI-P party developed their own networks with business associations. Golkar 
developed networks with Kadinda whereas PDI-P party with Dekranas with the aim 
to obtain political support. At the same time the association obtained financial 
benefit.  
 
Besides these two business associations, there are other business associations such as 
Bantul Craft, Manding Handicraft Association, ASEPHI, ASMINDO, APIKRI and 
Kasongan Small Business Cooperative. However they have not developed networks 
with political parties, and thus rarely receive funds from the local government of 
Bantul. They prefer to be autonomous associations (Case 2.6). 
Case 2.6: Bantul Craft Association want to be Autonomous Association. 
The Bantul Craft Association only received 375 million rupiah once in 2006 
from central government but they could still survive. These funds are aimed 
to make economic recovery to small business owners after the earthquake, 
which destroyed small business shops and houses, and thus the products of 
small businesses decreased. The chairman of the Bantul Craft Association, 
for instance, argued that this association became an autonomous institution 
without a district government grant. This association collected funds monthly 
from its members and if the member sold their products through the 
association, they had to provide 1 percent of total price. The association did 
not want to depend on the local government.
42
 
 
The Manding Handicraft Association was also not involved in the process of 
decision making at district level. In 2006, this association received technological 
assistance such as a sewing machine and compressor from the provincial 
government.
43
 The others 6 business associations never received funds from the 
district government of Bantul.  
 
It can be concluded that business association named Dekranas and Kadinda have 
links with political parties and receive funds from the Bantul district government. It 
is seen that Dekranas had more influence to district government than Kadinda 
because characteristics of the relationship between Dekranas and district government 
is patrimonialism. These associations were used by political parties to obtain 
political position. 
 
                                                 
42
Interview with Mr. S.A., chairman of the Bantul Craft Association, 16 June 2009. 
43
Interview with Mr. Sg., chairman of Manding Handicraft Association, 7 July 2009. 
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2.6.2. The Neighbourhood Association 
The community structure in Bantul is different from that in Gianyar, which will be 
described in more detail in the next chapter. As discussed above, the territory of 
Bantul is officially divided into sub-districts, and each sub-district is divided into 
villages. A   village is divided into several hamlets (pedukuhan), which is headed by 
a Dukuh. Finally, the pedukuhan is divided into several neighbourhood associations 
(Rukun Tetangga or RT). Beyond official structure, there is however no traditional 
customary structure. 
 
In Gianyar, there is a non-official government structure at a village level called Desa 
Pakraman (customary villages) beyond official villages (Desa Dinas).  At the hamlet 
level (pedukuhan), there is the Banjar.
44
 Both Desa Pakraman and Banjar are 
recognised by the Gianyar district government. At the pedukuhan level, the Banjar 
plays an important role to influence a communities’ behaviour. For instance, in the 
campaign season for the legislative member election, the Banjar played an important 
role as mediator between local communities and local political actors. 
 
Based on Law 32/2004, which started operating in 2005, the Bupati was directly 
elected by local citizens. As a result, there was change of role of neighbourhood 
associations (RT and Pedukuhan) at grassroots level. Both the head of RT and head 
of Pedukuhan played important roles as mediators between local politicians and 
voters. Legislator candidates and district head candidate approached the head of RT 
and head of Pedukuhan to obtain political support by providing funds and materials. 
They assumed that head of RT and head of Pedukuhan were able to influence voter 
behaviour at the grassroots level. However, the head of Pedukuhan stated that they 
allowed their members to vote for candidate based on their preference.
45
 The head of 
RT also argued that he did not force his members to vote for a certain candidate. In 
contrast, he allowed them to vote for a candidate based on their preference.
46
 
 
By mediating through Pedukuhan and RT, local communities can demand politicians 
to represent their needs. Some groups of society could politically bargain with 
                                                 
44
Banjar is customary local community organization at lowest level of social structure hierarchy 
45
 Interview with Mr. N, Head of Pedukuhan of Kasongan, 14 July 2009. 
46
 Interview with Mr. P., Head of RT, Pedukuhan of Karangasem, 9 July 2009. 
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legislature candidates. Several cases show that local communities could request 
funds from the local legislator candidate. For instance, the local communities in 
Pedukuhan Tirto request 4 million rupiah for buying loudspeakers from the local 
legislator candidate from the PAN party.
47
 Other local communities of Pedukuan 
Karangasem request the local legislator from the PDI-P party 500,000 rupiah to 
improve local roads.
48
 The local legislator candidate from the PDI-P party recognises 
that he provides T-shirts and materials to local community because the community 
ask him.
49
  
 
In other case, some candidates of legislature member provided directly money to 
local people individually to influence constituents’ behaviour. As a result, the 
behaviour of contituents will be based on a pragmatic reason in terms of money 
received rather than ideological reasons or programs offered by the candidates. 
Money politics emerged in political campaigning before electing legislature 
members. The Bupati of Bantul also told the researcher that there was change of 
behaviour of constituents from rationalism toward pragmatism which caused the 
decreased quality of local legislature members. This could endanger democratic 
development.
50
 
 
Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that Dekranas is one local 
business association which is used by the district head of Bantul to support his 
policy. Dekranas is supported by the district government and develops networks 
with political party in promoting small businesses. By this way, Dekranas is able to 
make a leverage with district government in local decision making.  
 
At the grassroots level, the RT played an important role as mediator between local 
politicians and local people as constituents. Local politicians competed in pursuing 
political position and used RTs to influences behaviour of local communities in local 
legislative member elections. The decentralisation policy increased the dynamics of 
local politics but money politics emerged at the local level.  
 
                                                 
47
 Interview with Mrs. S., Head of Pedukuhan Tirto, 7 July 2009. 
48
 Interview with Mr. P, Head of RT, Pedukuhan Karangasem, 9 July 2009. 
49
 Interview with Mr. A, local legislator candidate from the PDI-P party, 26 June 2009.  
50
 Interview with Bupati of Bantul, 25 June 2009.  
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2.7. Conclusion     
Geographically, the size of area of Bantul is small, so it is easily controlled by local 
government in implementing decentralisation. Bantul is not rich in natural resources 
and this provides small revenue for district government. The District government, 
therefore, has limited fiscal capacity to implement decentralised functions. In other 
words, the district government has difficulty in implementing administrative 
decentralisation.  
 
Demographically, the total population of Bantul is small, but the population density 
is high. This provides positive contribution in the implementation of decentralisation 
because the small population and high population density can be more easily served 
by the district head. In addition, the district government can easily provide physical 
infrastructures and public services for local population such as roads, market 
buildings, hospitals and education.  
 
The agricultural sector provided the largest contribution (24 percent) for the gross 
regional domestic product of Bantul, while the industrial sector only contributed 16 
percent. The growth of industrial sector has been slow. The average of locally 
derived revenue (PAD income) is only 7 percent of total district government revenue 
(from 2002 to 2010). Therefore, the financial capacity of local government has been 
very low and in-sufficient to support the implementation of decentralisation policy. 
As a result, the district government has depended on central government grants. It 
may be concluded that without the central government grants, Bantul has difficulty 
to implement administrative decentralisation.   
 
In terms of economic structure, the research finding found that the decentralisation 
policy has not given benefit to district government in revenue from local taxes 
because the district government has lack of control over taxes. The central 
government determined types of tax and tax rates. In relation to spending of local 
taxes, the local government has discretionary power. The local government of Bantul 
has discretionary power to help small businessmen by using revenue from tax 
incomes. In addition, the local government has discretionary power in terms of 
revenue and expenditure levies because local governments can control the type and 
amount of levy charges. Based on the Law 28/2009, district government has 
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discretion to determine three types of levies such as levy of general public service, 
levy of business service and levy for certain license.  The number and variety of each 
type of levy is different among districts. Therefore, the district government tends to 
develop many levies with the aim to increase its locally derived revenue. The local 
government of Bantul established seven types of business levies such as levy for 
using local government’s assets, levy for place fish sales, levy for passengers in bus 
station, parking levy, husbandry abattoir levy, levy for sport centre and 
entertainment, and levy for agricultural products. 
   
The district government income consists of the PAD income and equalisation funds. 
The PAD income consists of income from local taxes, local levies and district 
government enterprises. The local government has discretionary policy to use 
income from local taxes, local levies and district government enterprises. Since 2001 
the central government has provided equalisation funds to the district government in 
form of general grants
51
 and specific grants. In relation to specific grants, the local 
governments have no discretionary power to use them. In respect to general grants, 
the local government has discretionary power in terms of spending. It is concluded 
that decentralisation policy could increase discretionary power of local government 
in terms of spending general grants and the PAD income. 
 
Based on the discussion of political decentralisation, it is understood that all local 
legislative members have been directly elected by local citizens since 2004, whereas 
the district head has been directly elected by local citizens since 2005. Therefore, 
politicians approached local citizens to obtain political positions both in the 
executive and legislative institutions. There was a change of political power in local 
legislature and emergence of new political parties during decentralisation era, but the 
performance of local legislative members did not change. They were not qualified 
because they are involved in money politics in the election process. As a result, the 
performance of local legislature members was low.  
 
Political parties had financial problems because they depended on the local 
government grants. In addition, they were not innovative in making policy and were 
                                                 
51
 One of component of general grants is share of revenue from natural resources.  
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not able to represent the interests of local small businesses and local citizens. It is 
interesting that political parties developed networks with business associations such 
as the PDI-P party with Dekranas (Bantul Handicraft Board), and the Golkar party 
with Kandinda (Bantul Chambers of Industry and Trade). As a result, the business 
associations received funds from the Bantul district government. The relationship 
between business associations and political parties provided benefits for small 
businesses. However, the relationship between Dekranas and district government 
may also be called a patronage relationship because the chairman of Dekranas is 
wife of district head of Bantul. Business associations will be further discussed in 
Chapter Four.  
 
Based on the discussion of local bureaucracy, it is understood that style of district 
head leadership has changed since 2004, under Bupati Idham Samawi. The district 
head actively supports poor people by providing credit and protection policy for 
small businesses. Following the change of style of the district head leadership, local 
bureaucrats changed their behaviour in providing public services to small businesses. 
The majority of small business owners perceive that the behaviour of local 
bureaucrats have improved under decentralisation. This means that political 
decentralisation encouraged district the head and bureaucrats to become close to 
local small business owners and increase public services. It indicates that the 
relationship between district head and small businesses is called supportive 
relationship.     
 
In addition, the district head developed networks with non-government organisation 
to obtain political support. At grassroots level, political decentralisation encourages 
local politicians to approach the chairman of local community associations such as 
heads of hamlets (Pedukuhan) and heads of RTs with the aim to influence voter 
behaviour by providing money and material to local communities. Thereby, the 
candidates for local legislative members could obtain political support from local 
communities.  
 
The next section will discuss the social, economic and political setting of the Gianyar 
district with the aim of examining their process in comparison to that of Bantul. The 
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main concerns addressed are whether social, economic and political differences 
affect the implementation of decentralisation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL  
SETTING OF GIANYAR  
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates the social, economic and political setting of Gianyar which 
will be used as a basis for exploring how decentralisation measures change the 
dynamics of local political activity. The social, economic and political structures are 
important variables that can influence the capacity of the district government in 
implementing local autonomy. Social factors such as high population density below 
the poverty line can be constraints for the district government in implementing 
decentralisation. In contrast, regions with rich natural resources and a high income 
from the local taxes/levies might have the financial capacity to implement the 
decentralised function.  
 
Political decentralisation may provide an opportunity for small businesses to 
participate in elections for district heads and local legislature members as well as 
participate in the process of decision-making. A large number of small business 
owners in Gianyar were potential voters in this election and potential participants in 
the decision-making process. Business associations may persuade local government 
to become responsive to the needs of small business owners. 
 
The chapter is divided into five sections: The first examines the impact of the 
geographic and demographic setting on the implementation of decentralisation in the  
Gianyar district. It explores how geographic factors, such as location, population 
size, and the available natural resources of Gianyar promote or prevent the 
implementation of decentralisation measures. The second section studies the effect 
of the economic structure such as the gross district product, the economic growth 
rates, the industrial structure and the employment trends as well as the financial 
capacity of district government. The extent to which the economic structure can 
support financial capacity in carrying out decentralised functions. The third section 
examines political institutions that consist of local legislature and political parties 
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with the aim to analyse the extent to which they are responsive to the interests of 
small businesses. The fourth section examines the local bureaucracy. It discusses the 
behaviour of local bureaucrats and the style of district head leadership. The last 
section deals with the community structure. It will examine how the social structure 
of Gianyar such as business groups, citizens' groups and neighbourhood associations 
affect the implementation of decentralisation policies. This chapter argues that 
although geographic factor  such as the size of area and social factor such as the total 
population contributed effectively to the implementation of decentralisation, 
economic factors such as district government revenue and industrial sector had less 
of an impact on contributed less to local autonomy. 
 
3.2. Geographic and Demographic Setting 
The geographic factors such as the size of area and the natural resources can 
influence income for the district government. In turn, this affects the financial 
capacities of district government in implementing decentralisation policy. The 
demographic factor such as the population size can influence the effectiveness of the 
implementation of decentralisation. The objective of the discussion is to explore the 
extent to which the geographic and demographic factors influence the 
implementation of decentralisation.  
 
3.2.1. The Location, Area, and Natural Resources  
Gianyar is a district in the province of Bali, located about 30 km north east of 
Denpasar city. Administratively, the territory of Gianyar covers 368 km² and consist 
of 6 kelurahan (villages in urban areas) and 64 desa (villages in rural areas), and 523 
Banjar,
52
spread across 7 kecamatan (sub-districts) (Figure 3.1). The region of 
Gianyar is fertile for agriculture. However, the majority of the population works in  
handicrafts, woodcarving and stone-carving industries. This may be due to the fact 
that these jobs provide greater economic benefits than the agricultural sector. 
Generally, people of Gianyar pass on their artisan skills to the next generation.  
 
                                                 
52
 Banjar is the term of a customary hamlet, the lowest level of the local customary community 
association in Gianyar. It is similar to a Pedukuhan in Bantul. However, the Pedukuhan is officially 
the lowest level of local community association. 
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The territory of Gianyar is a combination of both urban and rural areas. The territory 
is bordered by the city of Denpasar in the west, the district of Bangli in the north, the 
district of Kelungkung in the east and the Indonesian ocean in the south. Transport 
from Denpasar city to the eastern and northern districts of Bali passes through 
Gianyar territory. As a result, art shops, markets and small businesses activities have 
emerged between the Denpasar city and the eastern and northern districts. They have 
contributed to the economic growth of Gianyar. Unlike the Bantul district, the 
location of Gianyar district is strategic and provides more opportunity for developing 
business activities. In turn, the these activities support Gianyar’s economic growth 
and contributes to the efficient implementation of decentralisation policies.  
 
The area of Gianyar is smaller than that of Bantul and also that of the districts of 
Sumatera and districts of Kalimantan. The district of Agam in West Sumatera, for 
example, has an area of 2,232.30 km², while the district of Banyuasin in the province 
of South Sumatera has an area of 11,822.99 km². The district of Banjar in the 
province of South Kalimantan has an area of 4,688 km², whereas the district of 
Sambas in the province of West Kalimantan has an area of 6,395.70 km². The small 
area makes is possible for local government to easily provide physical infrastructures 
such roads, market, hospital and school buildings. These pre-existing conditions 
have contributed to the effective implementation of decentralisation policy. 
Figure 3.1. 
Map of Gianyar District 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar 2008, p.3. 
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About 40 percent of total area of Gianyar is rice fields, which produced 106,434 
thousand tons of rice in 2007. Gianyar had surplus rice because the local 
consumption of rice was only 67,141 thousand tonnes in 2007. The fishery sector 
produced 733.20 tons in 2007. The area of plantations is only 0.12 percent of the 
total area of the Gianyar region, and these produced products such as coffee, 
coconuts, and tobacco. The Gianyar district does not have any natural resources such 
as oil, natural gas or geothermal resources. As a result, the district of Gianyar had 
only small income from natural resources and this was a constraint in the 
implementing local autonomy. The Gianyar district had difficulty in carrying out 
decentralised functions because of limited fiscal capacity.     
 
3.2.2. The Population 
In 2008, the population of Gianyar was 390,698, consisting of  194,947 males and 
195,751 females with a population density of 1,062 people per km². The population 
growth rate was less than 2 percent over four decades (1960 to 2000). For the first 
five years of the last decade (2000–2005), the population growth was only 1.38 
percent. In 2008, the population of 0-14 years was 97,467 (22 percent), age 15 to 64 
years was 303,334 (70 percent) and above 65 years was 34,048 (8 percent). This 
means that the majority of the population was of a productive age, which could 
contribute to the dynamics of economic activities and increase the gross regional 
domestic product.  
 
The number of families below the poverty line was 4,234 or aproximately 4.19 
percent of total families in 2003. In 2004 it increased to 5.43 percent. After that, it 
increased to 6.00 percent in 2005. In 2006, population number below the poverty line 
in Gianyar is the same as the number of the population below the poverty line 
throughout the Province of Bali, which was 7.0 percent. In 2007 it increased slightly 
to 7.47 percent or 8,391 families. In 2007, the number of population below poverty 
line in the province of Bali was 6.3 percent and this was 6.17 percent in 2008. 
However, the population below the poverty line in Gianyar is smaller than that in 
Indonesia overall which was 17.75 percent in 2006, 16.58 percent in 2007, and then 
decreasing slightly to 15.42 percent in 2008 (Pemerintah-Indonesia, 2009, p. 48).  
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Small population numbers provide a good opportunity in implementing local 
autonomy because the local government does not need to spend a lot of funds for 
providing public services and infrastructures. However, larger population figures 
below poverty line may become constrained in implementing decentralisation 
because local government is required to fund their assistance. As a result, local 
government had a lack of funds to develop physical infrastructures such as roads, 
schools and hospital buildings. 
 
Most of the people of Gianyar follow the Hindu religion (97.82 percent). The 
remainder is distributed among four other religions: Islam 1.69 percent, Buddhism 
0.18 percent, Protestantism 0.18 percent, and Catholicism 0.13 percent. Indeed, 
Hindu values influence the behaviour of people in their social activities and working 
environments toward greater harmony and less conflict (H. S. Nordholt, 2007). In 
turn, it contributes to the implementation of local autonomy. Although the people in 
Gianyar are religious, in local parliament, there are no political parties with religious 
links. The characteristics of all political parties of Gianyar are those of secular 
nationalist parties.The researcher believes that pluralist secular nationalist parties 
may contribute to pluralist society development and reduce the degree of conflict 
among societies. The following section discusses the economic structure of Gianyar 
with the aim of analysing their influence on the financial capacity of the district.   
3.3. Economic Structure 
The objective of this section is to examine the extent to which fiscal capacity of 
Gianyar can support the implementation of decentralised functions. The fiscal 
capacity is influenced by variables such as the gross district product, the economic 
growth rates, the industrial structures and the market conditions.   
 
3.3.1. The Gross Regional Domestic Product 
In general, the structure of gross regional domestic product (GDRP) during 2003-
2008 did not change significantly (Table 3.1). Unlike the Bantul district, where the 
agricultural sector accounted for most of the GDRP, the trade, hotel, restaurant, and 
services sectors provided the greatest contribution in the Gianyar district amounting 
to about 48 percent to the GRDP. The agriculture sector only contributed 
approximately 19 percent and the industrial sector contributed approximately19 
percent. This means that the economic structure of Gianyar was not dependent on the 
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agricultural sector. Sectors of trade, hotel and restaurant played an important role in 
providing job opportunities for local people. More than 50 percent of the population 
worked in the industrial and trades sectors.  
 
Table 3.1 
Percentage Distribution of Gross Regional Domestic Product of  
Gianyar District at Constant Price 2000, 2003-2008 
 
No. Sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1. Agriculture 19.01 19.11 19.33 19.54 19.21 18.66 
2. Minning 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 
3. Industry 19.06 18.76 18.44 18.29 18.47 18.72 
4. Electricity, Gas and 
Water Supply 
0.86 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.91 
5. Construction 4.63 4.45 4.34 4.20 4.15 4.14 
6. Trade, Hotel and 
Restaurant 
31.84 31.39 31.03 30.73 30.62 30.66 
7. Transport and 
Communication 
4.66 4.74 4.77 4.80 4.83 4.88 
8. Financial 4.88 4.87 4.87 4.94 5.01 5.09 
9. Services 14.64 15.43 15.97 16.24 16.44 16.97 
  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar, (2008b, p. 79). 
 
The economic growth increased from 3.60 percent in 2004 to 4.87 percent in 2008. 
In 2006, the economic growth rate was 5.75 percent, which was the highest growth 
rate during the period 2003-2008. However, the economic growth rate decreased 
slightly to 4.49 percent in 2007, and then it increased slightly to 4.87 percent in 
2008. During 2004-2007, the economic growth did not significantly change (Table 
3.2). The economic growth rate of Gianyar in 2008 was the same as that of 
Indonesia, which was 4.7 percent in 2007. Decentralisation policy could not drive 
economic growth because the Gianyar had limited local resources which provided 
only a small benefit for district government revenue. Furthermore, this was an 
obstacle in the implementation of decentralisation.  
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Table 3.2. 
The Economic Growth of Gianyar at Constant Price 2000, 2003-2008 
 
No. Year GRDP (Million Rp) Growth Rate of GRDP 
(%) 
1. 2003 5,505,984.88  
2. 2004 5,704,075.22 3.60 
3. 2005 5,939,335.13 4.12 
4. 2006 6,281,044.63 5.75 
5. 2007 6,562,892.80 4.49 
6. 2008 6,882,677.86 4.87 
       Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2008b, p. 75).       
 
After discussing the contribution of each sector to the GRDP and the economic 
growth, the next section will examine the district government income with the aim to 
evaluate to what extent the district government income can support the 
implementation of decentralisation. 
 
3.3.2. District Government Income 
Law 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regional 
Governments states that the total district income comprises of locally derived 
revenue (PAD income), equalization funds
53
 (dana perimbangan) and other income. 
In the case of Gianyar in 2009, the total district government income was 652,453.02 
million rupiah. The PAD income was 86,533.56 million rupiah or 13.26 percent of 
total district government income whereas the equalization funds from the central 
government were 476,757.75 million rupiah or 73.07 percent of total district 
government. The other income was 89,161million rupiah or 13.67 percent of total 
district government income (Chart 3.1). This means that the locally derived revenue 
was very small. As a result, the acquired revenue was not able to support the 
implementation of decentralisation policy. In other words, although Bantul district 
adopted the decentralisation policy, the central government still provided grants. The 
district government faced constraints in the implementation of decentralisation 
policy without the central government grants because it is not able to carry out 
decentralised functions. The following section will discuss each type of district 
government income. 
                                                 
53
 Equalization funds are grants from the central government to sub-national governments which 
consist of general grants, specific grants and revenue sharing funds. 
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Chart 3.1 
Distribution of District Government Revenue, 2009 
 
 
     Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2009). 
 
3.3.2.1. The PAD Income 
The first source of district revenue is locally derived revenue or PAD income. The 
PAD income derived income from local taxes/local levies, profits of local 
government owned companies and other legal revenue. In 2009, the PAD income 
was 86,533.56 million rupiah derived from (1) Income from local taxes was 
45,301.72 million rupiah or 52.35 percent. (2) Income from local levies was 
14,526.27 million rupiah or 16.79 percent. (3) Income from profit of the district 
government owned companies was 3,100.00 million rupiah or 3.58 percent. (4) 
Income from other legal revenue was 23,608.56 million rupiah or 27.28 percent 
(Chart 3.2). This means that income from local taxes accounted for the greatest 
contribution for the PAD income. As discussed in Chapter Two, local taxes consist 
of taxes on hotels, restaurants, entertainment, public advertisement, public street 
lighting, and local natural resources exploitation (category C). The important 
question is what kind of local tax that can greatly contribute to PAD income.  Taxes 
on hotels accounted for the largest contribution to the total tax income because there 
were many hotels and restaurants in Gianyar, especially in the sub-district of Ubud. 
To highlight the tax contribution, there were 14 star hotels and 433 non-star hotels in 
2006 .  
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Chart 3.2 
Distribution of the PAD Income, 2009 
 
 
           Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2009). 
 
Since the implementation of decentralisation policy in 2001, a majority of the local 
governments of Indonesia have attempted to increase their PAD income because one 
of indicators of the local government’s capacity was the proportion of the PAD 
income to total district revenue. The greater PAD income would contribute to greater 
total district government revenue. The percentage of PAD income to total district 
revenue during 2003-2009 can be seen in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 
Locally Derived Revenue (PAD) of Gianyar District 
2003-2009 
 
No. Year Total District  Income 
(Million Rp) 
PAD Income 
(Million Rp) 
Percentage PAD 
Income Total 
District Income 
1. 2001 302,024,98 50,107.88 16.59 
2. 2002 337,877.45 54,386.43 16.10 
3. 2003 279,914.63 37,131.73 13.27 
4. 2004 298,649.18 49,738.94 16.65 
5. 2005 320,461.30 55,006.63 17.16 
6. 2006 466,546.45 68,447.92 14.67 
7. 2007 549,618.07 74,906.98 13.63 
8. 2008 616,693.54 87,780.87 14.23 
9. 2009 652,453.02 86,533.56 13.26 
  Average  15.06 
    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009). 
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In general, the ratio of the PAD income to total district income in Gianyar was 
higher than that in Bantul (15.06 percent for Gianyar and 7.91 for Bantul). This 
means that financial capacity of the Gianyar district government was higher than that 
of the Bantul district government. However, the PAD income of Gianyar was also 
not able to support the district government’s expenditures. This suggests that 
financial capacity was a main problem of Gianyar extending to other districts in 
implementing decentralisation policy.  
 
During 2003-2009, local levy income accounted for an average of 15.15 percent of 
total district revenue. The local levies consist of 21 types of local levies such as local 
fees for: building permits, disturbance permits, transport permits, trading business 
permits (SIUP), industrial business permits (IUI), parking fees, market fees and 
public health service fees. 
 
3.3.2.2.   Equalization Funds (Dana Perimbangan) 
The second source of district revenue is that granted from the central government, 
called equalization funds. During 2003-2009, the main source of district government 
income is derived from central government. In 2009, the Gianyar district government 
received equalization funds of 476,757.75 million rupiah or 73.07 percent of total 
district income (Table 3.4). This indicates that the Gianyar district government was 
financially dependent on the central government. It was difficult for the district 
government to implement administrative and political decentralisation without 
central government subsidy. 
Table 3.4 
 Equalization Funds  
 Received by the Gianyar District Government, 2006 - 2009 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
Equalization 
Fund 
(Million rupiah) 
Percentage of 
Equalization Fund  to 
Total District Income 
1. 2003 279,914.63 231,304.19 82.63 
2. 2004 298,649.18 223,226.21 74.75 
3. 2005 320,461.30 252,117.56 78.67 
4. 2006 466,546.45 387,600.13  84.79 
5. 2007 549,618.07 412,970.26  76.71 
6. 2008 616,693.54 459,755.12  74.55 
7. 2009 652,453.02 476,757.75  73.07 
  Average  77.88 
        Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar  (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009).    
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In the case of Indonesia, equalization funds consist of a general allocation funds (the 
DAU fund) or general grants, special allocation funds (the DAK fund), specific 
grants and revenue sharing funds (the DBH fund). In 2009, as an example, the DAU 
fund was 393,604.97 million rupiah or 60.33percent of total district government 
income. The DAK fund was 59.614 million rupiah or 9.14 percent and the revenue 
sharing fund was 23,538.78 million rupiah or 3.61 percent (Table 3.5, Table 3.6 and 
Table 3.7). The details of each funds will be discussed the following. 
 
3.3.2.2.1. The DAU Fund (General Grant) 
The general fund or the DAU Fund played an important role in supporting local 
autonomy in the Gianyar district government because the average of the DAU Fund 
was 64.08 percent during 2001-2009 (Table 3.5). The local government had 
discretional policy to spend this fund. If we compare the DAU funds between 
Gianyar and Bantul, the financial dependency of Bantul was higher than that of 
Gianyar because in Bantul the average of the DAU fund was 71 percent, whereas in 
Gianyar it was 64.08 percent. This condition was a result of limited fiscal 
decentralisation given by the central government to local government, so that the 
local government did not have sufficient discretion to increase local fiscal capacity. 
Law No. 34/2000 provides limited discretion policy on local taxes, whereas Law 
No.66/2001 provides discretion policy on local levies for local governments. In a 
long term perspective, the implementation of decentralisation could not succeed, 
unless the central government provided larger discretion in fiscal policy to sub-
national governments. However, local government had discretional policy to spend 
these funds. 
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Table 3.5 
 General Allocation Fund (DAU Fund)  
 Received by the Gianyar District, 2006 - 2009 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
DAU Fund 
(Million rupiah) 
Percentage of the 
DAU Fund  to Total 
District Income 
1. 2001 302,024,98 195,040.73 64.58 
2. 2002 337,877.45 190,521.15 56.39 
3. 2003 279,914.63 203,642.04 72.75 
4. 2004 298,649.18 193,932.61 64.93 
5. 2005 320,461.30 198,172.00 61.84 
6. 2006 466,546.45 314,673.00 68.84 
7. 2007 549,618.07 347,800.00 64.61 
8. 2008 616,693.54 385,187.68 62.46 
9. 2009 652,453.02 393,604.97  60.33 
  Average  64.08 
        Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009). 
    
3.3.2.2.2. The DAK Fund (Specific Grant) 
The DAK fund is a specific grant that aims to finance special needs such as 
educational, health and business development. During 2003-2009, the total DAK 
fund increased every year. In 2009, the Gianyar district government received the 
DAK fund 59.614 million rupiah or 9 percent of total district government income. 
The total DAK fund received by the Gianyar district government was higher than 
that of the Bantul district government. In 2009, for instance, the percentage of the 
DAK fund in Giayar was 9.14 percent of the district government income, while the 
DAK fund in Bantul was only 6.7 percent. The total DAK fund increased every year 
(Table 3.6).   
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Table 3.6 
 Special Allocation Fund (DAK Fund)  
 Received by the Gianyar District Government, 2006 - 2009 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
DAK Fund 
(Million rupiah) 
Percentage of the 
DAK to Total 
District Income 
1. 2003 279,914.63 999.95 0.36 
2. 2004 298,649.18 5,000.00 1.67 
3. 2005 320,461.30 12,620.00 3.94 
4. 2006 466,546.45 30,530.00 6.68 
5. 2007 549,618.07 43,147.00 8.00 
6. 2008 616,693.54 50,927.00 8.26 
7. 2009 652,453.02 59.614.00 9.14 
  Average  5.44 
        Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009).    
 
3.3.2.2.3. The Revenue Sharing Fund (DBH Fund) 
The revenue sharing fund is a general grant as the district government has 
discretional policy to spend the fund. During 2001-2009 the Gianyar district 
government received revenue sharing funds equating to 7.04 percent of total district 
income (Table 3.7). This means that income from natural resources was very small 
for the district government. In other words, this region did not have potential natural 
resources such as oil and gas mining.  
 
Table 3.7 
Share of Revenue from income from Taxes and Natural Resources (SR of TNR) 
the Gianyar District Government, 2006 - 2009 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
Share of Revenue from Taxes 
and Natural Resources Income 
(Million rupiah) 
Percentage SR 
of TNR to Total 
District Income 
1. 2001 302,024,98 16,642.54 5.51 
2. 2002 337,877.45 21,319.44 6.31 
3. 2003 279,914.63 26,662.20 9.53 
4. 2004 298,649.18 24,283.60 8.13 
5. 2005 320,461.30 41,325.56 12.90 
6. 2006 466,546.45 47,987.19 10.29 
7. 2007 549,618.07 23,460.00 4.27 
8. 2008 616,693.54 23,640.44 3.83 
9. 2009 652,453.02 23,538.78 3.61 
  Average  7.04 
    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar  (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009). 
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Based on the data above, the Gianyar district remained financially dependent on the 
central government’s subsidies because total district government income was not 
sufficient to support its expenditure. Gianyar had difficulty in enhancing public 
services as well as physical infrastructures for small businesses. In other words, the 
implementation of decentralisation in Gianyar faced financial constraint without the 
central government subsidy. 
 
3.3.3. The Industrial Sector 
Rather than large-scale industry development, the Gianyar district government 
focused more on small and medium scale industry development because there were 
many small business activities in this region. For instance, the number of small 
businesses increased from 15,912 in 2001 to 22,144 in 2007. In 2003 the small and 
medium industries absorbed 30,730 employees, and this increased to 65,802 
employees in 2007. However, most of the small and medium businesses were 
informal and were not registered (Table 3.8). As a result, the Gianyar district 
government did not obtain income from local levies from these small businesses. 
This indicated that the Gianyar district government could not control small 
businesses. Although the district government enacted local regulation on business 
permits, most small businesses ignored them. They could exist despite not 
possessing legal business permits such as Trade Business Permit or Industry 
Business Permit. In other words, they were not dependent on the local government. 
 
Table 3.8 
The Number of Small and Medium Businesses (SMB) and Employees  
in the Gianyar District 2001-2007 
 
 
No. 
 
Year 
Number of  SMB Total Number of Employee Total 
Formal Informal Formal Informal 
1. 2001 277 15,635 15,912 2,856 27,874 30,730 
2. 2002 306 18,150 18,456 3,440 39,878 43,318 
3. 2003 417 19,399 19,816 4,397 45,830 50,227 
4. 2004 438 20,262 20,700 4,685 50,592 55,277 
5. 2005 455 21,418 21,873 4,839 56,544 61,383 
6. 2006 471 21,426 21,897 5,353 59,519 64,872 
7. 2007 489 21,655 22,144 5,690 60,112 65,802 
   Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2008b). 
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In 2007, the industrial sector absorbed the largest proportion of employees at 32.70 
percent of total employees. Most of them worked in the small business sector. The 
agricultural sector absorbed 25.36 percent, whereas the sectors of trade, hotels, and 
restaurants absorbed 20.55 percent. The other sectors reflected 12.44 percent of the 
total employees (Chart 3.2). 
 
Chart 3.3 
Distribution of Employment by Sector 
 
 
 Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2008b, p. 23). 
 
In 2003, the unemployment rate was 8.01 percent. It decreased sharply to 3.51 
percent in 2004, but increased again to 7.59 percent in 2005. In 2006 it decreased 
slightly to 4.51 percent and further in 2007 the unemployment rate fell steeply to 
2.80 percent. At this time the  unemployment rate in Indonesia was 9.11 percent. 
Reflecting in 2007 that the unemployment rate in Gianyar was lower than the 
national level. 
 
From the economic structure, it may be concluded that most of the PAD income is 
derived from local tax revenue. However, the PAD income was not sufficient to 
support the total expenses of the district government. The economy of this region 
remains dependent on central government’s subsidies, both general and specific 
grants. The ratio of the PAD income to total district government revenue in Gianyar 
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is larger than that in Bantul (Table 3.3 and Table 2.4). I suggest that the financial 
capacity of Gianyar was higher than that of Bantul in supporting the implementation 
of decentralisation policies. The next important question is whether political 
institutions in Gianyar improved to support the implementation of decentralisation.  
 
3.4. Political Institutions 
The aim of this section is to explore changes of political institutions at a local level 
as the result of decentralisation policy. As discussed in Chapter One, political 
decentralisation may increase the power of political parties and local parliament. The 
important question relates to whether increased power of political parties as well as 
local parliament can increase their role in local politics particularly in promoting 
small businesses.  
 
3.4.1. Local Parliament 
During 2004-2009, there were seven political parties in local parliament of Gianyar 
(Table 3.9). Local politics was relatively homogenous because secular nationalist 
parties, the Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (PDI-P party) and Golkar party 
occupied more than 50 percent of the total seats in the local parliament. Although 
there were many political parties in local parliament, there were no political parties 
with religious links. Even though people of Gianyar were religious, the 
characteristics of all political parties in Gianyar were those of secular nationalist 
parties. As a result, it may have minimalized conflict among religions. 
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Table 3.9 
Distribution of Seats among Political Parties in Local Parliament of 
Gianyar 2004-2009 and 2009-2014 
 
Political Parties 2004-2009 2009-2014 
Seat Percentage Seat Percentage 
Indonesian Democracy Party of 
Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan or PDI-P Party)  
19 47.50 16 40.00 
Golkar Party 10 25.00 6 15.00 
New Indonesian Association Party 
(Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru 
or PPIB) 
4 10.00 2 5.00 
Freedom Bull National Party (Partai 
Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan or 
PNBK) 
4 10.00 2 5.00 
Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat or 
PD)  
1 2.50 5 12.50 
Mahaenism Indonesian Nationalist 
Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia 
Marhaenisme or PNIM) 
1 2.50 2 5.00 
Nationhood and Caring Party (Partai 
Karya Peduli Bangsa  or PKPB) 
1 2.50 1 2.50 
People’s Conscience Party (Partai 
Hanura) 
- - 3 7.50 
Reform  Democracy Party (Partai 
Demokrasi Pembaruan  or PDP) 
- - 3 7.50 
Total 40 100 40 100 
     Source: KPUD of Gianyar, 2009. 
 
In the 2009 election of legislature members, the PDI-P and Golkar parties lost 3 
seats and 4 seats respectively in the local legislature, because the voters moved to the 
People’s Conscience party,  the Reform  Democracy party and the Democrat party 
(Table 3.11). However, the PDI-P and Golkar parties were still the majority in the 
local parliament. The election results in Gianyar were not in line with that at national 
level. At national level, the Democrat party obtained the majority votes (21 percent), 
whereas in Gianyar this party only obtained 5 seats or 12.5 percent of total local 
legislature seats. 
 
The Freedom Bull National Party (PNBK) and Marhaenism Indonesian Nationalist 
Party (PNIM) were actually fragments of the Indonesian Democracy Party of 
Struggle (PDI-P party), but only the PNBK party integrated into the PDI-P faction 
(Fraksi PDI-P) in the local parliament. The PNIM party, the Nationhood and Caring 
Party (PKPB), the Democrat party (PD) and the New Indonesian Association Party 
(PPIB) formed a new coalition called the Fraksi Gianyar Bersatu (United Gianyar 
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Faction) in the local parliament. I suggest this created a sound political climate for 
developing local democracy because there were many factions in the local 
parliament. Moreover, the Gianyar Bersatu faction, who often criticized the district 
government policy for not providing sufficient benefits to local people.
54
 
Unfortunately, the membership of the faction was small (25 percent), so it could not 
influence local government policy in promoting or advocating for benefits small 
businesses. The important question is the extent to which local legislature members 
could carry out the local legislature functions such as articulating the preferences of 
local communities. One local legislature member described the problem to me as 
follows: 
Case 3.1: Low Performance of Local Legislature Member  
Basically, local legislature members were not innovative because they had no 
knowledge regarding the legislature’s functions. In addition, they had no data 
and information related to social, economic and political issues. Most of them 
did not attend local parliament meetings (such as committee, fraction and 
general meetings) and meeting between legislature and executive bodies. 
This indicated that the performance of local legislature was low.
55
  
 
One vice chairman of local legislature said that there was no change of performance 
of local legislature during decentralisation era (Case 3.2).  
Case 3.2: The Behaviour of Local Legislature Members 
During decentralisation era, the behaviour of local legislature members did 
not significantly change. They have not yet produced local regulations, which 
have a large impact on local communities. In contrast, they only focused on 
developing local regulation with the aim to increase district revenue.
56
 
 
The question arises as to whether or not local parliament members who came from 
business backgrounds were able to promote the interest of the small business sector 
in Gianyar.Table 3.10 indicates that more than half of local parliament members 
were previously businessmen, but they did not represent nor were able to articulate 
the interests of small business. The Kadinda (local business association) suggested 
them to help the interests of business sector, and they failed to respond.
57
 The next 
                                                 
54
Interview with Mr. B.M, member of Fraksi Gianyar Bersatu of Gianyar Local Parliament, 23 April 
2009. 
55
 Interview with  Mr. B.M., Gianyar Local legislature member, 23 April 2009. 
56
Interview with Mr. R.K., Vice Chairman of Gianyar Local legislature, 28 April 2009. 
57
 Interview with Mr. A.A., Chairman of Gianyar Chamber of Industry and Trade, 24 April 2009. 
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section will discuss the extent to which political parties played an important role in 
promoting the small business sector. 
 
Table 3.10 
Background of Local Parliament members of Gianyar, 2004-2009 
 
Previous Job of Parliament Member Number 
 Number Percentage 
Bureaucracy 3  7.50 
Politicians 6 15.00 
Businessmen 23 57.50 
Teacher/Lecturer 2 5.00 
Building Contractor 4 10.00 
Doctor 1 2.50 
Private Bank 1 2.50 
 40 100.00 
         Source: Field work, 2009. 
 
3.4.2. Political Party 
Under the centralized system (1967-1998), there were only three political parties in 
Gianyar: the Golkar party, the Indonesian Democracy party and the United 
Development party. Following the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998, the 
Indonesian government adopted a decentralised policy. The policy caused the 
emergence of new political parties in Gianyar region, as in other regions in 
Indonesia. In 2009, 24 political parties were involved in national and local legislature 
member elections. However, only 9 political parties obtained seats in local 
legislature. 
 
The main problem for political parties of Gianyar was insufficient financial capacity 
to support their activities. There were three sources of political party income. Firstly, 
there was the income derived from members. Each local legislature member had 
contributed around 10 percent of his salary to his party. Secondly, political parties 
received funds from the district government based on the number of seats held in the 
local legislature. As an example, in 2008 the district government of Gianyar 
allocated Rp 760,000,000 to 8 political parties which had seats in local parliament.  
Then it slightly decreased to Rp 759,999,999 in 2009. Further, in 2010 it also fell to 
Rp 750,348,312. Thirdly, political parties can receive funds from donors. Based on 
anecdotal evidence from the political parties, they primarily depended on the first 
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and second financial sources. Although many political parties emerged during 
decentralisation era, the performance of political parties remained low. They had not 
yet articulated the preferences of local communities.   
 
Case 3.3: Party did not help the poor.   
Political parties did not pay attention to the poor. Generally, they helped the 
poor only throughout the political campaigns to attract sympathy from the 
poor by providing money or materials. Thus, they failed to develop 
sustainable policy to support populist economic activities (ekonomi 
kerakyatan). This was a result of weak leadership and management of the 
political parties.
58
 
 
One small business argued that political parties were not responsive to the needs of 
small businesses.
59
  One party member said that the process of recruitment within 
parties to be a legislator candidate was not fair because it was based on financial 
capacity, not intelligence or experience. As a result, a person who was able to pay a 
high level of funds to party was chosen by party to be candidate.
60
 This indicated that 
the behaviour of party was not based on preference of cadres' qualifications,  but 
rather on money. The behaviour of political parties had not yet changed. As a result, 
they could not respond the need of local communities nor small businesses sector. 
 
3.5. Local Bureaucracy  
This section will answer the question as proposed in Introduction: Have local 
bureaucrats and district head responded the needs and interests of small business 
owners? As discussed in Chapter One, in many countries decentralisation policies 
may increase tasks and responsibilities for the local bureaucracy as well as the 
district heads. Thus, the behaviour of local bureaucracy and the district head demand 
improvement. This section will examine the extent to which the behaviour of local 
bureaucrats and district head had changed as a result of decentralisation policy.  
 
3.5.1. The Behaviour of Local Bureaucrats 
The section examines change of local bureaucrats behaviour as a result of 
decentralisation. In 2008, there were 8,557 employees in Gianyar district,   
                                                 
58
 Interview with  D.A., Director of Bali International Institute of Tourism Management, 4 May 2009.  
59
 Interview with Mr. A.P, Small Business Owner  and Kelian Adat, Banjar Kendran, Desa Kedran, 
Tegallang, 23 May 2009. 
60
Interview with Mr. B.M, political party member and local legislature member, 23 April 2009. 
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distributed across 27 local government bodies such as agencies, boards, sub-districts 
government, the district secretariat, hospital and election office. It was a complex 
task for the Gianyar district government to improve the behaviour of local 
bureaucrats due to the numbers and scope of overseeing the task. The local 
government needed funds to provide training with the aim to increase skills and 
knowledge of local bureaucrats. If they had good skills and a better understanding of 
their jobs, they might have been able to serve small businesses well.  
  
During 1967-1998, the Golkar party controlled the civil servants of Gianyar. 
However, following the fall of the New Order Government in 1998, Golkar could 
not control civil servants because the central government enacted Law No. 43/1999 
which banned all civil servants from participating in political parties. These 
circumstances raise a critical question as whether local bureaucrats became more 
responsive to the needs of small businesses without the influence of politics.  
 
According to Mr. B.M, a member of local legislature of Gianyar, local bureaucrats 
were still passive and not innovative. In general, decisions made are not supported 
by accurate data.
61
 In relation to small businesses, the Diskop dan UKM (Local 
Agency for Cooperatives, Small and Medium Businesses) has responsibilities to 
promote small businesses. As a new local government agency, the Diskop dan UKM 
has not yet achieved much for promoting small business. Upon conducting this 
research and questioning the strategic plans of this agency, one staff of member 
answered that it did not have a strategic plan to promote small business.
62
 Thus, this 
local agency may not be carrying out its functions to provide public services and 
promotion of the sector. The research findings were concurrent with the result of 
interviews of small businesses as well as survey data. The interviews indicated that 
public services for small businesses have not yet changed significantly until since the 
implementation of decentralisation as stated by the Chairman of Kadinda of Gianyar. 
Case 3.4: Less Support for Small Businesses 
The business sector has provided funds to support the district government 
revenue, but the district government has not yet improved public services for 
them, such as physical infrastructures (roads, market building, car park 
                                                 
61
Interview with Mr. B.M., a local legislature member, 23 April 2009. 
62
Interview with Mr. M.A, Head of Section of Business Development, Diskop dan UKM, 30 April 
2009. 
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areas), financial and material assistance. We expected that the district 
government was able to better promote the small business sector.
63
 
 
The following case showed that the district government did not provide physical 
infrastructures such as market buildings, car parks and roads to facilitate the sector. 
Case 3.5: Less Physical Infrastructure Supports for Small Businesses. 
 
           One small businessman told the researcher that the district government had 
not improved the roads around Tegallalang sub-district where there were 
many small businesses. The roads were still narrow and there was no parking 
available along as this road. As a result, buyers had difficulty to park their 
cars for shopping.
64
 
 
In relation to local bureaucrats and their jobs, research findings show that the local 
bureaucrats were less interested in improving office equipment and computers to 
support their jobs. As a result, they could not provide better public services for small 
businesses. This indicated that behaviour of local bureaucrats had not changed in 
providing public services for small businesses (Case 3.6). 
Case 3.6: Less Office Equipment  
 One staff member of the UPTD reported to her boss that some computers in 
UPTD
65
 did not work. As a result, she and other employee could not perform 
their work. Despite knowing the situation, the boss failed to action any 
change. As a result, the performance of the UPTD in providing public 
services for small business deteriorated. 
66
 
 
This means that during decentralisation era, the district government had not 
significantly improved public services for small businesses. The interview referred to 
above was supported by a survey data from 100 small business owners, which 
showed most respondent (29 percent) revealing that local bureaucrat behaviour did 
not change during decentralisation era. A further, 18 percent said their behaviour 
worsened and 26 percent did not chose to comment further. However, 27 percent 
argued that their behaviour improved (Chart 3.4). 
 
 
 
                                                 
63
Interview with Mr. A.A., the chairman of the Gianyar Kadin, 24 April 2009. 
64
Interview with Mr. A.W., Small business owner and Kelian Dinas in Tegallalang sub-district, 23 
May 2009. 
65
 UPTD is Unit Pelaksana Teknis Dinas (Technical Unit of Diskop and UKM). 
66
Interview with M.R., one of the UPTD Staff, 22 April 2009. 
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Chart 3.4 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Behaviour of Local Bureaucrats  
(N=100) 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009. 
 
The behaviour of local bureaucrats who can not change can result in poor public 
service.  Survey data indicates that the majority of respondents (24 percent) said that 
public services remained the same. Further, 30 percent noted that public service 
became less responsive. This means that public services did not improve. Only 22 
percent of respondents commented that public service became responsive (Chart 
3.5). In other words, only a few small businesses recognised that the behaviour of 
local bureaucrat changed to improve public services for small businesses. This 
suggests that increased power of local bureaucrats as a result of decentralisation 
policy could not cause improvements to public service.   
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Chart 3.5 
The Perception of Small Business Owners to Public Services 
(N=100) 
 
 
Source: Field work 2009 
 
Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that decentralisation did not drive 
changes of behaviour of local bureaucrats. As a result, public services for small 
businesses become poor.  
 
3.5.2. Style of Leadership of the District Head 
As discussed in Chapter One, decentralisation policy can cause the district head to 
become closer to local communities because the district head is directly elected by 
local communities. This section will examine whether the district head of Gianyar 
became closer and more responsive to the needs of small businesses. Before 
discussing the leadership of the district government head, it will explore the 
background of the Gianyar district head to ascertain whether the personal 
background of the district head can influence the style of leadership.  
 
As a district head, Tjokorda Oka Ardhana known as Cok Ace was a son of the Royal 
House of Ubud (Puri Ubud),
67
 chairman of the Bali Branch of the Indonesian 
Association of Hotels and Restaurants, BPD PHRI
68
  and vice-head of the Bali 
Tourism Board. He was also a lecturer in the Faculty of Engineering, Udayana 
University, Bali. In 2002 he competed as a candidate for the district government 
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 Puri is house of Balinese nobility. 
68
BPD PHRI is the Badan Pimpinan Daerah - Perhimpunan Hotel dan Restauran Indonesia 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Public service
become
responsive: 22%
Public service is
the same with
previously: 24%
Public  service
become less
responsive: 30%
I Don't know: 24%
150 
 
 
 
head. However, he failed to become candidate beacuse he was not supported by 
majority of political parties of local legislature. At that time the candidates for the 
district head required nomination by political parties and election by the local 
legislature members.  
 
In the 2008 election for the district head (Pilkada), Cok Ace was proposed by a 
coalition of several small political parties: the PPIB party, Demokrat party,  Patriot 
Pancasila party, PDK party, Pelopor party, PKPL party, PNBK party, PNI 
Marhenisme party and the PKPB party. These parties had only 11 seats in the local 
legislature. Then, Cok Ace tried to gain more political support from Golkar party by 
participating in the Golkar party convention on 1 September 2008. Finally, he was 
supported by the Golkar party and aforementioned parties. During the pilkada 
campaign, Cok Ace (with his running mate, Dewa Made Sutanaya) launched seven 
programmes: no tuition fees for education, free health care for poor families, 
fertilizer subsidies, subsidies for land-ownership and building taxes, credit without 
collateral for small business, credit for new overseas employees, enhanching the 
tourism industry and equitable development of all sectors. Cok Ace and  Dewa Made 
Sutanaya won by a small margin from the incumbent Bupati, A.A. Gde Bharata 
(with running mate Yudha).  Cok Ace won 136,182 votes and Bharata 134,527. As 
district government head, Cok Ace appears to have fulfilled the promises made 
during his political campaign. To implement the credit program for small businesses 
without colateral, Cok Ace developed networks between local government and 
financial institutions such as BNI Bank, BPD Bank or Bank Pembangunan Daerah 
(Regional Development Bank) and LPD to help small businesses. The BNI Bank is 
the State Owned Company, the BPD is Provincial Government owned company and 
the LPD is a Customary Village Owned Company. These networks will be discussed 
in the following section. 
 
Firstly, Cok Ace signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with BNI Bank in 
mid 2008 with the aim of providing low interest loans to small businesses in 
Gianyar. However, when the researcher asked some small businesses about the 
program, not all of them were aware of its existence. This was likely because it was a 
new program and the district government did not intensively inform small businesses 
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about it. In other words, the Local Government Agency for Cooperative, Small and 
Medium Businesses (Diskop dan UKM ) has not yet operated efficiently. 
 
Secondly, in 2009 the Gianyar District deposited 500 million rupiah in the BPD 
Bank, which was subsidized with two billion rupiah by the BPD Bank. Thus, in total, 
2.5 billion rupiah was available to be distributed to small businesses and small 
business cooperatives. One small business could receive 7.5 million rupiah whereas 
one cooperative could also receive this same amount. In 2009, 59 small businesses 
received loans from the BPD Bank without collateral.  
 
Thirdly, the Gianyar district head introduced credit schemes to help small businesses 
through the Institution for People’s Credit (Lembaga Perkreditan Desa or LPD). The 
majority of the small businesses preferred to borrow money from the LPD rather 
than from the BPD Bank. This was because the process for obtaining the credit from 
the LPDs was faster and required simpler administration than that of the BPD Bank. 
The number of LPD loans increased from 255, in 2003 to 266, in 2007. Ideally, each 
Banjar has a LPD, but in fact not all Banjar have them. Moreover, the survey 
indicated that small businesses were able to survive without credit from state banks 
above because they depended on private financial institutions such as LPD and credit 
from family and friends. Their businesses also depended on domestic and foreign 
market rather than help from local government. Based on the discussion above, it can 
be concluded that the district head paid little attention to small business during 
decentralisation era. The important question is the extent small business owners 
perceive the district head of Gianyar. Does the behaviour of district head become 
responsive and close to small business owners? 
 
Based on survey data from 100 small business owners, 37 percent of respondents 
perceived that the district head became responsive and close to small business, 32 
percent revealed that there was no behaviour change at the district head. Twenty six 
percent had the view that the district head became less responsive (Chart 3.6). The 
finding was different from that in Bantul where 60 percent of respondents said that 
district head had became more responsive. This means that decentralisation policy 
had a bigger impact on behaviour of the district head of Bantul than that of Gianyar.  
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 Chart 3.6 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Behaviour of District Head 
(N=100) 
 
 
Source: Field work, 2009. 
 
It can be concluded that district head provided only financial assistance to small 
businesses owners through financial institutions such state banks and LPDs. 
Although the district government head had a business background, he was less 
responsive to the needs and interests of small businesses. This suggests that the 
district head of Bantul was more supportive of small businesses than the district head 
of Gianyar. The next section will discuss the community structure in Gianyar with 
the aim to explore the effect of community structure in implementing 
decentralisation policy. 
 
3.6. Community Structure 
Community structure reflects local citizen groups and business associations at the 
local level.  This section will explore the role of business associations and local 
citizen groups in the process of decision making at local level. It will show the extent 
to which they play an important role in the decision making process at local level. 
 
3.6.1. Business Associations 
There are four business associations in Gianyar disrict: the Business Association for 
Wood (Asosiasi Pengusaha Kayu), the Business Association for Silver (Asosiasi 
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Pengusaha Perak), the Business Association for Fabric (Asosiasi Pengusaha Kain) 
and the Gianyar Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadinda). From these four 
business associations, only Kadinda was active within the community. Despite four 
business associations in existence, only a few business people are involved because 
the associations have not yet played important roles in promoting the interests of 
businesses. For instance, less than 40 percent of the total wood businessmen are 
involved in the Business Association for Wood.
69
 Most small businesses did not 
participate in the associations because they felt the associations did not provide 
substantial assistance. For instance, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
Gianyar has no mediation between the district and its business people. The 
association has not yet become a pressure group, demonstrated by the following 
cases. 
Case 3.7: Powerlessness of Business Association 
In 2008, some traders brought timbers from the Gianyar region to other 
regions for sale. As a result, Gianyar had a lack of timbers and business 
owners had difficulties in purchasing timber as an input of their businesses. 
However, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Gianyar could not 
pressure the local government to overcome this problem by stopping the trade 
of timbers out of Gianyar. Indeed, the business association expected that the 
district government could help small businesses. This case indicated that the 
relationship between business group and the local government was not well 
institutionalised.
70
 
 
The case above indicates that business association was not able to reach an 
agreement with district government to produce local policy which provides benefits 
for small businesses. Furthermore, local government and the Kadinda really could 
not help the business sector when they faced a problem. The business sector had to 
overcome their problems without intervention from local government, indicating that 
the business sector was not dependent on local government (Case 3.8).   
Case 3.8: Lack of input supply 
The district government of Gianyar and the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry could not do anything when businessmen in Gianyar faced a lack of 
supply of timber because an investor established a new plywood factory in 
the Bangli district, absorbing the timber resources from the Gianyar region.
71
 
                                                 
69
Interview with Mr. A.A., Chairman of Gianyar  Business Association for Wood, 24 April 2009 
70
 Interview with Mr. A.A., Chairman of Gianyar Business Association for Wood and Chairman of 
Gianyar Chamber of Industry  and Trade, 24 April 2009 
71
 Interview with Mr. A.A., Chairman of Gianyar Business Association for Wood and Chairman of 
Gianyar Chamber of Industry and Trade, 24 April 2009. 
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These cases indicate that the Gianyar Chamber of Commerce and Industry has not 
yet played an important role as mediator between business people and the local 
government. In addition, the business association has not yet helped business people 
to solve the problems of the supply inputs. The relationship between business 
association and local government has not developed into an institutionalized and 
inclusive partnership, despite the local government head's background in business. 
 
3.6.2. Neighbourhood Association 
The social structure of Gianyar is different from Bantul. The lowest level of social 
organisation in Gianyar is called a Banjar, which regulates rights and obligations of 
the Balinese community. These rights and obligations  are documented in the“aweg-
aweg”.72A Banjar is headed by a notable person (tokoh adat), who understands  
customary behaviour. In Gianyar, there are official villages called Desa Dinas and 
customary villages caled Desa Adat or Desa Pakraman. There are 523 Banjar and 
271 Desa Adat. Historically Desa Pakraman and Banjar arose from Dutch colonial 
rule. 
 
In the 1930s, Dutch colonial rule introduced a distinction between administrative 
(dinas) and customary (adat) rules at the village level. This construction was 
designed to retain Balinese religion and culture (H. S. Nordholt, 2007, p. 27).   
However, when the New Order Government took power in 1968, desa adat became 
subordinate to desa dinas. The Law 5/1974 on Regional Government only 
recognized desa dinas. During the reformasi period, Law 5/1974 was replaced by 
Law 22/1999, which recoqnised desa dinas and desa adat. Following suite, Law 
32/2004 abolished Law 22/1999, which opened sphere of the relationship between 
desa dinas and desa adat.  
 
In 2001, the provincial government of Bali issued  a local regulation (Perda No. 
3/2001) on the role of the desa adat which replaced Perda 6/1986 in which adat was 
sub-ordinated to the interests of national development. The word adat was replaced 
by the word pakraman. Krama refers to customary practice as well as the village 
council. Moreover, Perda No. 3/2001 provided desa pakraman full authority to 
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Aweg-aweg is local regulation of Balinese behaviour at Banjar level. 
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manage their internal affairs and make the village council the highest authority. Desa 
pakraman even has authority over village land, deterring land that can not be sold 
(Nordholt, 2007:28). However, the concept of desa pakraman has been criticized. 
Firstly, the local regulation creates double standards because it articulates that the 
migrants are members of the desa pakraman, and no obligations to fulfil religious 
practices. Secondly, the concept of desa pakraman creates a fragmented autonomy at 
the village level (Nordholt, 2007).  
 
The Desa Pakraman is headed by Bendesa,
73
 who receives a monthly salary from the 
local government. During the political campaign for the local legislature member 
election and district head election, local politicians approached Bendesa to obtain 
political support from local communities by providing money or materials to Desa 
Pakraman. The local politicians expected that the Bendesa could influence the 
behaviour of local communities (Case 3.9). 
Case 3.9: Local politicians approached Bendesa 
Candidates for district head, A.A.Gde Agung Bharata and Cokorda Oka 
Ardana Sukawati approached the notables of customary organisations such as 
Bendesa and heads of villages to gain political support in the 2008 district 
head election. The candidates showed their appreciation for political support 
by providing money. They assumed that by addressing the Bendesa, they 
would easily win because Bendesa were able to influence voter behaviour.
74
 
 
During the political campaign for the legislative election in 2009 and the district 
head election election in 2008, Banjars also played important roles as mediators 
between candidates for the legislature and small businesses as voters. The candidates 
usually gave money to local community (Case 2.10).   
Case 3.10: The Role of Banjars  during  Local Parliamentary Elections 
 
During the political campaign for local parliamentary elections in 2009, there 
were five candidates for the local legislature who came to a Banjar meeting 
to introduce themselves and asked support from the Banjar members. Each 
candidate gave about Rp 500,000 up to Rp 1,000,000 to the Banjar. This 
money was called “uang sukarela” or voluntary contribution. This money 
was distributed to Pura (temples) to finance religious ceremonies. 
Furthermore, in the campaign for Pilkada, one of candidates for district head 
also came to give money, called “sesari”, for religious ceremonies. However, 
after finishing religious ceremonies, the remaining money could be used for 
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Bendesa is head of customary village 
74
 Radar Bali, 2-1-2007 quoted by Imfath (2008, p. 85). 
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the needs of  the Pura and the needs of local society. By providing funds, the 
candidates hoped they could influence voter behaviour. 
75
 
 
The cases above showed that Banjars were used by local politicians to obtain 
political support. Although Banjars received funds from politicians, they were not 
able to lobby politicians to get more than what was given. In another case, candidates 
for the local legislature gave materials to local community (Case 3.11). 
 Case 3.11: Money Politics during Local Parliamentary Elections. 
 
One candidate for the local legislature gave a bulldozer during his campaign 
to the local community through the Banjar with the aim to influence voters 
behaviour. The bulldozer was used by the local community to build a football 
field. Another candidate for the legislature gave Rp 50 million to local 
community. However, the head of Banjar let the Banjar members elect their 
candidate based on their individual preference.
76
 
 
When the current district head was competing in the district head election (Pilkada), 
as the incumbent, he could use public resources with the aim to obtain political 
support in election for district head (Case 3.12 and Case 3.13). 
Case 3.12: Obscurity between Public and Private Resources 
One of the candidates for district head who was the incumbent gave 1.5  
million rupiah to a Pura during his campaign for pilkada, but it was difficult 
for ordinary people to judge whether he was acting in his position as district 
head or as a candidate for disrict head.
77
 
 
Another case indicates that during the campaign, the district head of Gianyar, as 
incumbent donated materials and services to local people (Case 3.13). 
Case 3.13: Seeking Political Influence by Providing “Sembako” 78 and 
Health Services for Poor People 
 
The Bupati of Gianyar, Agung Bharata headed a “safari” for public health 
services for villages. Thousands of local people received free health services. 
In addition, the Bupati delivered “sembako” packages to tuberculosis disease 
sufferers.
79
 
 
Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that business associations in 
Gianyar had not yet become pressure groups and most of the business people are not 
involved in these association. They also had not yet played an important role as 
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Interview with Mr. A.W., head of  Kelian Dinas and Kelian Adat, Banjar of Bonjaka,  23 May 2009. 
76
Interview with Mr. K.K., head of Kelian Dinas, Banjar of Sapat, 14 May 2009. 
77
 Interview with N.S, Head of Kelian Dinas and Kelian Adat, Banjar of Pujung Kaja, 23 May 2009. 
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Sembako is human basic foods such as: rice, sugar, cooking oil, etc. 
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 Radar Bali Daily, 24-09-207 quoted by Imfath (2008, p. 69).  
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mediators between local government and business people. In other words, business 
association had no power to make a bargaining with district government.  
 
Further, Bendesa and head of Banjar was the customary organisation at village level, 
but they played an important role as mediator between local politicians and local 
communities. Local politicians approached Bendesa and the head of Banjar to 
influence local communities in the election for local parliament members and the 
district head. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
Demographically, the population of Gianyar is small. Culturally, the population is  
homogeneous with Hindu culture. It is postulated that the small population and 
homogeneous culture contributes to the implemention of decentralisation policies 
because there is  a little conflict among the population. However, many individuals 
below the poverty line implicate a financial burden for district government because 
the district government needs to allocate funds to help the poor people.  
 
Gianyar is not rich in natural resources such as minerals and forests. Further, the 
district government has only a small income from natural resources and tax revenue. 
As a result, the district government has difficulty in implementing administrative 
decentralisation such as providing public services, financial assistance and training 
programs for small business. The administrative decentralisation thus has only a 
minimal impact on the relationship between local government and small business.    
 
In 2008, the sector of trade, hotel and restaurant accounted for the most part of gross 
regional domestic product of Gianyar (30 percent), whereas the agricultural sector 
was only 18 percent. This means that economic structure of Gianyar was not 
dependent on the agricultural sector. This differed with Bantul, which depended on 
the agricultural sector as the basis of its economy. As in the case of Bantul, locally 
derived revenue of Gianyar was not sufficient to support the district government’s 
expenditure. As a result Gianyar was financially dependent on the central 
government’s grants. Gianyar had limited fiscal decentralisation to increase financial 
capacity. I suggest that without central government grants, financially the local 
bureaucrats of Gianyar faced constraints to implement the decentralisation policies.  
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Decentralisation policy provides discretionary power to the district government in 
terms of using local tax incomes, levy incomes and general grants because the 
central government does not determine how to use such incomes. The central 
government also gives authority to local government to develop types of levies and 
determines charge of each levy. Therefore, the district government can give financial 
assistance to small businessmen by using incomes from taxes, levies and general 
grants.   
 
Based on the political institutional discussion, we understand that both the behaviour 
of political parties and local legislature members did not change during 
decentralisation era. Following decentralisation policy, many political parties 
emerged and they competed intensively in pursuing public resources and official 
position in executive government and legislature at local level. However, their 
competitiveness was accompanied by money politics. As a result, many local 
legislature members were not qualified and not able to carry out their functions. 
While political parties were not able to articulate the preferences of local small 
business owners. It can be concluded that political institutions such as local 
legislature and political parties had difficulty in improving their roles because they 
were involved in money politics.  
 
Local bureaucrats and district heads have not dramatically changed in providing 
public services during decentralisation era. Although most of local legislature 
members and district heads came from business background, they were less 
responsive to the interests of the business sector. However, by comparison the 
district head of Bantul is more responsive to help small business sector than the 
district of Gianyar.   
 
Kadinda as a business association was not involved in the process of decision 
making at district level because the district government and local legislature did not 
provide access to participate in the process of decision making. As a result, the role 
of business associations in promoting small businesses’ interests was limited. The 
business association had no power to influence local policy. In the other words, 
political decentralisation did not increase participation of business associations in the 
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process of decision making. As a result, business association had no power to make a 
bargain with district government.   
 
Political decentralisation caused local politicians to approach the heads of Desa 
Pakraman (Bedesa) and the heads of Banjars (Kelian) to obtain political support by 
providing funds and materials. In return, they expected that the head of Desa 
Pakraman and head of Banjar could influence voter behaviour in elections for the 
district head and legislature members. However, the Banjars have no power of 
negotiation with local politicians to get benefits for local small businesses and 
citizens. In fact some politicians directly provided money to individuals with the aim 
to buy votes.  
 
The next two Chapters will analyse the implication of decentralisation on small 
business in Bantul and Gianyar. The objective is to provide insights into how 
decentralisation influences the relationship between local government and small 
business and to analyse what kind of benefits are obtained by small business as result 
of decentralisation policy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION ON 
SMALL BUSINESS IN BANTUL 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter Two discussed how the social, economic and political setting of Bantul 
influenced the implementation of decentralisation. Chapter Three then examined the 
social, economic and political settings of Gianyar. This chapter will discuss the 
impact of decentralisation on small businesses in Bantul. Do the increased functions 
and political power of the district government as a result of decentralisation policy 
have an impact on small businesses? The extent to which local government carried 
out regulations reform to provide better public services and help small businesses in 
the form of financial assistance, training as well as technological assistance and 
infrastructure facilities are also discussed. 
 
In Indonesia, administrative and fiscal decentralisation policies implemented since 
2001 have institutionally changed the structure of fiscal and functional relationships 
between central and local government. However, the effects of policy in developing 
autonomy and capability local governing entities are not yet evident. 
Decentralisation policy was quite effectively implemented in terms of functional 
decentralisation (or redistribution of functions to sub-national levels), but not carried 
out effectively in fiscal terms. The central government did not adequately delegate 
the power of revenue-raising to local governments. The poor local governments had 
difficulties in delivering the decentralised functions such as small business 
development; they had no choice but to depend on transfer payments from the 
central government to meet their financial demand. Therefore, the central 
government still played an important role in promoting small businesses although 
local governments adopt decentralisation policy. Further, another important issue is 
whether political decentralisation can increase political participation of small 
businesses. 
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In locality of Bantul, political decentralisation has opened opportunities for small 
business owners and business associations to participate in the process of decision 
making. However, political decentralisation failed to encourage political parties to be 
close to small business owners. Further, political parties were not able to represent 
the interests of local small businesses in an accountable and responsive way. In 
addition, small business owners were not interested in being involved in political 
parties.  
 
Furthermore, the local government of Bantul has promoted small business by 
providing financial, training, technological assistance and market development as 
well as infrastructure facilities. However, this aid provided small impact on small 
businesses because only few small businesses received this aid. Under the on-going 
reform, the local governments pass on few public services, including services and 
goods to small businesses. However, improved public services had a minimal overall 
impact on the small business sector because local government had small financial 
capacity.  
 
This chapter analyses the relationship between local government and small 
businesses. The structure of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
section examines the impact of decentralisation policy on business licenses, local 
tax/levy policy, and policy to protect small businesses. The relationship between 
local government and small businesses is influenced by regulations that can promote 
or prevent small businesses. The second section explores the extent to which 
decentralisation can encourage local government to promote small businesses by 
providing financial assistance, training and technological assistance and 
infrastructure facilities. Under decentralisation era, local government has discretional 
policy to help small businesses. The important issue is the extent to which local 
government could use local public resources to help small businesses. The third 
section analyses political influence of local authorities as well as politicians over 
small businesses and participation of small businesses owners in the process of 
decision making. Decentralisation can change the relationship between local 
authorities and small businesses owners as the local authorities are directly elected 
by local communities which include small businesses owners. As a result, they 
intensively approach small business owners to obtain political support. The 
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important question is then in what way did they influence small businesses owners to 
obtain votes?  
 
4.2. Regulation of Small Businesses 
This section will answer the questions that have been proposed in Introduction: 
Firstly, to what extent do the district governments carry out local regulation reform 
to promote small businesses. Secondly, can the district governments use regulations 
on local levies to control small businesses? 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, administrative decentralisation can cause local 
governments to have more functions as well as discretional policy to carry out 
regulation reform with the aim to provide public services for small businesses. In 
this context of small businesses, local governments have authority to improve 
regulation concerning business license, local tax/levy policy and policy to protect 
small businesses. Each policy will be discussed separately with the aim to provide 
detail analysis of the policy.    
 
4.2.1. Business License Policy  
Regulations can be used by national and local government to affect business sector. 
Both national and local government can regulate business sector with the aim to 
promote businesses sector and protect citizen. They can promote the business sector 
by providing various assistances such as subsidy, financial, material and 
technological assistances as well as facilitating infrastructures such as roads, 
electricity, water and gas. In addition, they can set up policy to protect business and 
interests of citizens or consumers especially in regard to quality standard, safety 
levels and pollution control. For instance, by controlling business license policy, 
government can control business activities and protect citizens or consumers. 
 
Regarding business license, although the central government delegated some 
business licenses or functions to district governments, the central government was 
still holding many authorities. The Minister of Investment/Chairman of Coordinating 
Agency for Capital Investment (Meninves/Kepala BKPM) issued decree No. 
57/SK/2004 on Manual Procedure of Applying for Investment Established in 
Framework of Domestic and Foreign Investment. According to that decree, the 
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Meninves/Kepala BKPM has authority to issue: (1) Limited Importer Identification 
Number (Angka Pengenal Impor Terbatas); (2) Business License and Permanent 
Business License (Ijin Usaha dan Ijin Usaha Tetap); (3) Plan for Use of Foreign 
Employees (Rencana Penggunaan Tenaga Kerja Asing); (4) Recommendation for 
Visa for Foreign Employees (Rekomendasi Visa bagi Tenaga Kerja Asing); (5) 
License for Foreign Employees (Ijin Tenaga Kerja Asing) (6) Extensions for Foreign 
Employee Permits (Perpanjangan Ijin Tenaga Kerja Asing); and (7) Approval for 
Waiving/Reduction of Import Duty on Imported Goods (Fasilitas 
Pembebasan/Keringanan Bea Masuk atas Pengimporan Barang). The local 
government had only authority for License of Location; Certificate for Land-
Ownership; Permit for Building Establishment; and Disturbance Permit.  
 
The aforementioned authorities indicate that local governments had limited functions 
and jurisdiction in providing investment licenses because some authorities related to 
investment license were in the hands of the national government. In the case of 
Bantul, the district government carried out organisation reform with the aim to 
improve various services of licenses. For instance, the district government 
established a new local agency called the local agency for provision of licenses 
(Dinas Perijinan) with the aim of improving public services to business sectors and 
promote this sector. This local agency had authority to issue business licenses.  
 
The Bantul local government carried out two kinds of reform with the aim to provide 
better public service for small business: institutional reform and administrative 
reform. In relation to institutional reform, the local government established Dinas 
Perijinan which functions to issue various types of business permits. Effective on 1 
January 2008, all types of permits were issued by Dinas Perijinan. Previously, 
various types of permits were issued by several local agencies. For instance, a permit 
for trade business was issued by Diperindagkop; a permit for building and location 
was issued by Dinas Pekerjaan Umum (local Public Works Agency). Under Dinas 
Perijinan, all types of permits became more accessible for customers.  
 
Administrative reform aims to simplify procedures of processing for obtaining 
business licenses as well as to shorten waiting times for obtaining permit. Presently 
there is a clear period of time for obtaining a business permit. For instance, a permit 
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for industry registration identification should be issued by local government within a 
maximum of 12 working days after the completed document is submitted. 
Furthermore, a permit for store registration identification should be issued within a 
maximum of 5 working days (Table 4.1). This is different from previous local 
regulations where the procedure process for obtaining business permit required a 
long time and did not even mention a period of time for obtaining a business permit. 
Consequently, in many cases, business licences were issued by local government 
after more than one month.    
 
Furthermore, local government also enacted fixed cost of for each type of permit. 
For instance, an industry business permit (IUI) was 250 thousand rupiah; a large 
trade business permit (SIUP Besar) was 200 thousand rupiah; and middle trade 
business permit (SIUP Menengah) was 150 thousand rupiah whereas a small 
business trade (SIUP Kecil) was free. This is different from previous local regulation 
which the cost for obtaining business permit was unclear. 
 
Table 4.1 
Type of Permits under Local Agency for service of Licenses of Bantul 
 
No. Type of Permit Time Service 
1. Ijin Lokasi (Permit for Building Location) 12 work days 
2. Ijin Mendirikan Bangunan or IMB (Permit for 
Building Establishment) 
12 work days 
3. Ijin Gangguan (Disturbance Permit) 12 work days 
4. Ijin Daftar Industri (Permit for Industry Registration 
Identification) 
12 work days 
5. Ijin Usaha Industri or IUI (Industry Business Permit)  12 work days 
6. Ijin Tanda Daftar Industri or TDI (Permit for 
Industry Registration identification)  
12 work days 
7. Ijin Perluasan Industri (Permit for extended 
Industry) 
30 work days 
8. Tanda Daftar Perusahaan (Company Registration 
Identification)  
12 work days 
9. Tanda Daftar Gudang (Store Registration 
Identification) 
5 work days 
10. Surat Ijin Usaha Perdagangan or SIUP (Trade 
Business Permit) 
12 work days 
11. Surat Ijin Usaha Jasa (Services business Permit)  12 work days 
12. Ijin Usaha Hotel Bintang (Star Hotel Permit) 12 work days 
13. Ijin Usaha Hotel Melati (Non-Star Hotel Permit) 12 work days 
14. Ijin Penginapan (Inn Permit) 12 work days 
15. Ijin Usaha Pasar Seni (Art Market Permit) 12 work days 
       Source: Dinas Perijinan Kabupaten Bantul (2009). 
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The impact of implementation of local regulation reform regarding licenses above is 
the total small businesses owners who applied for permits increased. The number of 
Trade business permit (SIUP) doubled from 213 in 2002 to 410 in 2007. The total of 
Company Registration Permits (TDP) increased from 257 in 2002 to 309 in 2004 and 
to 358 in 2006, and increased sharply to 437 in 2007 (Table 4.2). In other words, 
local regulation reform may have increased the total number of registered small 
businesses. However, the majority of small businesses remain without business 
permits. Therefore, the impact of administrative reform is not significant if its aim is 
to increase the number of small businesses with proper business permits.  
 
Table 4.2 
The Number of Local Business Permits, 2002-2007 
 
 Types of Permit Number of Local Business Permits 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1. Trade Business Permit 
(SIUP) 
213 226 321 311 336 410 
2. Company Registration 
Identification (TDP) 
257 317 309 229 358 437 
3. Industry registration 
identification (TDI) 
46 76 72 70 45  12 
4. Industry Business 
Permit (IUI) 
3 58 22 20 15 12 
5. Store Registration 
Identification (TDG) 
35 1 - - 2 - 
6. Cooperative 
Registration Permit  
11 23 19 16 11 44 
7. Total 565 701 743 646 767 915 
    Source: Diperindagkop Kabupaten Bantul (2009). 
 
Data obtained by interviews with small business owners also showed that most of 
them did not have business licenses. According to interviewees, business licenses 
were not important because they could operate their businesses without business 
licenses. It indicated that small business owners were able to function relatively 
independent from local government regulations. The business licenses were only 
needed when they sought credit from the state banks or commercial banks and the 
district government. This suggests that small business owners actually did not need 
financial support from formal financial institutions and local government.    
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In addition, the possession of business licenses also could be considered when the 
district government recruited small business owners to be involved in training 
activities and national and international business exhibitions. The local government 
gave subsidies for small businesses to be involved in trade exhibition activities as 
well as provided assistance in form of daily transportation costs when they 
participated in training activities. It could be concluded that business license could 
be considered as incentive but it was not significant because data showed that most 
small business owners still did not have business licenses (Table 2.9).  
 
Does the reason of the unregistered small business owners relate to the complicated 
procedure for obtaining licenses? The research finding indicated that most 
respondents perceived that the procedure for obtaining business licenses was 
uncomplicated (55 percent). Only 18 percent of the small business owners perceived 
that the procedure was complicated. Lastly, 15 percent of the respondents said that 
the procedure for obtaining business permits remained the same (Chart 4.2). It can be 
concluded that the reason for not owning business permits was less likely associated 
with the procedure.   
 
Char 4.1 
The Perception of Small Business Owners regarding Procedure for Business Licenses 
(N=60) 
 
 
         Source: Data obtained by survey questionnaire, 2009. 
 
The next section will examine local taxes/levies regarding small businesses with the 
aim to analyse the extent to which small business owners obeyed paying taxes/levies 
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and the extent to which local government can use the local tax/levy policy to control 
small businesses. This is important because if the majority of small business owners 
paid local taxes/levies, the district government revenue could increase. As a result, 
the fiscal capacity of Bantul district might increase. Further, the district might be 
able to meet the fiscal needs of local small businesses such as public services, 
training and physical infrastructures for small businesses.   
 
4.2.2. Local Tax and Levy Policies 
As discussed in Chapter One, fiscal decentralisation can cause the district 
governments to have authority to set up their own local taxes/levies and tax/levy 
rates. Further, it may improve efficiency in using public resources based on the 
needs of local communities. Discussion of this section will be divided into two sub-
sections: Firstly, the local tax policy and secondly, the local levy policy. 
 
4.2.2.1. Local Tax Policy 
Before discussing the impact of local taxes on small businesses, it is important to 
present the analyses of contribution of local tax income to the district government’s 
revenue in Bantul. Data indicates that the local tax income account for the total 
district government income was an average of 1.5 percent during 2002-2010 (Table 
4.3). The income from local tax was insufficient to pay the salaries of local 
bureaucrats. For instance, in 2009, income from local tax was 13,000 million rupiah, 
yet the total salary for local bureaucrats was 533,231 million rupiah. In other words, 
income from local tax only contributed 2.44 percent to budget for public servants 
salary. In 2010, the budget for local public servants salary was 557,144 million 
rupiah, whereas the income from local tax was only 16,489.58 million rupiah or 2.96 
percent. It can be concluded that income from local taxes was insufficient to pay the 
local public servants salaries for one month.  
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Table 4.3 
Local Tax Incomes of the Bantul District Government, 2002-2010  
(Million rupiah) 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
 Local Taxes 
Income 
Percentage Local taxes 
Income to Total District 
Income  
1. 2002 336,570.26 4,803.61 1.43 
2. 2003 374,266.60 6,080.85 1.62 
3. 2004 398,879.89 6,951.70 1.74 
4. 2005 432,516.37 7,688.50 1.78 
5. 2006 597,788.83 8,740.45 1.46 
6. 2007 693.827.54 8,104.47 1.17 
7. 2008 995,971.70 9,507.00 0.95 
8. 2009 829,474.65 13,000.00 1.56 
9. 2010 876,204.47 16,489.58 1.88 
  Average  1.50 
         Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul,(2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010) 
 
The small income from local tax has two implications: Firstly, financially, the 
district government of Bantul was dependent on the central government. The district 
government received funds from the central government in the form of general 
allocation fund, special allocation fund and revenue sharing fund as discussed in 
Chapter Two. Secondly, the district government had difficulty carrying out 
decentralised functions to increase public services as well as financial assistance for 
small businesses. As a result, administrative decentralisation had not yet provided 
valuable changes for small businesses.  
 
In contrast, when the district government gains much income from local tax and 
levies, the district government can allocate the funds to improve roads, assistance for 
equipment, capital and training for small businesses. The local government has 
discretionary policy to use local tax and levy income as well as general grant derived 
from the central government. In relation to roads, the district government can 
improve roads between location of handicraft village and city with the aim to 
facilitate domestic and foreign tourists to visit the handicraft village or facilitate 
small business owners to bring their product to markets or harbor. For instance, in 
2007 income from local taxes and levies in Bantul was low. Consequently, the 
Bantul district did not have adequate finances to repair damage roads. Data shows 
that there were many damaged roads in Bantul (Table 4.10). In my opinion, many 
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damaged roads were hardly an incentive for small businesses. In addition, financial 
inadequacy could cause local government to have difficulty in facilitating training 
activities for small business and facilitating local public health services.   
 
As stipulated by Law 34/2000, the local tax income derived from taxes on (1) hotels 
(2) restaurants; (3) entertainment; (4) public advertisement; (5) public street lighting; 
(6) local natural resources exploitation (Category C); and (7) parking. This means 
that district government of Bantul had limited discretional policy to set up tax policy.  
In the case of Bantul, income from tax on public street lighting contributed most part 
of the total local taxes income, which was the first rank. The second rank was 
income from tax on public advertisement; the third rank was income from tax on 
restaurants; the fourth rank was income from tax on entertainment; and the fifth was 
income from tax on hotels.  
 
According to Law 34/2000, the district government has authority to create other 
local taxes beyond those mentioned above with the following criteria: (1) tax objects 
must be located in the particular district and possess relatively low mobility across 
district boundaries; (2) the tax does not contradict the public interest; (3) the tax does 
not constitute a national or provincial tax; (4) the tax has sufficient revenue potential, 
(5) the implementation of the tax will not negatively impact the local economy; (6) 
the development of the tax takes into consideration issues of fairness to and capacity 
of local residents; and (7) the tax guards the environment. However, all local taxes 
should be approved by the central government. In practice, until now the local 
government of Bantul has not yet identified types of local taxes beyond those 
mentioned by Law 34/2000. This means that the district government of Bantul had 
difficulty to increase tax revenue because of limited fiscal decentralisation. 
 
In relation to small business activities, the central government had the opportunity to 
obtain income from small businesses in the form of selling tax whereas the district 
government may only obtains income from tax on billboard from small businesses. 
However, most of small businesses did not pay tax in selling their products because 
their business transactions were not recorded. Most of small businesses also did not 
pay billboard tax because most of them had no advertising. Moreover, tax policy had 
minimal effect on small businesses because small businesses were not the target of 
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local tax. In contrast, small businesses were only the target of local levies. For 
instance, levies from licenses for building establishment, building location licenses, 
disturbance licenses, industry business; therefore, the next section will discuss local 
levies related to small businesses. 
 
4.2.2.2. Local Levy Policy   
This section will discuss the impact of local levies on small businesses and the extent 
to which the district government used local levies to control small businesses. Local 
levies are one of the sources of potential revenue for the district government of 
Bantul. Since decentralisation policy was implemented in 2001, the Bantul district 
government has improved local regulations on business permits related to local 
levies. 
1) Levies on Building Location License (local Regulation No. 23/2000) 
2) Levies on Building Establishment License (Local Regulation No. 7/2002) 
3) Levies on Disturbance License (Local Regulation No.15/2001) 
4) Levies on Industry Registration Identification License (Local Regulation No. 
12/2002) 
5) Levies on Industry Business License (Local Regulation No. 12/2002). 
6) Levies on Extended Industry License (Local Regulation No.12/2002) 
7) Levies on Company Registration Identification License (Local Regulation 
No. 15/2002). 
8) Levies on Store Registration Identification (Local Regulation No. 15/2003). 
9) Levies on Trade Business Permit (Local Regulation No. 11/2002) 
10) Levies on Market (Local Regulation No. 13/2007).  
11) Levies of Hotel and Inn (Local Regulation No. 10/2003). 
12) Levies on Entertainments (Local Regulation No. 11/2003). 
13) Levies on Restaurant (Local Regulation No. 2/2005). 
 
One question that arises is whether or not these local regulations regarding levies 
could be effectively applied in this region. Another is whether local levies could 
cause a financial burden for small businesses owners. Before answering these 
questions, it is important to present the income from local levies for the district 
government of Bantul with the aim to understand the role of local levies in 
generating the district government revenue. Through this process it will be evident 
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the contribution of income from of business license to the district government 
revenue.   
 
Data indicates that during 2002-2010 the total income from local levies increased 
every year. In 2010 the total income from local levies was more than three times of 
that in 2002. During 2002-2010, the average of local levy income of total district 
government income was 4.58 percent (Table 4.4). Income from levy on markets 
provided most contribution of the total local levies income. For instance, the income 
from the levies on markets was 1.01 million rupiah in 2007 increased to 1.21 million 
rupiah in 2010. 
 
Table 4.4 
Local Levy Incomes of the Bantul District Government, 2002-2010  
(Million rupiah) 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
Local Levies 
Income 
Percentage Local Levies 
Income to Total District 
Income  
1. 2002 336,570.26 12,538.45 3.73 
2. 2003 374,266.60 17,378.25 4.64 
3. 2004 398,879.89 19,620.69 4.92 
4. 2005 432,516.37 23,343.94 5.40 
5. 2006 597,788.83 26,045.89 4.36 
6. 2007 693,827.54 27,329.70 3.94 
7. 2008 995,971.70 31,479.63 3.16 
8. 2009 829,474.65 38,366.19 4.62 
9. 2010 876,204.47 56,473.04 6.44 
  Average 28,063.98 4.58 
         Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul,(2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010).   
 
The income from local levies was larger than the income from local taxes during 
2002-2010 (Table 4.4 and Table 4.3). In 2010, the total income from local taxes was 
less than one quarter of the total income from local levies. This means that local levy 
income played a more important role than local tax income in contributing to district 
government revenue. The data also indicates that local government preferred to 
introduce local levy than local tax because Law 34/2000 provided more discretion in 
introducing local levy than local tax. This Law mentioned types of local taxes and 
that the district government was limited in set up local taxes. 
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The total income from local taxes plus income from local levies was insufficient for 
budgetary requirements for local public servants salaries during a year. In 2010, for 
instance, income from local taxes plus income from local levies was only sufficient 
to pay the local public servants salaries for one and half months.   
 
Regarding the question of whether or not these local regulations regarding levies 
could be effectively applied in this region, this research suggests that most small 
businesses did not have licenses and never paid local levies. As presented in Chapter 
Two, Table 2.9 showed that in 2006, there was only 6.99 percent of small business 
owners who had business licenses and in 2007 there was 7.15 percent.
80
 In other 
words, most small businesses ignored local regulation on licenses. The figure was in 
line with data obtained from interviews that indicated most small businesses did not 
have licenses. This means that small businesses operated without obeying the district 
government policy. Local regulation on business licenses could not effectively be 
implemented by the district government. There are two implications from this. 
Firstly, the district government was not able to use the local regulations to control 
small businesses. Small businesses were not dependent on district government policy 
in operating their business. In practice, the district government never forced small 
businesses owners to apply for licenses. As a result, most small business owners 
ignored these regulations. They would only apply for business licenses if they 
wanted to obtain financial assistance from the district government or credit loan from 
state banks. In fact, without the financial and material assistance from the district 
government, small businesses could still survive. Secondly, financially the growth of 
small businesses could not impact on the district government revenue because most 
of them never paid local levies. The district government could not expect to increase 
the district government’s revenue from small businesses. However, the district 
government recognised that small businesses created large employment opportunities 
for local people. 
 
A further question is how the district government viewed small business owners who 
had no licenses. This study found that the local government of Bantul did not fine 
small businesses when they had no licenses such as licenses for building location, for 
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 In 2006 there was 1,250 of 17,865 small businesses had business licenses and in 2007 there was 
1,280 of 17,911 small businesses had business licences. 
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building establishment and for trade. I propose four arguments to explain this case. 
Firstly, I argue that the aim of local regulations on business licenses was not to 
increase district government income. For local government, the most important 
aspect of the existence of small businesses was absorption of employees, even 
though they contributed a small amount of levies income for district government’s 
revenue.
81
 For instance, the absorption of employee rate in the industrial sector 
increased from 77,600 workers in 2005 to 78,783 workers in 2007. If the local levy 
regulations were strictly applied for small businesses, the financial burden would 
result in most of them and having difficulty developing.   
 
Secondly, I argue that politically the district head and politicians of Bantul viewed 
small businesses as vote source in elections for district government head and local 
parliament members. It was important to gain their sympathy rather than to force 
them to pay local levies. Data showed that there were 17,911 small and medium 
businesses with a number of 79,904 workers in 2007. Based on the growth rate of 
small business about 0.25 percent, I estimated that there were around 18,003 small 
businesses in 2009; and based on the growth rate of employee about 0.15 percent, I 
estimated that the number of employees were 80,143 in 2009.  If each was owned by 
two people typically a husband and wife, the number of people who were involved in 
small businesses increases to 116,149.
82
 The important issue is what percentage of 
small businesses’ voted in the total vote for the election for district head and local 
legislature members in 2009. According to KUPD
83
 of Bantul, the number of 
constituents in election for legislature members in 2009 was 697,021. This means 
that about 16.66 percent of constituents came from small businesses. I estimate that 
in 2010, when the Bantul district held district head election, the number of 
constituents who came from small businesses could be around 16.69 percent.  
 
Thirdly, in my opinion, the district head of Bantul tried to gain political support from 
small businesses by ignoring local levies to develop an image as a populist leader. 
Former district head of Bantul, Sri Roso Sudarmo was from an authoritarian regime 
led by the military. He governed coercively and had a reputation for dealing harshly 
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 Interview with Head of District Government of  Bantul, 25 June 2009. 
82
 18,003 x 2 + 80,143 = 116,149. 
83
 KPUD (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah) is the Committee for the General Election at district 
government level.  
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with dissenters and protesters. In contrast, the next district head, Idham Samawi, 
worked consistently to develop an image as populist leader.  
 
Fourthly, the local government of Bantul intended to provide good public services 
for small businesses. By doing so, the businesses could remain in the Bantul region 
despite having no business permits. Tiebout’s theory (1956), as discussed in Chapter  
One suggests that businesses will stay in a region which provides good public 
services and taxes, but will leave if local government services are unsatisfactory. In 
my view, the Bantul district government policy is concurrent with the Tiebout’s 
theory.  In the case of Indonesia, types of local levies and local levy rates among 
regions are not the same. Furthermore, local government can promote small 
businesses through providing good services and implementing relatively light local 
levies. In another case, a local government may protect small businesses from 
competition with big businesses with the aim to promote them. The next section will 
discuss protection policy for small businesses. 
 
Does the fact of unregistered small business owners relate to cost of permits?  Based 
on the survey data from 60 small business owners, the majority of respondents (33 
percent) perceived that the cost of local levies was reasonable, whereas 22 percent 
said that cost of local levies was light. In the other words, 55 percent respondents 
revealed that cost of local levies was not heavy (combined reasonable and light). 
Only 2 percent said that cost of local levies was too heavy and 17 percent said that 
local levy was heavy (Chart 4.1). Thus, cost of levies was not the main reason for not 
having business licenses for small business owners. This research finding differed 
from Pramusinto’s work (2005) which indicated that cost of local levies was 
perceived as a financial burden by businessmen in Sidoarjo district, East Java. Thus, 
some businessmen did not pay local levies.    
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Chart 4.2 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Local Levies 
(N=60) 
 
 
           Source: Data obtained by survey questionnaire, 2009. 
 
I argue that the absence of fines was the main reason for not having business permits 
for the small business owners. They perceived that business licenses were not 
important because they could operate their business without licenses. In other words, 
the existence of small businesses did not depend on the district government. It 
depended on markets. If there were more buyers seeking products from small 
businesses, small businesses may develop. It indicates that district government had 
difficulty to use local regulations on business permits to control small businesses. 
 
4.2.3. Protection Policy for Small Business 
Generally, small businesses have a lack of capital and technology in operating their 
business. As a result, they produce products of low quality. In contrast, big 
businesses are supported by huge capital and high technology, so they can produce 
high quality products. Small businesses may have difficulty in competing with big 
businesses without protection from district government. The intervention of the 
district government is necessary to promote small businesses. In the case of Bantul, 
in September 2008 the district head of Bantul introduced Bupati’s Decree 
(Keputusan Bupati) No. 503/5439 to protect small businesses and local public 
markets. According to the Bupati’s decree, big entrepreneurs were not allowed to 
develop supermarkets in Bantul regions because they generally succeed in competing 
with small businesses. 
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In the following, two cases indicate district government of Bantul protected small 
businesses are discussed. Firstly, case 4.1 shows the district government protected 
small seafood businesses from a big business. Based on my observation during 
fieldwork in 2009, small seafood businesses in Parangtritis beach used a traditional 
way to cook fish and prawns because they lack capital, technology and skill. The 
district government expected that they could develop by protecting them from big 
businesses.   
Case 4.1: Case of Parangtritis 
 
The district head did not permit Mr. Ciputra, a conglomerate of Jakarta who 
has a plan to build a large luxurious restaurant in Parangtritis beach. The 
district head thought that many seafood restaurants, which were owned by 
local small businesses would become bankrupt if Mr. Ciputra was allowed to 
realize his plans. As a result, this would cause unemployment and social 
problems in Bantul. 
 
The case above indicates that the district government protected small seafood 
businesses against a large business. However, I suggest that the protection policy 
could not be maintained continuously. Small seafood businesses in Parangtritis could 
become well developed and compete with larger businesses if they were supported 
by technological and skill assistance such as stove, gas, cooker, refrigerator and 
freezer as well as good service training.  
 
Secondly, the following case concerns the conflict between the owner of a mini 
market and traditional market sellers. In this case, district government supported 
interest of small businesses. 
Case 4.2: Case of Piyungan 
In Piyungan sub-district, traders in traditional markets complain to Bupati 
when their business dropped because a new mini-market was established by a 
businessman where the location is close with the traditional market. Bupati 
responded by asking the owner of mini market to change the business hours, 
starting at 09.00 am. Previously, the business hours of the mini market were 
the same as the business hours of traditional market sellers at 6 am. In 2008 
Bupati launched Bupati’s decree to postpone permits for new mini markets 
establishment before Bantul district introducing local regulations (Perda).
84
 
 
The case of Piyungan sub-district above shows that small businesses had power to 
bargain with the district head with the aim to provide benefit for them. Further, the 
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 See Bupati’s Decree No. 503/5439 in 27 September 2008.  
177 
 
 
 
district government head is now very strict in issuing business permit for mini-
markets. This aims to protect sellers in local markets. The case also indicates that 
small businesses were not ready to compete in a free market system and asked the 
district government to protect them. Large business increased their own buying 
power and pushed small players out of the market place. However, the protection 
from large businesses is not the best way in long term because it may cause the 
dependency of small businesses on the district government. Without district 
government intervention, mini markets and supermarkets are able to attract larger 
buyers than small businesses because they offer higher quality goods and services 
than those of small businesses. I argue that protection policy is only temporary when 
small businesses are still weak. Both the case of Parangtritis and Piyungan indicates 
that district head of Bantul was strongly responsive to the needs and interest of small 
businesses. This suggests that the relationship between district head and small 
businesses was responsive relationship.   
 
Based on the discussion above it can be concluded that the district government of 
Bantul carried out local regulation reform on business permits with the aim to 
provide better public service for small businesses. Following reformasi 1998, the 
district government developed local regulation on business permits more transparent 
and accountable than previously. Additionally, the district government enacted 
protection policy for small businesses. From the regulation aspect, characteristic of 
the relationship between the district government and small businesses is called 
responsive relationships as discussed in Chapter One. However, the district 
government could not use the local regulations to control small businesses. Most of 
small businesses owners could operate without business licenses. They were 
relatively independent from the district government policy. Research findings show 
that small businesses had power to negotiate with the district government with the 
aim to provide benefit for them.        
 
4.3. Small Business Promotion Policy 
This section will answer the question as proposed in Introduction: To what extent 
does the district government develop small business promotion policy? As discussed 
in Chapter One, administrative decentralisation may cause local governments to 
create functions to promote small businesses and distribute public resources to them. 
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The promotion of small businesses includes providing financial assistance, training 
and technological assistance as well as infrastructure facilities, will be discussed 
below.  
 
4.3.1. Financial Assistance 
The allocation of public resources must be undertaken by the district government 
because a free market economy failed to ensure citizen welfare. Chapter One 
indicated that the most obvious problems faced in developing countries is the limited 
capital of small businesses entrepreneurs. In this context, the local government can 
play an important role in providing financial assistance for small businesses with the 
aim to increase capital. The local government of Bantul used two ways in providing 
financial assistance for small businesses. Firstly, the district government provided 
direct financial assistance to them and secondly, the local government cooperated 
with financial institutions in order to provide them with a credit scheme. 
 
In Chapter Two, it was shown that small business affairs are served by the 
Diperindagkop.
85
 The Bantul district allocated its local budget to the Diperindagkop, 
then distributed funds to small businesses in the form of financial assistance for 
increasing capital or for supporting business exhibition. In 2007, the Diperindagkop 
distributed 11.5 million rupiah to 28 people who produced handicraft, ceramic, 
woodcarving and other fine art in Pasar Seni Gabusan. The Diperindagkop also 
facilitated funds of 485.9 million rupiah to support thirty one business exhibitions in 
Pasar Seni Gabusan in 2007 with an aim to attract buyers.  
 
Financial assistance was also used to support business exhibitions. For instance, in 
2006 the Bantul district government allocated 44.9 million rupiah for 51 small 
businessmen who participated in a domestic business exhibition in Jakarta, Bandung, 
and Jogjakarta. Then, in 2007, the Bantul district allocated 337.87 million rupiah for 
small business owners, who were involved in the business exhibitions. In 2008, the 
Bantul district financed 10 small business owners to participate in Jogja Business 
Exhibition and Jakarta Business Exhibition. The Bantul district also held the Bantul 
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Diperindagkop is local agency for industry, trade and cooperatives.  
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Business Exhibition at Gabusan Art Market Centre and Jogja Expo Sekaten in 
Yogyakarta city to promote furniture and craft products. 
 
The Diperindagkop also provided financial assistance to small business owners 
through Dekranas (business association). For instance, in 2007, the Diperindagkop 
allocated 9.6 million rupiah to Dekranas for supporting business exhibition. The 
local budget for Diperindagkop was lower than that of other local government 
agencies (education, health, public work, and transportation) (Table 4.5). However, it 
is difficult to say that the Bantul district provided small financial assistance to small 
business activities because not all came through the Diperindagkop. Dinas Tenaga 
Keja dan Transmigrasi
86
 as well as Dinas Pertanian dan Kehutanan
87
 also reserved 
funds to help small businesses used and provide training.  
 
The local government also allocated fund for small businesses in local markets 
through Market Bank (Bank Pasar), a district owned enterprise. The Bank Pasar 
provided a credit scheme for small businesses in local public markets with the aim to 
protect them from exploitative creditors called lintah darat. According to the local 
regulation No. 13/2001 regarding Bank Pasar, the local government has to invest 15 
billion rupiah in Bank Pasar. However, if it is needed, the local government can add 
capital to Bank Pasar. As a result, small businesses at public markets of Bantul 
could seek credit loan from Bank Pasar.  
 
Table 4.5 
        Allocation of District Government Budget to Selected Local Agencies, 
 2008-2009, (Million rupiah) 
 
No. Name of Local Agency 2008 2009 
1. Local Agency for Industry, Trade, 
and Cooperative (Diperidagkop) 
 7,111        5,460 
2. Local Agency for Education 383,530     384,566 
3. Local Agency for Health and 
Local Hospital 
  83,605        87,006 
4. Local Agency for Public Work 265,377      122,277 
5. Local Agency for Transportation     3,529          3,531 
             Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul,(2008, 2009). 
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Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi is the Local Agency for Employment and Internal Migration. 
87
Dinas Pertanian dan Kehutanan is the Local Agency for Agriculture and Forestry. 
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Besides the local budget, the Diperindagkop also received part of national budget as 
a transfer payment from the Ministry of Cooperative and Small and Medium 
Enterprises (Kementerian Koperasi dan Usaha Kecil) for developing small 
businesses. During 2004-2006, the average percentage of transfer payments of total 
local budget was around 26 percent. Then, it decreased sharply to 15 percent in 2008 
and to 4 percent in 2008 (Table 4.6). It was important to develop coordination 
between the central and local government in providing public services. Both local 
budget and transfer payment were used for training program, workshop, marketing 
development and loan for small business. During 2004-2005 data indicated that the 
total transfer payment decreased, but the total local budget increased every year 
(Table 4.5). After discussing financial assistance, a discussion on the response of 
owners of small businesses on the financial assistance follows with the aim to 
understand whether or not financial assistance was useful for them.  
 
Table 4.6 
Financial Source for Sporting Small Businesses, 2004-2007 
(Million rupiah) 
 
Source of Budget 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
District Local 
government 
budget  
 1,284.33 
(74.04) 
 1,240.35 
(73.75%) 
 1,240.35 
(73.75%) 
 1,284.83 
(84.87%) 
4,125.06 
(95.38%) 
Transfer 
payment 
   450.32 
(25.96%) 
    441.52 
(26.25%) 
   441.52 
(26.25%) 
   229.12 
(15.13%) 
   199.92 
(4.62%) 
 
Total 1,734.65  1,681.88 1,681.88 1,513.96 4,324.98 
     Source: Diperindagkop-Kabupaten Bantul (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
 
The responses of small business owners were obtained from interviews and survey 
methods. In the interviews with owners of small businesses, they recognized the 
district government has already provided financial assistance to help them. The 
following case indicates the financial assistance from the district government to 
small businesses (Case 4.3). 
 Case 4.3: Financial Assistance from District Government 
Mr. SB., a business owner and political party member started his business in 
1980. He commented that under the Idham Samawi regime, local government 
had provided much help for small businesses through financial assistance, 
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market development and administrative facilities in obtaining business 
permits.
88
 
 
The next case presents the comparison of financial assistance between centralised 
system and decentralised system in Bantul district (Case 4.4). It indicates that under 
decentralisation era the district government strongly promoted small businesses by 
providing financial assistance.  
Case 4.4: Financial Assistance under two Different District Government 
Systems 
 
Mr. SW started his business in 1982 under the authoritarian regime of the 
New Order Government. He could compare the role of local government 
between the centralised system and the decentralised system. In the 
decentralisation era, local government provided much assistance for small 
businesses in the form of loans and infrastructures compared with 
previously.
89
 
 
The district government of Bantul cooperated with State Owned Enterprises 
(BUMN) to support small businesses. For instance, Mandiri Bank, PT Peruri, PT 
Angkasa Pura, and Perum ASEI have provided loans with low interest to small 
businesses. The Perum ASEI has distributed 200 million rupiah to two cooperatives 
and 335 million rupiah to nine small businesses in 2005. PT Garuda, PT Angkasa 
Pura, and PT Bank Mandiri supported the market development by financing 
transport and accommodation costs to small business people who were involved in 
business exhibition.
90
 From interviews with small business owners, they recognised 
that the State Owned Enterprises played an important role in supporting them (Case 
4.5).  
Case 4.5: Financial Assistance from State Owned Enterprises 
Mrs. Pj who was a business owner and started her business 25 years ago has 
not yet received financial support from the local government. However, she 
has received credit from PT Angkasa Pura (State Owned Enterprises) 
400,000 rupiah with a rate of interest 0.8 percent
91
. 
 
Another case showed that small businesses preferred to choose the Village Financial 
Institution to support their businesses rather than banks because the institution was 
more flexible (Case 4.6).  
                                                 
88
 Interview with Mr. S.b. is small businessmen, 9 June 2009. 
89
 Interview with Mr. S.W. is small businessmen, 7 July 2009.  
90
 Interview with Mr. E.S., 7 July 2009. 
91
 Interview with Mrs. Pj., 7 July 2009. 
182 
 
 
 
Case 4.6: Financial Assistance from Village Financial Institution 
Mr. MU started business in 1971 and employed 35 workers. He sold his 
products for export. Indeed, there were opportunities from private banks 
offering loans but he only borrowed once. He preferred to borrow funds from 
village cooperative. He told me that when he borrowed a million rupiah from 
village cooperative, he only received 9,800,000 rupiah because he had to pay 
administration fee two hundred thousand rupiah. Further, he had to return 
twelve million rupiah in twenty months. 
92
  
  
In general, small business owners could borrow money from village cooperatives, 
but most were not members of cooperatives.
93
 Survey data indicates that only 20 
percent of respondents are members of cooperative. In 2007 there were 6 Village 
Handicraft Cooperatives with 278 members. It is different from experience in Italy 
(Becattini, 2004) and Denmark (Kristensen, 1992) as discussed in Chapter One, 
where village financial institutions can play an important role in developing small 
businesses. The village institution is very closely linked with local small business 
owners and understands their needs. The responses of owners of small businesses to 
financial assistance also could be obtained from survey method. The survey data 
indicates that about 36 percent of respondents said that district government was 
financially supportive and 26 percent perceived that district government was very 
supportive. In contrast, about 36 percent of respondents answered not at all or they 
did not know about it (Table 4.7).  
 
Table 4.7 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Financial Support  
 
What do you think about the local 
government’s financial support (financial aid, 
subsidies, favourable business taxes, low 
interest loan) for local small business? 
 
Frequency Percent 
Very supportive 16 26.7 
Supportive 22 36.7 
Not at all 22 36.7 
Total 60 100 
      Source: Data obtained by survey questionnaire, 2009 
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 Interview with Mr. M.U., 23 June 2009. 
93
 Interview with Head of Village Small Business Cooperative of Kasongan, 11 June 2009. 
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Based on the discussion above, it is clear that although the Bantul district 
implemented decentralisation policy, the central government still provided financial 
assistance to develop small businesses. However, during 2004-2008 the total 
financial assistance from the central government decreased slowly every year. This 
has implications that future district governments would have more responsibilities to 
small businesses by providing financial and training support. The next section will 
discuss training programs for small businesses with the aim to improve the skill of 
workers.   
 
4.3.2. Training for Small Business 
Small businesses generally have limited skills in managing their business. 
Additionally, the quality of workers of small business is low. Training programs are 
one of the ways to improve the owner managerial skills of small businesses and to 
overcome the low quality skills of workers.  
 
Since the implementation of decentralisation policy (2001-present), the local 
government of Bantul has provided various training programs with the aim of 
enhancing quality of management and products of small businesses (Table 4.8). 
During 2004-2008, the number of small businessmen owners involved in training 
increased, except in 2006. In 2006 the local government only provided training three 
times because the Bantul district government had problems resulting from a huge 
earthquake. The earthquake caused severe damage to the government office building, 
public market building, school building and roads. The district government therefore 
had to re-allocate much of the local budget to rebuilding them. Subsequently, there 
was only a small amount of the local budget left for training programs.   
Table 4.8 
Training Program for Small Businesses 
2004 – 2008 
 
No. Year Number of Training 
Program 
Number of Participants 
1. 2004 3 90 
2. 2005 50 120 
3. 2006 3 60 
4. 2007 6 200 
5. 2008 10 400 
           Source: Diperindag Kabupaten Bantul (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
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The training program was financed by the district and central government budget. 
Although several training programs were solely financed by the central government, 
the training programs were serviced by the local government of Bantul. The central 
government has devolved the function of training to the Bantul district government, 
with the subject of training on the hand the local government.   
 
Furthermore, the district government of Bantul developed BLK or Balai Latihan 
Kerja (Centre for Employment Training) with the aim to increase quality skill of 
workers including small business workers. The BLK is controlled by Dinas Tenaga 
Kerja dan Transmigrasi (Local Agency for Employment and Migration), whereas 
small businesses are serviced by Diperindagkop (Local Agency for Industry, Trade 
and Cooperative). Therefore, Diperindagkop needed to coordinate with Dinas 
Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi to facilitate training for small businesses. Small 
business promotion was not only the responsibility of Diperindagkop but also of 
other local agencies such as Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi, Dinas Perijinan 
(Local Agency for Service of Licenses), BPR or Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (Bank for 
People’s Credit) and Bank Pasar (Bank of Market). It can be concluded that small 
business promotion required coordination between the central and local governments 
and among local agencies at district level.  
 
The response of small business owners to the training program can be seen in Table 
4.9. According to 20 percent of respondents, the Bantul district was very supportive 
in providing training program; about 40 percent responded that the Bantul district 
was supportive. However, 40 percent didn’t know or did not provide response. From 
interview data it can be understood that a few small businesses did not provide 
positive response to training program (Case 4.7). 
Table 4.9 
 The Perception of Small Business Owners on Training Program 
 
What do you think about the local 
government’s facilitating training to local small 
business? 
Frequency Percent 
Very supportive 12 20 
Supportive 24 40 
Not at all 24 40 
Total 60 100 
         Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009. 
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Case 4.7: Small Business Owners were not responsive to training 
program 
 
During the decentralisation era, small businesses owners were less responsive 
to training programs held by district government. Some small business 
owners refused to be involved in training program, unless the local 
government provided them daily transport fee during the training. The daily 
transport fee was assumed as an opportunity cost while they were involved in 
training program. Based on the small business person’s experience, the daily 
transport fee varies from 15,000 rupiah up to 25,000 rupiah.
94
 
 
The case 4.7 suggests that a few small business owners had a low awareness of the 
benefit of the training program. They did not understand its benefit in improving the 
management skills and production quality. Beyond the training program, 
technological assistance was also needed to improve the quality of products as 
majority of small businesses used traditional tools.    
 
4.3.3. Technological Assistance 
The Bantul district developed the UPT or Unit Pelayanan Teknis (Unit of Technical 
Services) with the aim to increase the quality of product of small businesses. Today 
there are 4 UPTs in Bantul: The UPT of Ceramics in Kasongan, the UPT of Leather 
in Manding, the UPT of Various Handicrafts in Gunung Sempu and the UPT of 
Furniture in Potorono. In practice, the UPTs provided workshop and introduced new 
technology to small businesses with the aim of enhancing the quality of products.  
 
The UPT of Ceramic in Kasongan, as an example, introduced new technology in 
enhancing quality of ceramic products. Additionally, in 2004, the Bantul district 
government provided a dryer tool for wood at the price of 49.8 million rupiah to 
small business owners of Kasongan village with an aim to increase the quality of 
product. As a result, the quality of ceramic products improved and a majority of 
products were exported to Australia and European countries. For instance, Mr. T.R, a 
small business owner exported his product to European countries such as 
Netherlands, Italy, France, Spain and Australia.
95
 Examples of ceramic products can 
be shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Interview with the Chairman of Kasongan Small Business Cooperative, 11 June 2009 and with Mr. 
Sb., a small businessman, 9 June 2009. 
95
Interview with Mr. T.R., small business owner, 11 June 2009. 
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Figure 4.1 
Ceramic Products of Small Business in Kasongan Village 
 
              Source: Fieldwork, 2009.  
 
In relation to the UPT of Leather in Manding, small businesses were able to increase 
the quality of leather craft products, thus could penetrate larger markets. Beyond the 
UPTs, in 2006, the Yogyakarta provincial government also provided technological 
assistance such as sewing machine and compressors to small businesses producing 
leather craft in Manding village.
96
 As a result the quality of leather products 
increased. For instance, Mr. Sn, leather craft small business owner of Manding said 
that 70 percent of his products are exported to many countries such as the Australia 
and European countries.
97
 
 
Based on the discussion above, the district government provided technological 
assistance for improving products of small businesses. The important question is 
what perception of small business owners on this assistance. The survey data 
indicates, most respondents perceived that local government was supportive in 
providing technological assistance, although one-third did not know about it (Chart 
4.3). This means that the technological assistance from district government has not 
yet spread widely to small businesses of Bantul. After discussing technological 
assistance, a discussion on the infrastructure facilities for supporting small 
businesses activities will follow.  
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Interview with Mr. Sg, chairman of Manding Handicraft Association, 7 July 2009. 
97
 Interview with Mr. S., small business owner of Manding Village, 9 July 2009., 
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Chart 4.3 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Material Assistance 
(N=60) 
 
 
 Source: Survey research 2009. 
 
4.3.4. Physical Infrastructure Facilities 
The infrastructure facilities for small business such as roads, banks and automatic 
teller machine (ATM), market building, telephone networks and electricity are useful 
for developing business activities. As discussed in Chapter One, under 
administrative decentralisation, resources allocation or service delivery can be 
delegated to sub-national governments. Thus, the district government has a 
responsibility to facilitate the physical infrastructures as part of public services. Each 
will be discussed as follows: 
 
4.3.4.1. Roads 
In relation to physical infrastructures support, the local government improved roads 
at the location of Kasongan handicraft village with the aim of facilitating domestic 
and foreign tourists to visit the village. As discussed before, small businesses are 
concentrated in Kasongan and Imogiri sub districts. The local government asphalted 
the roads from the city of Yogyakarta to the two villages (Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2 
Road in Kasongan Village 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 Source: Fieldwork 2009.     
 
In general, the district government improved the quality of roads of Bantul. For 
instance, the number of good roads increased from 305 in 2005 to 362 in 2007. In 
contrast, number of seriously damage roads decreased from 59.35 in 2005 to 49.53 in 
2007. In the same period, the number of damage roads also decreased from 231.75 to 
214.45 (Table 4.10). Good condition of roads may have facilitated buyers to come to 
the handicraft villages. It indicates that the district government seriously improved 
roads with the aim at facilitating small business development.  
 
Table 4.10 
Length of Roads by Condition of Roads (Km) 
 2005-2007 
 
No. Condition of Road 2005 2006 2007 
1. Good 305.28 341.23 362.95 
2. Moderate 304.65 284.00 272.90 
3. Damage 231.75 223.15 214.45 
4. Serious damage 59.35 51.45 49.53 
 Total 901.03 899.83 899.83 
    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2008a, p. 307). 
 
4.3.4.2. Banks 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Kasongan and Manding are handicraft villages where 
many small businesses exist there. Most small businesses of Kasongan concentrated 
on ceramic products while majority of small businesses of Manding concentrated on 
leather craft. The Bantul district government suggested the Mandiri Bank provide an 
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Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) in Kasongan village as well as in Manding village 
with the aim of supporting local business activities. 
 
In addition, in 2008 there were 17 BPR or Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (Bank for 
People’s Credit) and 2 branch offices of State banks: BRI Bank and BPD Bank in 
region of Bantul. All banks could facilitate credit for small businesses.   
 
4.3.4.3. Electricity 
Electricity is another important infrastructure for developing the industrial sector. 
The state owned enterprise (PT PLN) installed power facilities in Bantul regions. 
Table 4.11 shows the growth of installed capacity by PT PLN for consumers in 
Bantul district. However, the number of installed capacity in 2007 was twice that in 
2004 whereas the number of customers increased 73 percent. In my view, the 
electricity facilities may have encouraged small businesses activities because the 
process of production needs electricity. When an earthquake struck Bantul district in 
2006, many buildings were badly damaged, including art shops and homes of small 
businessmen. The district head of Bantul suggested that the PLN (State Owned 
Company for Electricity) waive electricity bills for small businesses in several 
months, thus also proving that the district head was conscious of helping small 
businesses. The aim of this policy was to accelerate the rebuilding and economic 
recovery in Bantul, resulting with small businesses swiftly reopening.  
 
Table 4.11 
Number of Electricity Installed Capacity and Costumers, 2004-2007 
 
No. Year Total Number of Installed 
Capacity (VA) 
Total Number of 
Customers 
1. 2004 76,726,590 114,883 
2. 2005 80,186,881 117,797 
3. 2006 126,700,677 154,542 
4. 2007 158,363,072 198,763 
    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2008a, p. 281) 
 
 
4.3.4.4. Telephone Networks 
Telephone networks are an important facility to support business for entrepreneurs. 
Based on the data in Table 4.12 telephone networks did not significantly change 
during 2004-2006. The number of telephone networks decreased about 2 percent in 
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2005 due to an increase in mobile phone usage. However, in 2006 they increased 
again to 4,955. The data signifies that the district government could not pressure the 
PT Telkom (State Owned Company for Telephone) to facilitate a telephone network 
in Bantul. 
 
Table 4.12 
Number of Telephone Networks 
 
No. Year Number of Networks Growth 
1. 2004 4,828  
2. 2005 4,719 -2.26% 
3. 2006 4,955 5.00% 
                Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul (2008a, p. 312) 
 
4.3.4.5. Market Buildings 
In 2004, the district of Bantul established the Gabusan Art Market (Pasar Seni 
Gabusan) to assist small business owners in selling their products. The Pasar Seni 
Gabusan was not only for the market place for 4,444 small businesses but also a 
business exhibition place and the business information centre (Figure 4.3). The small 
businesses who occupied the stalls in the Pasar Seni Gabusan did not have to pay 
the cost of renting. The manager of the Pasar Seni Gabusan developed networks 
with travel bureaus with the aim of increasing buyers to visit Pasar Seni Gabusan. 
The travel bureau was be able to bring many domestic and international tourists and 
buyers to Pasar Seni Gabusan to shop. In 2007, there were 150,000 visitors/buyers, 
increasing to 200,000 in 2008.  
Figure 4.3 
Pasar Seni Gabusan 
 
                                   Source: www.yogyes.com 
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One of constraints in developing the market was the behaviour of small business 
owners. Some of them did not manage their businesses seriously. For instance, there 
were no exact business hours. As a result, buyers were inconvenienced (Case 4.8). 
Case 4.8: Small businesses owners had no exact business hours 
One day in May 2009 about at 8 am, some domestic tourists arrived by buses 
visit the Pasar Seni Gabusan but the sellers have not yet opened their 
business. The visitors then cancelled their shopping in the market. In other 
case, when the domestic tourists came to the market at 4 pm, some of the 
sellers had closed for the day.
98
 
 
The case above indicates that small business owners were not responsive to the 
interest of buyers. This finding was in line with Freeman’s study (2004) as discussed 
in Chapter One regarding small business in Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. He found 
that poor understanding of the market expectations was an obstacle faced by small 
businesses owners. Many did not know that they should be responsive to the needs 
of market.   
 
Besides developing the Pasar Seni Gabusan, in 2007 the Bantul district also 
established new buildings for local public markets to replace the old local public 
market building in Niten, Imogiri and Piyungan sub-districts. An example of the new 
local public market building is presented in Figure 4.4. According to the district 
head, the new local public market building could attract local buyers. The Bantul 
people would not shop at these markets unless the local government could develop 
good facilities such as a parking area and good stalls. By developing local public 
markets, local people could shop at these markets and increase the dynamics of 
business activities of Bantul. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98
 Interview with Mr. T, General Manager of Pasar Seni Gabusan, 11 June 2009. 
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Figure 4.4 
New Local Traditional Market of Piyungan Sub-district 
 
 
                           Source: Fieldwork, 2009. 
 
Despite the district government acting to help small businesses by developing market 
buildings, it is necessary to analyse the responses of small business owners regarding 
market development assistance. Data obtained from a survey in 2009 indicates that 
most small business owners thought that the Bantul district was supportive (47 
percent) and very supportive (28 percent) in developing market (Chart 4.4). This 
means that, most small business owners felt satisfied with what local government 
had done to help them. However, 25 percent answered that they did not know about 
the developing market.  
 
Chart 4.4. 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Market Development 
(N=60) 
 
 
Source: Survey Questionnaire, 2009. 
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Based on the above, it can be concluded that the district government of Bantul was 
supportive to help small businesses by providing financial assistance, training 
program, technological assistance and physical infrastructure facilities, particularly 
market building. It indicates that characteristic of the relationships between district 
government and small business was a supportive relationship. The following section 
discusses political influence. As discussed in Chapter One, in many countries, small 
businesses were politicised by local authorities. The important question is, whether 
or not small businesses in Indonesia were also politicised by local authorities.     
 
4.4. Political Influence 
This section will answer the questions as proposed in Introduction: Firstly, can 
political parties help small businesses? Secondly, in what ways did local politicians 
approach small business owners with the aim to obtain votes in election of district 
head and local legislative member? Thirdly, have business associations and small 
business owners involved themselves in the process of decision making or political 
parties as well as political activities? 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, political decentralisation may cause change in the 
relationships between local politicians and small businesses as well as political 
parties and small businesses. Politicians may become close to small business owners 
because they seek political support in obtaining political position in both executive 
and legislature. Under decentralisation policy, both district head and local legislature 
members are elected by local citizens including small business owners. 
 
Political decentralisation also creates an opportunity for small business owners to 
participate in the process of decision-making at district level as well as participate in 
political parties and political activities. This section will be divided into two sub-
sections. Firstly, it analyses political influence of local politicians as well as political 
parties over small business owners and secondly, it discusses the participation of 
business associations and small businesses owners in the process of decision-making 
at district level. 
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4.4.1. Political influence of Politicians over Small Businesses 
As discussed in Chapter One, the result of political decentralisation, the district head 
and local legislature members are elected by local citizens. Local legislators came 
from elected political party members. The important question is whether or not 
political party members became close to local small business owners for their 
benefit. The next question is in what way political parties and politicians influence 
behaviour of small business owners in elections for district head and local legislature 
members, and the extent to which small business owners could influence political 
parties in the process of decision making at district level.  
 
Data obtained from survey research showed that most respondents perceived that the 
behaviour of political parties were the same as previously (32 percent). Only 15 
percent said that behaviour of political parties became close to small business owners 
(Chart 4.5). Resulting in political parties not obtaining sympathy from small business 
owners and they were not close to small business owners. The next question 
concerns how they could influence small business owners to obtain political votes in 
local legislator and district head elections. 
 
Chart 4.5 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Political Party 
(N=60) 
 
 
         Source: Fieldwork, 2009. 
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According to most small business owners (48 percent), political parties never did 
anything to support small businesses. Further, 45 percent of respondents said 
political parties were somewhat supportive of their business. Only 5 percent of 
respondents revealed that political parties supported small businesses (Table 4.13). It 
was clear that in general, political parties paid little attention to small businesses. 
Several respondents said that political parties approached small business only 
throughout their political campaign as they were seeking political support.  
 
Table 4.13 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Political Party’s Support 
to Small Business 
 
No. In general to what extent political 
parties support your business? 
Frequency Percentage 
1. Very supportive 1 1.7 
2. Supportive 3 5.0 
3. Somewhat supportive 27 45.0 
4. Not at all 29 48.3 
 Total 60 100 
         Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009. 
 
 
Although political parties understood that small business owners were potential 
voters in election for local legislature members, they did not provide assistance to 
develop small businesses. For instance, most small business owners (93 percent) said 
that political parties never helped them in facilitating legal aid, 85 percent revealed 
that political parties never helped them in developing network with financial 
institutions and 76 percent respondents perceived that political parties never helped 
in facilitating training programs to small businesses (Table 4.14). It can be concluded 
that political parties were not close to small business owners and most of them did 
not help small business owners.  
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Table 4.14 
Kinds of Political Parties’ Support to Small Business 
 
No. Various Kinds of 
Facilities 
Answer Total 
  Always Sometimes Not at all  
1. Developing network 
with financial 
institutions 
1 (1.17%) 8 (13.3%) 51 (85.0%) 60 (100%) 
2. Developing network 
with the markets 
13 
(21.7%) 
47 (78.3%) - 60 (100%) 
3. Facilitating training 1 (1.7%) 12 (20.0) 46 (76.7) 60 (100%) 
4 Facilitating legal aid  1 (1.7%) 3 (5.0%) 56 (93.3%) 60 (199%) 
     Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009.  
 
About 78 percent of respondents said that political parties sometimes helped them in 
developing network with the markets and 20 percent said that political parties 
sometimes helped them in facilitating training.  Only around 13 percent perceived 
that political parties sometimes helped them in developing a network with financial 
institutions (Table 4.13). For instance, Golkar Party, the Indonesian Democracy 
Party of Struggle (PDI-P Party) and Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS Party) 
assisted in developing networks between banks and small businesses (Case 4.9 and 
Case 4.10).  
Case 4.9: The Role of Golkar Party in Developing Network between 
Small Businesses and Financial Institutions   
 
The Golkar party asked the social organisations affiliated to the Golkar party 
to organize meetings among small business owners, the Mandiri Bank and 
the BRI Bank to help small business owners by providing loans and training. 
The Golkar party also encouraged its members who were active in business 
to encourage small businesses. The Chairman of Kadinda
99
 is now in the 
hands of a Golkar Party member. Thus, the Golkar party had no difficulty 
asking the financial institutions to facilitate loans for small businesses.
100
 
 
The PDI-P party is now controlling the Dekranas (National Handicraft Board-Bantul 
Branch) because the chairman of Dekranas is member of the PDI-P Party. The 
Dekranas was intensively involved in promoting small businesses. According to the 
secretary of the PDI-P Party, Bantul branch, the party had an important role in 
promoting small businesses as follows:  
 
                                                 
99
 Kadinda is Chamber of Commerce and Industry – Branch of  Bantul district 
100
Interview with Chairman of Golkar party – branch of Bantul district, 10 June 2009. 
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Case 4.10: The Role of PDI-P Party in Developing Networks between 
Small Businesses and Financial Institutions 
The PDI P party also had programs to help small businesses by facilitating 
loans from banks and introducing small business owners to buyers. Under 
President Megawati (2001-2004), the PDI-P Party established a Micro 
Financial Institution to help small businesses. The Micro Financial Institution 
was supported by one of the ministers of PDI-P party who came from the 
Bantul district.
101
 
 
The PKS party also helped small businesses by facilitating them in gaining loans 
from BCA Bank and Mandiri Bank. Furthermore, the PKS party provided guidance 
to small business owners. For instance, the PKS party cadres provided training for 
owners of small businesses.
102
 
 
Interviews with small businesses owners indicated that during the political campaign 
season for the local legislator election, local politicians intensively approached local 
small businesses owners to obtain political support. They provided money and 
materials to small business owners through the Rukun Tetangga or RT 
(Neighbourhood Association), but some of them directly provided money and 
materials to individuals. According to the politicians, they voluntarily gave money to 
local small business owners because they lacked capital. Several politicians 
suggested the local small businesses owners proposed a project regarding the 
problems related to their village such as damage roads and lack of capital for small 
business owners. Subsequently, the politicians responded by providing financial 
assistance. For instance, local community of Kasongan village proposed a 
loudspeaker for the local legislator candidate then the candidate delivered it to the 
RT.
103
 
 
The RT Head of Karangasem Pedukuhan
104
 in Imogiri sub-district said that during 
the 2009 political campaign, three political parties – the Democrat party, PAN party 
and Golkar party-visited and contacted the villagers. The Democrat Party gave 
500,000 rupiah and Golkar party also gave 500,000 rupiah for improving the village 
roads. The PAN party gave one million rupiah to establish a guardhouse (Gardu or 
                                                 
101
 Interview with Secretary of PDI P Party – branch of Bantul district, 26 June 2009,  
102
Interview with Mr. S, Head of Research and Development of PKS Party. 
103
Interview with Mrs. Sm., Head of Pedukuan of Tirto, Bagunjiwo, sub-district of Kasihan, 7 July 
2009. 
104
Dusun or Hamlet is lowest level of administrative government. 
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place for village security).
105
 The cases mentioned suggest that local politicians used 
RT to obtain political support by providing funds. However, the head of RT was not 
able to pressure politicians to articulate their interests. In other words, the head of RT 
had no bargaining position.   
 
Regarding matters of money politics in Bantul during the political campaign season 
for parliament elections, the secretary of the PDI-P party related to me the following: 
Case 4.11: Money Politics during Political Campaign Season  
The evidence showed that politicians offered money and material to local 
people – individual and groups - during political campaigns. It was 
approximately 15,000 rupiah or 20,000 rupiah per voter. The money was 
given to voters one day before voting. For local voters, money was very 
important because they generally were poor. However, he confessed that he 
did not give the money to individuals but gave it to groups to help the needs 
of these groups. He also gave t-shirts to members of these groups.
106
 
 
According to politicians, money politics still occurred up to one day before the 
election. Mr. S.B. who was local legislator member and chairman of Kandida of 
Bantul told me the following: 
Case 4.12: Money Politics in Local Legislator Election 
According to his estimate, he would obtain 400,000 votes in the election for 
local parliament members, but he only obtained 2,548 votes. This was 
because he did not indulge in money politics. He knew that other candidates 
gave money to voters at around 15,000– 20,000 rupiah per person. The 
voters elected the candidate based on money due to the weaknesses in the 
ideology of the voters
107
.   
 
Another local legislator candidate from the PDI-P Party, Mr. S.H. allocated the funds 
to the Neighbourhood Association or RT around two hundred and fifty thousand 
rupiah per RT to obtain votes in election for the local legislature members in 
2009.
108
 Regarding another political case, Mr H, the chairman of PAN Party told me 
that some candidates from this party asked the cadres to give the RTs as much as 
three hundred thousand rupiah per RT to buy votes in election for local legislature 
members. However, the money was directly distributed to constituents by the party 
                                                 
105
Interview with Mr. Pm, head of RT 5, Karangasem Dusun, 9 July 2009. 
106
 Interview with Mr. Ay, Secretary of PDI-P Party, 26 June 2009. 
107
 Interview with Mr. S.B., the Chairman of Kandinda  and local parliament member, 15 June 2009. 
108
Interview with Mr. S.H., the candidate for local legislator, 9 July 2009. 
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cadre. Consequently, the party cadre was prosecuted and punished by the Local 
Court.
109
 
 
Further, one of the national legislator candidates from the Democrat party, who was 
a big businessman, spent about one billion rupiah during the political campaign 
season in 2009.
110
 The cases of money politics above highlight that political party 
cadres were supported by large capital. Logically, political parties preferred to 
recruit big business owners than small business owners because the big business 
owners were able to provide financial support for the parties. Political party 
members faced high financial cost to obtain political positions. Today, political 
parties have become a political vehicle for big business owners to pursue political 
positions both in executive and legislative institutions. 
     
Based on the discussion above, we understand that during the decentralisation era, 
political parties were not close to small business owners and even less support were 
given them. The relationship between political parties and small business owners 
was accompanied by money politics. Politicians used money politics to influence the 
voting behaviour of small business owners for obtaining political support. Thus, 
voters used pragmatic reasoning in electing candidates for parliament.
111
As a result, 
programs proposed by the candidate were not important during the political 
campaign season because the behaviour of voters was based on money, not ideology 
and program.
112
 Subsequently, it caused a low quality election in the local 
democracy.  
 
Did small business owners use political parties to articulate their interest? Data 
obtained by survey research and interviews showed that most small business owners 
were not political party members. This means that they thought that they could not 
use political parties to articulate their interests. Survey data also indicated that most 
small business owners perceived that they could influence political parties through 
business associations (26.7 percent) and personal networking with politicians (25 
                                                 
109
 Interview with Mr. H.W., the Chairman of  Bantul PAN Party, 10 June 2009.  
110
Interview with Mr. A.P., the candidate for national legislator, 19 June 2009. 
111
Interview with Mr. W.U., senior lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Gadjah 
Mada University. 
112
 Interview with Mr. Sm., Chairman of B Commission , Local Parliament of Bantul 
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percent). Only about six percent perceived that they could influence political party 
through mass media (Table 4.15). This has two implications: Firstly, business 
associations could play an important role in the relationship between small 
businesses and political party. In the Bantul district we could see that the Dekranas 
was a business association which was close to the local bureaucrat and the PDI-P 
party. Small business owners preferred to communicate with the Dekranas because 
they knew that the chairman of Dekranas was close to policy makers at the district 
government level. Secondly, the relationship between political parties and small 
business was characterised by personal relations, not institutional relations. Thus, a 
personal figure in a political party had more dominance rather than the role of party 
itself.  
Table 4.15 
The Influence of Small Business to Political Party 
 
No. How do small business people attempt 
to influence political parties so that 
they will support their business 
Frequency Percentage 
1. Providing funds 5 8.3 
2. Creating personal networks 15 25.0 
3. Using small business associations to 
influence political party 
16 26.7 
4. Developing opinion in mass media   4 6.7 
5. Mass mobilization 3 5.0 
6. Combined between no. 1 and 3 3 5.0 
7. Combined between 1 and 5 2 3.3 
8. Combined between no 2 and 3 4 6.7 
9. Combined between no. 3 and 4 3 5.0 
10. Other 5 8.3 
       Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009.      
 
 
Table 4.15 indicates that the relationship between small businesses and political 
parties was not institutionalised but personalised. The role of a personal figure is 
more important than the role of the party itself in influencing small business owners. 
Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that local politicians approached 
small business owners to obtain votes in election of legislative members by 
providing money and material called money politics. Additionally, political parties 
developed networks with business associations, such as the PDI-P party developed a 
network with Dekranas while the Golkar party developed a network with Kadin. The 
following section will discuss participation of small business owners. 
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4.4.2. Participation of Small Businesses 
The aim of this section is to examine the participation of business associations in the 
process of decision making at district level and the participation of small business 
owners in party as well as in political activities.  
 
4.4.2.1. Participation of Business Association  
As discussed in Chapter One, business associations may have potential power to 
influence local government policy so that local government becomes more 
responsive to needs of local small business owners (Pyke, 1992). The important 
question is, whether or not business associations in Bantul could influence the 
district government policy. As discussed in Chapter Two, in Bantul, there are many 
business associations, but only the Dekranas was active in helping small businesses 
because the association was strongly supported by district government. The 
association developed cooperation with Diperindagkop as well as the Indonesian 
Institute of the Art to facilitate credit, workshops and training for small businesses. 
The Dekranas obtained political and financial support from the district government 
because its chairperson was the wife of the district head of Bantul. The relationship 
between Dekranas and district government may be called nepotism.  
 
The local government of Bantul allocated the district budget to the Dekranas, and 
then the Dekranas distributed financial assistance to help small businesses. Dekranas 
played an important role in promoting small businesses. As an example, in the case 
of Pasar Seni Gabusan, Dekranas was involved in the process of policy making. 
According to the manager of Pasar Seni Gabusan and head of Diperindagkop, the 
chairman of Dekranas was involved in managing small businesses in Pasar Seni 
Gabusan because she had the power to influence small business owners. The 
Dekranas operated at grassroots level and could persuade small business owners to 
obey local government policy. The relationship between Dekranas and local 
bureaucrats was quite intensive in promoting small businesses. As an example, on 11 
June 2009 the Dekranas held a meeting with small businesses at Pasar Seni 
Gabusan with the aim of encouraging small businesses to produce good quality 
products. Present at this meeting was the head of Diperindagkop who came to 
support it. According to Indonesian political culture, the level of officials (pejabat) 
attending an event is an indicator of the degree of the relationship between the 
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official and the invitor (host).
113
 Additionally, the chairman of Dekranas created the 
opportunity for small business owners to articulate their interests and problems. As a 
result, many attended and most assumed that the chairman of Dekranas would help 
them in mediating with the district government to obtain financial assistance. This 
indicates that the Dekranas played an important role in the relationship between 
small businesses and local government.  
 
Further, the Dekranas was used by the district head to control the business sector in 
Bantul. By allocating budget through the Dekranas, the district head and head of 
Dekranas gained their loyalty from small business owners. In my view, the 
Dekranas was used by Sri Suryawidati (the head) as the first political ladder before 
involving in the district head election. In May 2010, Sri Suryawidati obtained almost 
70 percent of the votes in the district head election.  This was a remarkable result as 
Sri Suryowidati obtained nearly the same total votes obtained by Idham Samawi in 
2005, 70 percent. In other words, the Dekranas was used by Sri Suryowidati to 
achieve political support. 
 
Another business association such as Bantul Craft Association and Bantul Chamber 
of Industry and Trade (Kadinda) received less support to promote small businesses 
although they have received funding from the district government. The Bantul Craft 
Association was established in 2003 headed by Supriastowo and received financial 
assistance from the local government. However, the association tried to become 
autonomous and run independent of the local government.
114
 The Bantul Chamber of 
Industry and Trade (Kadinda) was headed by Slamet Subagyo, a Golkar party 
politician received 40 million rupiah in 2008. Both the Bantul Craft Association and 
Kadinda were invited by the district government to discuss draft regulations 
regarding business and trade.
115
  However, the Dekranas had more influence in 
decision making process than the Bantul Craft Association and Kadinda. As 
example, Dekranas was involved by Diperindagkop to organise small business in 
Gabusan Art Market. By involving in decision-making process Dekranas was able to 
make a bargain with local government with the aim to provide benefit for small 
                                                 
113
 The chairman of Dekranas invited me to attend this meeting. 
114
 Interview with Mr. Sp., 16 June 2009. 
115
 Interview with Chairman of Kadinda, 10 June 2009. 
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businesses. For instance, small businesses which occupied in the Gabusan Art 
Market did not have to pay rental costs. 
 
The cases of the Dekranas and Kadinda indicate that political parties developed a 
network with business associations with the aim to obtain political support from 
small business owners in electing district head and local legislative members. This is 
because politicians aware that many small businesses exist in Bantul region. They 
were potential source of votes in the election of legislative members and the district 
head. 
 
Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that as a business association, the 
Dekranas is able to negotiate with district government in order to make local policy 
in accordance with the interests of small businesses. Moreover, political parties 
developed a network with business associations for supporting their interests. This 
leads to a discussion of the participation of small business owners in political parties 
and their activities with the aim of understanding whether political decentralisation 
drives small business owners to participate in politics. 
 
4.4.2.2. Participation of Small Businesses Owners 
In this study, the degree of political participation is measured by indicators such as: 
(1) Becoming a member of political party; (2) Participating in political campaign; (3) 
Attending regular political party meetings; (4) Becoming a member of an executive 
committee of political party; (5) Providing political donation or funds; (6) Becoming 
a candidate or member for local parliament. Data obtained by survey research 
indicated that most small businesses were not interested in participating in the 
political parties because there were no benefits for them. Only 6 out of 60 small 
businessmen owners were affiliated to a political party (Chart 4.6). It was clear, from 
the view of the small businesses that being involved in a local political party was not 
important.  
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Chart 4.6 
Participation of Small Business Owners on Political party 
(N=60) 
 
 
 Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009. 
 
Data obtained by interviews with small businesses owners also showed that most of 
them were not political party members and they were not interested in participating 
in political activities (Case 4.13; Case 4.14; and Case 4.15). 
Case 4.13: Small Business Owners were not interested in Political Party.  
Mrs. E.R, the owner of a small business in Kasongan village, who employed 
10 workers, said that she was not a political party member because the 
political party did not help her business. She also never attended political 
campaigns for parliament member election.
116
 
 
The case above was consistent with next case as told by Mrs. P. 
 
Case 4.14: Small Business Owner was not interest in Political Party  
 
Mrs. Pj started her business in 1986, and said that now she employs 25 
workers.  She also told me that she was not interested in participating in 
political parties because the political parties never supported her business.
117
 
 
The following case told us that the owner of small businesses was not a member but 
was affiliated with a political party. 
Case 4.15: Small Business Affiliated in Political party 
 
Mr. TM, owner of a small business of Kasongan village started his business 
in 1971. He employed 35 workers. He said that the Bantul district 
government supported his business by providing training facilities, but the 
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 Interview with Mrs. E.R. of  Kasongan Village, 23 June 2009. 
117
 Interview with Mrs. Pj of Kasongan village, 7 July 2009  
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political party never helped him. He was not a member of the political party 
but he affiliated to the Democrat party because he liked Mr. Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, the chairman of the board of supervisor of Democrat party.   
 
The three cases above show that most of small businesses did not want to participate 
in political parties and were not interested to be involved in political activities 
because political parties did not provide benefit for them. As a result they had 
difficulty to articulate their interest through political parties. 
 
During the 2009 political campaign season, only 15 percent of respondents 
participated in political campaigns. Further, 50 percent of respondents never 
participated in campaigns held by a political party and 85 percent never participated 
in regular political party meetings. It was noted that 91 percent never became 
member of executive committee in political party. Eighty eight percent never 
provided funds and 91 percent never became candidate for local parliament member 
(Table 4.16). It indicates that political parties could not expect funding from small 
business owners because only 3 percent of respondents provided donations. Political 
parties expected to obtain votes from small businesses by buying votes.   
 
Table 4.16 
  Political Participation of Small Business   
 
No. Indicator of Political 
Participation 
Answer 
Always Sometimes Never Total 
1. Participating in local election 
campaigns  
 9 (15%) 21 (35%) 30 
(50%) 
60 
(100%) 
2. Regular participants in 
political party meetings 
2 (3.3%) 7 (11.7%) 51 
(85.0%) 
60 
(100%) 
3. Member of an executive 
committee in a political party 
- 5 (8.3%) 55 
(91.7%) 
60 
(100%) 
4 Providing a political 
donation or funds  
2 (3.3%) 5 (8.3%) 53 
(88.4%) 
60 
(100%) 
5. Candidate or member for 
local parliament 
 
 5 (8.3%) 55 
(91.7%) 
60 
(100%) 
  Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009  
 
Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that political parties hardly 
helped small businesses by developing networks with financial institutions or 
markets as well as facilitating legal aid. However, the PDI-P party and Golkar party 
developed networks with business associations with the aim to obtain political 
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support. Further, small business owners were neither interested in nor involved in 
political party activities. In other words, decentralisation policy could not encourage 
small business owners to participate in the process of decision making. In addition, 
political parties failed to be close to small businesses and failed to provide benefits 
for small businesses. In contrast, political parties rather preferred to recruit wealthy 
people or big business owners who can be expected to provide funding for political 
parties. They assumed that voter behaviour could be influenced by money politics. 
Thus, most of politicians approach small business owner by providing money or 
material to obtain political positions. It indicates that characteristic of the 
relationship between political parties and small business is unsupportive relationship, 
but may be exploitative. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
Based on the discussion above it can be concluded that administrative 
decentralisation was not effectively implemented in Bantul because of limited fiscal 
capacity. Although the district government devised regulations and institutional 
reform, the regulations cannot be effectively implemented. Local government could 
not implement regulations on business permits nor could not use local levies to 
control small business owners. The majority of small business owners did not obey 
local regulations requiring business permits. In contrast, the local government did 
not fine them because of economic and political reasons. With local regulations, the 
district government of Bantul protected small businesses against large capitalists 
because small businesses are able to make bargain with district head. From the 
regulation aspect, the characteristic of the relationship between district government 
and small business was a supportive relationship.  
 
Further, from view of promotion policy for small businesses, the district government 
was very supportive to promote small businesses because the district government 
intensively provided financial assistance, training and technological assistance, as 
well as physical infrastructure facilities and market development.  
 
Political decentralisation was able to encourage district heads to be close to small 
business owners. The district head strongly responded the needs and interests of 
small businesses. In contrast, political decentralisation failed to encourage political 
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parties to be close to small businesses owners as well as failed to encourage small 
owners to participate in political parties and become involved in political activities. 
Political parties preferred instead to recruit big capitalists or big business owners as 
party cadres because they can provide benefit for parties. Political parties assumed 
that voter behaviour of small businesses could be influenced by money. As a result, 
politicians approached small business owners by providing money and materials 
during legislative member election with the aim to achieve an electoral purpose. This 
means that the relationship between politicians and small businesses was based on 
financial transaction.   
 
Further, political decentralisation policy has not created equally opportunity for 
business associations to participate in the process of decision making. For instance, 
the business association named Dekranas was given a large access to be involved in 
the process of decision making and as mediator between local government and small 
businesses because of a patrimonalism relationship. The business association are 
able to make a bargain with district government with the aim to provide benefit for 
small businesses. The next chapter examines the impact of decentralisation on the 
relationship between local government and small businesses in Gianyar with the aim 
to assess whether the impact of decentralisation is similar or different.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION ON 
SMALL BUSINESS IN GIANYAR 
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
Based on Chapter Two and Three it can be concluded that social, economics, and 
political aspects between Bantul and Gianyar are different. Chapter Four discussed 
the impact of decentralisation on small businesses in Bantul. This chapter will 
examine the impact of decentralisation policy on small businesses in Gianyar and 
whether or not the impact is different to Bantul.   
 
The implementation of decentralisation has changed the relationship between the 
central and local governments. As a result, authorities and functions of the central 
government decreases while authorities and functions of sub-national governments 
increase. Local governments have more power to regulate as well as to promote 
small businesses since 2001. However, the local levy on business has yet effectively 
implemented. Additionally, local government of Gianyar less promoted small 
businesses because of limited fiscal capacity. To overcome the limited fiscal 
capacity, the central government provides grants to the government of Gianyar. 
Thus, under decentralisation policy, the central government is still involved in 
promoting small businesses.  
 
Political decentralisation is expected to increase political participation of local 
citizens and small business owners in the process of decision making. In addition, it 
is hoped to encourage political parties to be close to local citizens. However, in 
Gianyar, political decentralisation could not cause political parties to be close to 
local small business owners and support them. Local politicians used heads of local 
customary associations such as Bendesa and Kelian
118
 to influence voter behaviour.  
Political parties were not able to represent the interest of small businesses. 
 
                                                 
118
Bendesa is the head of a customary village (Desa Pakraman), whereas Kelian is head of a Banjar. 
209 
 
 
 
The structure of this chapter is divided into three sections: Firstly, it examines local 
regulations with the aim to uncover the extent to which the regulations promote 
small businesses. Secondly, it explores promotion policy for small businesses. The 
extent local government facilitates small businesses by providing financial 
assistance, training programs, material assistance as well as physical infrastructure 
facilities and market development is also analysed. Thirdly, it analyses political 
influences of local politicians over small businesses and participation of small 
businesses in the process of decision-making.     
 
5.2. Regulation of Small Businesses  
This section will answer the questions as proposed in Introduction: Firstly: to what 
extent does the district government carry out local regulation reform to promote 
small businesses? Secondly: can the district government uses regulations on local 
levies to control small businesses? 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, local regulation means using law by local government 
to affect the business activities. The local regulation can provide incentives or dis-
incentives for small businesses. The regulation also involves allowing or prohibiting 
activities in business sector. There are three regulations that will be discussed: 
business license policy, local tax/levy policy and protection policy. 
 
5.2.1. Business Licensing Policy  
As discussed in Chapter Four, although the Indonesian government adopted a 
decentralisation policy, the central government still holds authority over investment 
licenses. For instance, the Minister of Investment/Chairman of Coordinating Agency 
for Capital Investment (Meninves/Kepala BKPM) has authority to issue: (1) Limited 
Importer Identification Number; (2) Business License and Permanent Business 
License; (3) Plan for Use of Foreign Employment; (4) Recommendation for 
Applying for a Visa for Foreign Employment; (5) License for Foreign Employment; 
(6) Extensions for Foreign Employment License; and (7) Approval for Providing 
Facilities of Import Duty. The local government has only authorities of: License of 
Location; Certificate for Land-Ownership; Permit for Building Establishment and 
Disturbance permit. Therefore, the district government of Gianyar has limited 
functions and authority in implementing administrative decentralisation.  
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The local government of Gianyar has provided improved public service, particularly 
in business licensing. In achieving this goal, the local government of Gianyar 
implemented institutional and administrative reform. In respect to institutional 
reform, in 2001 the district government started to reform the UPT (Unit Pelayanan 
Terpadu) or the Unit for Integrated Permit Service by changing the UPT to KUPT 
(Kantor Unit Pelayanan Terpadu), known as the Office of Unit for Integrated 
Business Permits. The reasoning behind the change was that the Unit was a part of 
local agency which has limited power and was supported by fewer staff. The Kantor 
is at a higher level of hierarchy than the unit and has more power by comparison. 
Then, in 2004, the KUPT changed its name became KPT (Kantor Pelayanan 
Terpadu) known as the Office of Integrated Business Permits. To increase power and 
responsibility of KPT, in 2008, the KPT was revised to become Badan Pelayanan 
Perijinan Terpadu (Local Board for Integrated Permit Services) with an aim to 
improve providing service of various permits (Local Regulation No.6/2008). The 
local board is the same level of hierarchy as the local agency (Dinas) which has 
more power and authority and under the direct control by the district head.  All 
businesses permits were issued by the Badan Pelayanan Perijinan Terpadu.  The 
office building of Badan Pelayanan Perijinan Terpadu was located next to the office 
building of the district head. The building looks impressive compared with other 
local board and local agency buildings.  
 
In relation to administrative reform, the procedure for obtaining business permits 
was made more transparent and accountable for small businesses (Table 5.1). The 
transparency is important as small businesses are aware of the long process of 
issuing business permits by the district government. Accountability is also important, 
thus the district government announced the fee for each type of business permit. 
Before the implementation of administrative reforms, the process of business permits 
was not transparent in terms of the timing and costs of the permits. Small businesses 
using the public service often paid extra money to obtain business permits. In 
conclusion, the local regulations related to business permits have dramatically 
improved as the process to obtain business permits is more transparent and 
accountable.   
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At present, there is a simplification of processing for obtaining business licenses as 
well as a shorter waiting time for obtaining permits. Business location permits and 
disturbance permits, for instance, are issued by the local government within a 
maximum for 4 working days after submission and trade businesses permits (SIUP) 
and industry business permits (IUI) should be issued by local government within a 
maximum for 10 working days (Table 5.1). In relation to business permit fees, 
enterprises with capital of more than 5 billion rupiah, for example, should pay fees 
for trade business permits up to 3 million rupiah. In general, as depicted below most 
of types of business permits are issued in 14 days or less (Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1 
Type of Permits under Local Board for Integrated Permit Services 
 
No. Type of Permit Time of Service 
 
1. Ijin Lokasi (Permit for Building Location) 14 working days 
2. Ijin Mendirikan Bangunan, IMB) (Permit for Building 
Establishment) 
15 working days 
3. Surat Ijin Tempat Usaha dan Ijin Gangguan (Permit for 
Business Location  and  Disturbance Permit) 
4 working days 
4. Surat Ijin Tempat Usaha–Minuman Beralkohol (Permit 
for Business Location for alcoholic Beverage) 
4 working days 
5. Ijin Usaha Industri (IUI) or Industry Business Permit.  10 working days 
6. Surat Ijin Tempat Usaha (Permit for Business Location)  4 working days 
7. Surat Tanda Daftar Perusahaan (Company Registration 
Identification Permit)  
10 working days 
8. Surat Ijin Usaha Perdagangan (SIUP) or Trade 
Business Permit. 
10 working days 
9. Surat Ijin Usaha Perdagangan (SIUP)-Minuman 
Beralkohol or Trade Business Permit for Alcoholic 
Beverage). 
10 working days 
10. Ijin Pemasangan Reklame (Permit for Advertizing) 7 working days 
11. Ijin Usaha Sarana Pariwisata (Permit for Tourism 
Facilities) 
14 working days 
12. Perpanjangan Ijin Usaha Sarana Pariwisata (Extended 
Permit for Tourism Facilities) 
14 working days 
13. Ijin Penyimpanan Bahan Bakar Minyak (Permit for 
Storage of Oil) 
- 
14. Mutasi Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan (Change of 
Ownership for Building and Land-Ownership Tax) 
1 working days 
15. Sertifikat Tanah (Permit for Certificate for Land-
Ownership) 
90 working days 
16. Akta Kelahiran (Birth Certificate) 7 working days 
17. Kartu Pencari Kerja (Card for Job Seekers) 1 working days 
     Source: Badan Pelayanan Perijinan Terpadu (2008). 
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The impact of institutional and administrative reform can be explained as follow: 
Data showed that the majority of small businesses did not have business permit. In 
2006, there were only 471 or 2.15 percent of 21,426 small businesses who had 
business permit. Then, in 2007 there were only 489 or 2.21 per cent of 22,144 small 
businesses with business permits (Table 3.8). Institutional and administrative reform 
did not encourage small businesses to apply for business permits.  It is therefore 
argued that both institutional and administrative reform had a little impact on small 
business.   
 
The impact of institutional and administrative reforms in both Bantul district and 
Gianyar district is the same. The majority of small business did not have business 
pernits. The administrative and institutional refoms have not encouraged small 
business owners to obtain business permits. 
 
Based on the survey data from 100 small business owners, 44 percent of respondents 
perceived that the procedure for obtaining permits was complicated and 13 percent 
viewed that the procedure for obtaining permits remained the same as previous 
experience. This totalled that 57 percent of respondents viewed that the procedure 
remained complicated. With only 24 percent commenting that the procedure was 
simple. However, a significant proportion of respondents (46 percent) noted that they 
did not know because they had not obtained a business permit (Table 5.2). The 
findings differed from Bantul where majority of respondents viewed that the 
procedure for obtaining permits as simple. It is suggested that the complicated 
procedure for obtaining business permits could cause small business owners to 
disobey local regulations. Evidence shows that majority of small business owners do 
not have business permits,
119
 thus, they did not pay local taxes and levies. The 
important question is, whether local taxes and levies could be implemented 
effectively. The following section will discuss local taxes and levies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119
 See Table 3.8 of Chapter Three. 
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Chart 5.1 
Perception of Small Business Owners on Procedure of Business Permit 
(N=100) 
 
 
         Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009. 
 
5.2.2. Local Tax and Levy Policy 
This section will be divided into two sub-sections: Firstly, local tax policy will be 
discussed and secondly local levy policy. 
 
5.2.2.1. Local Tax Policy  
This section will examine the extent to which district government has discretional 
fiscal policy and whether or not the district government can use local tax to control 
small businesses. Local tax is one source of district government revenues. Local tax 
income contributed to small part of total district government revenue (Table 5.2). 
Throughout 2003-2009, the average local tax income to district governemnt revenue 
was 7.40 percent. The local tax income increased from 17,704.61 million rupiah in 
2003 to 45,301.72 million rupiah in 2009. Income from tax on hotel contributed to 
the most part of  local taxes income at 58 percent in 2007. 
 
However, local tax revenues were insufficient to pay local bureaucrat salaries. For 
instance, in 2008 local tax incomes were only 9.95 percent of  budget for local 
bureaucrats salaries. In 2009 budget for local bureaucrat salaries was 426,253.03 
million rupiah whereas local tax revenues were only 45,301.72 million rupiah or 
10.62 percent. In other words, the local tax revenues were only sufficient to pay local 
bureaucrats salaries for one month. The small income from local taxes could have 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Simple: 24% Remained the
same 13%
Complicated:
44%
Don't know:
46%
214 
 
 
 
caused the Gianyar district government difficulty in improving public services for 
small businesses such as financial assistance and training as well as to facilitate 
physical infrastuctures such as market buildings, roads and electricity supply. 
 
Table 5.2 
Local Taxes Income of the Gianyar District Government, 2002-2010  
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
Total Local Taxes 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
Percentage Local taxes 
Income to Total District 
Income  
 
1. 2003 279,914.63 17,704.61 6.32 
2. 2004 299,761.81 24,860.64 8.29 
3. 2005 323,433.20 31,076.86 9.61 
4. 2006 457,115.47 33,510.55 7.33 
5. 2007 538,325.98 37,575.00 6.98 
6. 2008 616,693.54 39,395.73 6.39 
7. 2009 652,453.02 45,301.72 6.94 
  Average  7.40 
       Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). 
 
Although local tax income of the Gianyar disrict goverment was small, the district 
government did not introduce a new local tax to increase district government 
revenue. The district government had difficulty imposing new local taxes as the 
central government has stipulated types of local taxes as stated in Law 34/2000 
(Pemerintah-Indonesia, 2000a). The district government had limited discretional 
fiscal policy in decentralisation. The list of local tax policies as a follows: 
1) Tax on Hotel (Local regulation No. 2/2011). 
2) Tax on restaurant (Local regulation No. 3/2011). 
3) Tax on entertainment (Local regulation No. 11/2011). 
4) Tax on public adverstisement (Local regulation No. 9/2010). 
5) Tax on parking (Local regulation No.12/2007). 
6) Tax on public street lighting (Local regulation No. 12/2011). 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, small businesses are not the subject of local tax, but 
they are subject to central tax such as sales tax. Small businesses owners generally 
did not pay sales tax although they were subject to this tax because their business 
transactions were not recorded. Only a few of business owners paid this tax. The 
central government did not strictly implement this tax upon small businesses owners. 
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Currently, small businesses owners of Gianyar are relatively free from the local 
government regulations in terms of taxes regulations. The district government was 
not able to control small businesses by using tax policy. Therefore, decentralisation 
policy had minimal impact on small businesses in terms of local taxes. The next 
discussion on local levies examines the contribution of local levy incomes to the 
district government revenue and the impact of local levies on small businesses.   
 
Existence of small businesses has been recognised as important economic activities 
by local governments because it absorbs many employees and contributes to locally 
derived revenue. I argue that there three variables that influence each local 
government in providing financial and material assistance to small businesses, 
namely the local government’s commitment to small businesses, market conditions 
and the annual local budgets.  
 
Firstly, in relation to local government’s commitment to small businesses, the local 
government of Bantul allocated its local budget of Rp 1,284.83 million in 2007 and 
it increased up Rp 4,125.06 million in 2008. In contrast, the local government of 
Gianyar only allocated local budget of Rp 28,305 thousand for supporting small 
business training in 2006 and there was no local budget for small business training in 
2007.  In my opinion the district head of Bantul has higher commitment to support 
small businesses than in Gianyar.  
 
Secondly is market condition for small businesses. The location of Gianyar is a 
famous tourism destination in Bali. Many foreign and domestic tourists visit Bali and 
they buy small businesses’ products. Therefore, small business could develop well 
without the financial assistance from the district government. For instance, in 2009 
the district government of Gianyar provided training assistance only to small 
business beginners. In contrast, in Bantul, training assistance was not only for 
beginners but for all small businesses. In my opinion, small businesses in Gianyar 
are easier to develop because market condition. In Bantul, small businesses need  
strong support by local government to develop. Therefore, small business market 
conditions differ between Gianyar and Bantul, so government attitudes towards 
small businesses were also different. 
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Thirdly, as in the discussion before, since 2001 the central government has given 
increased equalization funds to the local governments in form of general grants and 
specific grants. The local government has discretionary policy to use general grants, 
tax incomes and levy incomes to support small businesses. The process of 
determining the program in the district government is as follows: First is discussion 
at village level. The village bureaucracy and villagers discuss  many issues to make a 
project proposal and its budgeting. The project proposal consists of many programs. 
Then the project proposal is submitted to sub-district. Second is discussion at sub-
district level. The project proposal derived from village government to be discussed 
by head of subdistrict and local people at subdistrict level. The sub-district 
government integrate many programs from villages and its result was submitted to 
district government. Third is discussion at district level. The district government 
bureaucracies discuss the project proposal derived from sub-district and determine 
program priority. In Bantul, the local government and local parliament invite local 
business associations in discuss annual local budget and programs, especially for 
small businesses program. In contrast, local business associations in Gianyar were 
not involved in discussing annual local budget and programs. Consequently, local 
business association could not provide input in formulating annual local budget. It 
could be concluded that small business is not a priority for budgetary support 
 
5.2.2.2. Local Levy Policy 
Local levy income is one source of revenue for the district government. The 
important question is, whether or not local government can use local levy to control 
small businesses. All local levies are regulated by Perda (local regulation) which is 
stipulated by the district head and local parliament. The Gianyar district revised local 
levy policies with the aim to improve public services for small businesses. The list of 
revised local levy policies as a follows: 
1) Levy on Building Establishment License (Local Regulation No.13/1998).  
2) Levy on Permit for Business Location (Local Regulation No. 5/1994). 
3) Levy on Industry Business License (Local Regulation No.7/2005). 
4) Levy on Trade Business License (Local Regulation No.6/2005). 
5) Levy on Disturbance Permit (Local Regulation No. 17/2010). 
6) Levy on Company Registration Identification License 
7) Levy on Market (Local Regulation No. 13/2007). 
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8) Levy on Trade Business Permit for Alcoholic Beverage 
9) Levy on Advertisement Permit (Local Regulation No. 9/2010) 
10) Levy on Permit for Tourism and Sport Facilities (Local Regulation No. 
8/2010). 
11) Levy on Change of Ownership of Building and Land Ownership (Local 
regulation No. 16/2010). 
12) Levy on Certificate for Land Ownership  
 
Throughout 2003-2009, the ratio of local levy income to the total district government 
income was 5.15 percent (Table 5.3.). The local levies consist of 21 types of local 
levies such as local fees for building permits, local fees for disturbance permits, local 
fees for transport permits, local fees for trading business permits (SIUP), local fees 
for industrial business permits (IUI), parking fees, market fees and public health 
service fees.    
 
The majority of local levy incomes are derived from the income raised by levies on 
the market. In 2007, the income from levies on all business permits was only 1,914 
million rupiah equating to 6.58 percent of total local levy incomes. The results infer 
that income from levies on business permits accounted for  a small part of total local 
levy incomes. It may be concluded that decentralisation policy had a small impact on 
small businesses in locality of Gianyar in terms of local levies. This condition was 
not far different from that of the Bantul district government. 
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Table 5.3. 
Local Levy Income of the Gianyar District Government 
2003 – 2009 
 
No. Year Total District 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
Local levy 
Income 
(Million rupiah) 
Percentage Local 
Levy to Total 
District Income 
1. 2003 279,914.63 13,085.73 4.67 
2. 2004 299,761.81 16,500.83 5.50 
3. 2005 323,433.20 20,421.63 6.31 
4. 2006 457,115.47 27,946.40 6.11 
5. 2007 538,325.98 29,961.68 5.57 
6. 2008 616,693.54 34,953.99 5.67 
7. 2009 652,453.02 14,526.27 2.23 
8.  Average  5.15 
     Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009). 
 
The data indicates that the local tax incomes were greater than the local levy incomes 
(Table 5.2 and Table 5.3). Majority of local tax incomes are derived from hotels and 
restaurants. In contrast, Bantul result calculated that local levy incomes were higher 
than local tax incomes.  
 
The district government of Gianyar expanded local regulation to local levies with the 
aim to increase district government revenues. However, the majority of small 
businesses owners did not have business permits such as a business location permit, 
trade business permit, or a building location permit. As a result, they did not pay 
levies on business permits. They ignored business permits and local levies as the 
district government did not impose fines. For instance: Ninety seven percent
120
 of 
Gianyar small businesses did not have a business permit and never paid local levies. 
This has two implications: Firstly, it appears that there was no relationship between 
local government and small buinesses activities. Small businesses could operate 
without a business permit from local government. They only applied for a business 
permit if they required credit from the state or private bank as these banks demand  
business permits for administrative puposes in providing loans. Secondly, local 
government was not able to use local levy policy to control small businesses at the 
local level. Increased number of small businesses might not affect increased district 
                                                 
120
 See Table 3.10 in Chapter 3 where there were 21.655 of 22,144 small business owners had no 
business permits.  
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government revenue. In the other words, local levy policy had a small impact on 
small business activities and district government revenue. 
 
It is important to note that the district government did not effectivelly implement 
local regulation on business permits. On one hand, the district government created 
local regulation on business permits with the aim to increasing its revenue. On the 
other hand, the district goverment ignored small businesses who were operating 
without business permits with many reasons as will be explained as follows: 
 
Economically small businesses create employment opportunities for a local 
community, which in turn, contributes to decreasing the unemployment rate. From 
local government’s view, a low unemployment rate contributes to social and political 
stability, despite small businesses providing a small local levy for district 
government income. As discussed in Chapter Three, small and medium businesses of 
Gianyar provided a large number of employment opportunities for the local 
community. The small and medium businesses of Gianyar provided employment 
opportunities for 30,730 workers in 2001, and then increased to 65,802 workers in 
2007.  
 
Politically small business owners were a voter source for politicians seeking election 
for district government head and local parliament members. Typically, politicians 
gained support from small business owners by allowing owners to operate despite 
having no business permits. In doing so, politicians expected that they would gain 
many votes from small businesses in the election of district government head and 
local parliament members. In 2007, the total number of small and medium 
businesses was 21,665 with the number employees were 65,802. Based on the 
growth rate of small and medium businesses of 3.12 percent
121
, I estimated that in 
2009 the total number of small and medium businesses was 23,546. Further, based 
on the growth rate of employment 7.36 percent
122
, in 2009 the total number of 
employees of small and medium businesses was 75,844 workers.  If each small 
business was owned by two people (husband and wife), in 2009 the total number of 
                                                 
121
 The average of growth rate of small and medium businesses was 3.12 per cent during 2002-2007. 
122
 The average of growth rate of employee in small and medium businesses was 7.36 per cent during 
2002-2007.  
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people involved in small business was 129,936.
123
 In Gianyar, there were 330,000 
constituents in 2009 general election.
124
 This means, 39.37 percent of the 
constituents were came from of small businesses sector, thus, small businesses were 
potential voters in terms of vote total number.   
 
On a final note, the local government disregard for small businesses that did not pay 
a levy may have been due to the need for such businesses to remain in the region of 
Gianyar. As discussed in Chapter One, businesses will remain in a region which 
provides good public services and taxes. In contrast, they will exit from regions if 
local government provides unsatisfactory services and taxes (Tiebout 1956). The 
district government of Gianyar tried to provide better public service to small 
business owners as stated by the district head and outline below:  
Case 5.1: The view of the District Government on Local Levies 
For the district government of Gianyar, the spirit of local regulation on 
businesses permit was not only intended to increase district government 
income but to keep order among small businesses owners. The district 
government was obligated to increase welfare to small business owners and 
did not want to place financial burden upon them. The district government 
was also obligated to maintain security, so that small business owners could 
safely operate their business.
125
 
 
It was clear that local regulations on business permits have not been effectively 
implemented by local government. Formally, the district government regulated small 
business by stipulating local regulation on local levies, but practically, both the 
district government and small businesses did not care about local regulations on local 
levies. The view of small businesses on local levies can be obtained from the 
following. 
 
When conducting survey research, 100 small businesses owners were questioned 
with, “What do you think about local levies on small businesses?” Six alternative 
answers were provided:  
(A) Generally, the local levies were relatively light;  
(B) The local levies were reasonable;  
(C) The local levies were heavy;  
                                                 
123
 23,546 x 2 + 75,844 = 122,936. 
124
 KPUD (Committee of Local Election).  
125
 Interview with the District Government Head of Gianyar, 23 April 2009. 
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(E) the local levies were very heavy; and  
(F) Don’t know.  
 
The survey data indicated that most respondents perceived that local levies were 
reasonable, 33 percent; and about 22 percent responded that it was relative light or 
cheap. This means that more than 50 percent of small business owners had the 
opinion that local levies were not expensive (combined between light and reasonable 
answers). Seventeen percent of them perceived that they was heavy or expensive; 
only 2 percent perceived that local levy was very heavy and 26 percent of them said 
they did not know (Chart 5.2). The result reflects that most owners do not pay local 
levies. Data obtained by interviews with small businesses owners also indicated that 
most of them had no business permits and did not view this as an issue for their 
business.  
Chart 5.2 
 Perception of Small Business Owners on Local Levies 
(N=100) 
 
 
    Source: Data obtained by survey questionnaire, 2009. 
 
According to several small businesses owners, the local government did not 
seriously promote small businesses. For instance, small business owners of 
Tegallalang sub-district said that local government had not improved physical 
infrastructures such as roads or local market buildings. As a result, they feel free 
from the obligation for the local government. Furthermore, they were able to survive 
in their business without receiving assistances from local government. Finally, they 
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did not care about business permits. One small business owner said that he would not 
to look for business permit because his business can operate without it and the local 
bureaucrats never forced him to apply for the permit.
126
 It appears that small 
businesses were not dependent on local government. The following discussion 
concerns whether local government protect small businesses.  
 
5.2.3. Protection Policy for Small Businesses 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the Bantul district developed a protection policy for 
small businesses with the aim to promote them. In contrast, the Gianyar district did 
not implement such a policy. The Gianyar district government handed over free 
market mechanisms to promote small businesses. Although the district government 
facilitated financial assistance for small business owners, there was not a protection 
policy against big businesses.  
 
Based on the data in Chapter Two and Three, there are more small businesses in 
Gianyar than in Bantul. Despite the figure, the district government of Bantul 
intensively developed and protected small businesses by making various policies 
such as not allowing supermarkets to operate in all regions of Bantul.   
 
The Gianyar district government did not install protection policies for small 
businesses, however small businesses could still be developed (Table 3.8). This 
means that growth of small businesses was not dependent on the district government 
policy yet on the market. The majority of small businesses products were exported to 
countries such as the United States, European countries and Australia. During 2003-
2007, the export growth rate of Gianyar was 6.30 percent. In 2003, non-oil export of 
Gianyar was 23,855,349.33 rupiah and in 2007 it was 31,367,132.02 rupiah
127
.  The 
majority of exports were derived from wood handicraft products such as wood 
statues, wood decorations and various woodcrafts (Figure 5.1 and 5.2). Further, the 
majority of exported products from the Bali province were derived from Gianyar 
district.
128
 Thus, the growth of small businesses was more influenced by demand of 
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 Interview with Mr. P.D., Small Business Owners and Bendesa of Banjar Jasan, 23 May 2009.  
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Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar, (2008b, p. 51) 
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 Interview with Mr. A.S., District Head of Gianyar, 23 April 2009. 
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international market than the local government protection policy. The next section 
will discuss policy to promote small businesses.    
 
Figure 5.1 
Wood Statues of Small Business Products 
 
                        Source: Field work, 2009   
 
Figure 5.2 
Handicrafts of Small Business Products 
 
 
                        Source: Field work, 2009 
 
Based on the discussion above, it can be summarised that the district government of 
Gianyar carried out institutional and regulation reform in 2001 with the aim to 
provide better public services for small businesses. The district government 
developed Local Board Integrated Permit Services and improved the procedure for 
obtaining business licenses. However, most of small business owners ignored 
business permits and did not pay local levies. This suggests that district government 
failed to use local regulation on business permits to control small businesses.  
224 
 
 
 
5.3. Promotion Policy for Small Businesses 
This section will answer the question as proposed in Introduction: To what extent 
does the district government develop small business promotion policy? As discussed 
in Chapter One, administrative decentralisation is concerned with sharing 
responsibilities between central and sub-national governments. It comprises a set 
policy that transfers the functions and delivery of public services such as the 
business sector, public works to sub-national governments. This section will discuss 
the extent to which the sub-national government of Gianyar provided financial, 
training and material assistance as well as infrastructure facilities and market 
development for small businesses. 
 
5.3.1. Financial Assistance for Small Businesses 
In Chapter One, it was discussed that to overcome a lack of financial capacity in 
small businesses, local government could provide financial assistance them so that 
they could improve their products. There are two ways to provide financial 
assistance to small businesses. Firstly, local government provides direct financial 
assistance to small businesses. Secondly, local government develops a network with 
state/private banks and village financial institutions in order to provide credits to 
small businesses. In the case of Gianyar, the local government tends to use the latter 
way in providing financial assistance to small businesses. The state banks consist of 
the Bank Pembangunan Daerah (Provincial Government Bank or BPD) and Bank 
BNI. The following discussion will discuss financial assistance from the Bank BPD, 
Bank BNI and the village financial institution. 
 
Starting in 2009 the Gianyar district government developed joint cooperation with 
the Bank Pembangunan Daerah (Provincial Government Bank or BPD) to help small 
businesses. The Gianyar district government deposited money in the BPD bank 
amounting to 500 million rupiah. The BPD provided a subsidy of 2 billion rupiah. 
Therefore the total fund was 2.5 billion rupiah that was available for distribution as a 
loan without collateral for small business owners. Small business owners could 
borrow up to 7.5 million rupiah with the condition of being repaid over three years.   
 
Secondly, the local government of Gianyar signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) with BNI Bank in mid 2008. This program aimed at helping small business 
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activities in Gianyar by providing credit scheme. Small businesses could borrow up 
to 30 million rupiah with the condition of repayment in three years. However, upon 
interviewing small business owners, many were unaware of the program because the 
district government only promulgated the program through local daily newspapers 
and not all small businesses owners read the newspaper. 
 
Thirdly, the Gianyar district government developed cooperation with the Institution 
for People’s Credit (Lembaga Perkreditan Desa or LPD). The LPD is owned by the 
Banjar and operates at a customary village (desa adat) level. Besides the district 
government of Gianyar, the provincial government of Bali also provided financial 
assistance to the LPDs (Table 5.2). The LPDs provided loans for villagers including 
small business owners with a simple administrative procedure. Thus, small business 
owners and villagers preferred to borrow money from the LPDs rather than to the 
State Banks or Commercial Banks (Case 5.2).  
Case 5.2: Financial Assistance from Village Financial Institutions 
Mr. P.D. lives in Banjar Yasan, sub-district of Tegalalang. He has operated a 
small business since 1993, and he employed 16 workers. He borrowed money 
from the LPD to increase capital. He preferred to borrow money from LPD 
rather than from state or private banks because the administrative 
requirement was simple. He borrowed 60 million rupiah from the LPD and 
repaid the loan over a year.
129
 
 
Another small business owner also commented that he preferred to borrow money 
from the LPDs because they were not able to fulfil the administrative requirements 
for borrowing from state or private banks. He also has not received loans from the 
district government.
130
 
 
The district government provided very small financial assistance to the LPDs. For 
instance, in the case of Sukowati sub-district, the district government provided only 
24 million rupiah, although there were 32 LPD. In Balbatuh sub-district, despite 
there were 36 LPDs, the district government only provided thirty million rupiah. 
This means, both in Sukowati sub-district and Balbatuh sub-district, every LPD 
received less than one million rupiah (Table 5.4). 
 
                                                 
129
Interview with Mr. P.D., Small business Owner, 23 May 2009. 
130
 Interview with Mr. A.W., Small Business Owner and Kelian Dinas, Banjar Bonjaka, Desa Sebatu, 
Tegallalang, 23 May 2009. 
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Table 5.4 
Financial Assistance for LPDs, 2007 
 
No. Sub-district Number of 
LPD 
Provincial 
Government  
Financial Assistance 
(million rupiah) 
District Government  
Financial Assistance 
(million rupiah) 
1. Sukowati 32 3 24 
2. Blahbatuh  36 1 30 
3. Gianyar 39 3 31 
4. Tampaksiring 36 3 28 
5. Ubud 32 5 20 
6. Tegallalang 43 3 25 
7. Payangan 48 3 40 
 Total 266 21 198 
    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2008a, p. 222) 
 
The LPDs played an important role in providing financial assistance to small 
businesses at the grassroots level and prevented small business owners from 
resorting to illegal money lenders. As discussed in Chapter One, in Denmark as an 
example, local banks  also played an important role in developing small businesses 
(Kristensen, 1992, p. 149). However, the role of local government in supporting the 
LPDs was limited. It indicates that financially the local government of Gianyar paid 
little attention to small businesses. 
 
Based on the data above, it was clear that the Gianyar district government provided 
financial assistance for small businesses through financial institutions, but the total 
amount financed was minimal. This provided further impetus that financially the 
district government of Gianyar paid little attention to small businesses. It is 
important to note that the implementation of decentralisation policy had minimal 
impact on small businesses in terms of financial assistance. The following discussion 
will examine the perception of small business owners on financial assistance from 
the district government. 
 
The study surveyed 100 small business owners. According to 29 percent of 
respondents, the district government was supportive to small businesses and 10 
percent said the district government was very supportive of small businesses. 
However, the majority of respondents, 61 percent said that the district government of 
Gianyar did not do anything for small businesses (Table 5.5). In general, respondents 
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did not know that local government provided money to LPDs. The responses reflect 
that small business owners rarely had contact with local bureaucrats and further they 
failed to read the local newspaper which detailed activities. 
 
Table 5.5 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on  
 Financial Assistance 
 
What do you think about the local government’s 
financial support (Financial aid, subsidies, 
favourable business taxes, and low interest loan) 
for local small business? 
 
Frequency Percent 
Very supportive 10 10.0 
Supportive 29 29.0 
Not at all 61 61.0 
Total 100 100.0 
       Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009 
 
According to small businesses of Gianyar, financial assistance from the district 
government was small and not the main determinant for success of their businesses. 
As mentioned above, based on the experiences of small business owners they were 
able to survive without receiving financial assistance from the district government. 
The next section will discuss training for small businesses. 
 
5.3.2. Training for Small Business Owners 
This section will examine: How far does the Gianyar district government allocate 
public resources to provide training programs. Does the central government play an 
important role in providing training for small business owners? To what extent did 
small business owners provide response to training programs? 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, local government provided training for small business 
owners to improve the skills of workers and quality products. In 2006, the district 
government of Gianyar established the UPTD
131
 with an aim to provide training for 
small businesses. The location of this office building was far from the main road and 
far from central office building of the Gianyar district government. The building next 
to the office of UPTD was a primary school. Thus, the environment of the UPTD 
                                                 
131
UPTD is Unit Pelaksana Teknis Dinas (Technical Service Unit of Local Agency for Industry, 
Trade and Cooperative) regulated by district head’s decree No. 10/2006, 20 February 2006. 
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office was quite noisy, particularly during the school recess. In short the surrounding 
was not ideal as a training location.  
 
Some of staff members appeared jobless and were left to converse with each other. 
The majority of the computers could not be used for the previous 6 months and had 
yet to be repaired. The boss was aware that the computers require repair, however a 
staff member commented that there was no local budget for this purpose. This 
phenomenon showed that the Gianyar district government paid less serious attention 
in implementing its functions in term of training.   
 
The Gianyar district government provided training for small businesses to increase 
their skills. For instance, in 2003 the local government of Gianyar provided training 
for 380 small business owners across seven sub-districts. However, in 2007 the 
Gianyar district government provided training only for 140 small business owners 
across seven sub-districts (Table 5.4). All training programs were financed by the 
central government. It is interesting to note that although the district government of 
Gianyar adopted a decentralisation policy, the central government still played an 
important role in providing funds training for small businesses (Table 5.6).   
 
Table 5.6 
Training Program for Small Business Owners 
2003 – 2007 
 
No. Year Location of 
Training 
Source of Finance Number of 
Participants 
1. 2003 7 Sub-districts Central government grant 380 
1. 2004 7 Sub-districts Central government grant 110 
2. 2005 7 Sub-districts Central government grant 380 
3. 2006 7 Sub-districts Central government grant 80 
4. 2007 7 Sub-district Central government grant 140 
      Source: Diperindagkop (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007) 
 
At the same time, the local government of Gianyar through the Diperindag (local 
agency for industry and trade) provided training for small business owners with the 
aim to increase their skills. During 2004-2007, this training involved 710 participants 
(Table 5.7). The training was fully funded from the local government budget. 
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Table 5.7 
The Number of Training Programs and District Budget, 2004-2007 
 
No. Year The number of Training 
Sessions 
Total Budget 
1. 2004   7 Rp 40,878,000 
2. 2005 18 Rp  62,060,000 
3. 2006   4 Rp 28,305,000 
4. 2007  8 n.a. 
 Total 37 Rp131,243,000 
        Source: Diperindagkop (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007).     
 
This is evidence that under decentralisation policy, the central government was still 
involved in promoting small businesses by providing grants for training programs. 
At the same time, the local government of Gianyar were actively involved in 
facilitating funds for training program. The important question is, whether the 
training program can promote small businesses. We need to look at the perception of 
small business owners on the training program, as to whether this program is useful 
for them. 
 
Data obtained by survey research indicated that 10 percent and 6 percent of 
respondents had the opinion that the Gianyar district government was supportive and 
very supportive in providing training for them. But, most of respondents (84 percent) 
did not have opinion about the training held by the local government (Table 5.8). In 
the other words, they ignored the training programs. There was the possibility that 
the training program was not useful for them. The limited financial capacity of 
Gianyar may have allowed poor training programs as well as negative perceptions of 
the training.  
 
Table 5.8 
 The Perception of Small Business Owners on Training Program 
 
What do you think about the local government’s 
training support (Support for in-house education, 
government job training) for local small business? 
 
Frequency Percent 
Very supportive 6 6.0 
Supportive 10 10.0 
Not at all 84 84.0 
Total 100 100.0 
       Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009. 
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In short, the district government of Gianyar did not have sufficient financial 
resources to implement administrative decentralisation particularly in providing 
training programs for small businesses. The UPTD had poor financial resources and 
physical infrastructures to implement training programs.   
 
The district government of Gianyar did not actively facilitate training for small 
businesses because there was no political pressure to do so from local parliament 
members. As described on Chapter Three, the district head was supported by Golkar 
party and several small parties, such as the PPIB party, Democrat party, Patriot 
Pancasila party, PDK party, Pelopor party, PKPI party, PNBK party, PNI 
Marhenisme party and PKPB party that had occupied 21 seats at of 40 seats of 
parliament member. Thus, the majority of local parliament members did not criticize 
the district head policy.  
 
5.3.3. Material Assistance for Small Businesses 
One of factors that influence the sustainability of small businesses is the availability 
of material input. My research took a case of woodcraft in the sub-district of 
Tegallalang.  Wood is the main material for 450 small businesses in the sub-district 
of Tegallalang in 2009. According to small business owners, they can buy wood 
from the locality of Tegallalang and from other sub-districts.    
 
During 2007-2008, small woodcraft businesses faced a lack of wood supply due to a 
major investor having established a plywood factory in Bangli district located 30 km 
east of Gianyar district. The new plywood factory needed a lot of wood from many 
regions including wood from Gianyar district. As a result, the small businesses of 
Gianyar faced supply problems and were forced to buy from other regions at a higher 
cost. In addition, illegal wood was sold from Gianyar to other districts, further 
exacerbating the problem. This caused Gianyar to have a lack of wood and small 
businesses had more difficulty in buying wood. The problem encouraged Kandinda 
(the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Gianyar) to assist small business owners 
and communicate with the local government. 
 
The chairman of Kadinda met with the district head of Gianyar to discuss the 
problem, however the district head did not take a decision to resolve the problem. 
231 
 
 
 
The Kadinda of Gianyar responded to the problem with a tree planting program. The 
program was managed by Consortium under the Kadinda of Gianyar. The first step 
involved Kadinda rent land around 6 ha to plant abesia trees. The process is 
expected to take three years.
132
 
 
It was clear that the district government of Gianyar did not do anything to help small 
businesses in overcoming the lack of materials despite the district head being a 
businessman. Cok Ace, the district head and businessmen, failed to rectify the 
situation, furthermore the problem was not related to his business. As discussed on 
Chapter Three, Cok Ace operated within the hotel and restaurant sector. In contrast, 
Kadinda played an important role in overcoming the lack of material inputs.  
 
The local government of Gianyar did not intervene to help small businesses source 
raw materials. In my opinion there are three possible reasons for this. Firstly, the 
local government of Gianyar did not help with the procurement of raw material due 
to a possible absence of political will to stop the trade in wood out of Gianyar to 
other regions. Both district head and local parliament members did not have strong 
commitments to help small business because they were not sensitive to needs of 
small businesses. Secondly, the district government was reluctant to help small 
business owners regarding raw materials due to a lack of funding to facilitate it.  
However, I argue that to solve this problem did not require much funding but rather 
political will to make regulation. The district government should have developed 
regulations on trade of wood. For instance, the local government should have 
decided on a quota for traders in selling raw materials for woodcraft to other regions. 
However, the local government did not do this. Thirdly, the local government was 
believed that market mechanism could overcome the problems faced by small 
businesses. It could be interpreted that local government tended to adopt a market 
economy model. Market economy is one in which goods are bought and sold at 
prices determined by a free market, with a minimum of external government control. 
It is also an economy in which decisions regarding production and distribution are 
based on supply and demand. This study found that the absence of local government 
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 Interview with  Mr. A.A., Chairman of Kadinda, 24 April 2009. 
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help to small businesses in the procurement of raw materials has led the Gianyar 
district to adopt a market economy model. 
 
To understand the perception of small business owners on material assistance from 
local government, small business owners were questioned: What do you think about 
the local government’s material support such as raw materials, investment guidance, 
favourable supply of gas and electricity for local small business?  Three alternative 
answers were provided: (A) Very supportive; (B) Supportive; and (C) Not at all.   
Data obtained by survey research showed that 6 percent of respondents perceived 
that the local government of Gianyar was very supportive in providing material 
assistance for small businesses, and 28 percent said that local government of Gianyar 
was supportive. About 66 percent respondents said that they did not know about 
material assistant from the Gianyar district government (Chart 5.3). 
 
Chart 5.3 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Material Assistance 
(N=100) 
 
 
             Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009. 
 
 
Based on the data obtained survey research, it was clear that most small business 
perceived that local government did not do anything (66 percent). The results infer 
that the local government of Gianyar was not responsive to provide materials 
assistance for small businesses. The results of survey research were consistent with 
data obtained by interview with the Chairman of Kadinda as discussed above. Data 
obtained by interview with small businesses also showed that the Gianyar district did 
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not improve road and facilitate parking areas for small businesses in Tegallalang 
sub-district.  
 
Although in 2008 the Gianyar district has already established Diskop dan UKM 
(Local Agency for Cooperative, Small and Medium Businesses), substantially, the 
Diskop dan UKM had not yet provided sufficient material assistance for small 
businesses. I argue that the establishing the Diskop dan UKM was more driven by 
need of the distribution of power and authority among local bureaucrats rather than 
to help small businesses. Before the decentralisation policy, besides Dinas (local 
agencies) there were also deconcentrated functions from the central government 
located in district of Gianyar called Kandep.
133
 Since the implementation of the 
decentralisation policy, these functions of Kandep were transferred to Dinas which 
carry out functions of decentralisation. Public servants of Kandep were transferred to 
Dinas. The increased number of public servants in the Dinas could drive district 
government to create new local agencies with the aim to distribute power and 
authority to them.   
 
If we make a comparison of Bantul and Gianyar, the Bantul district played a more 
important role in allocating public resources by providing material assistance for 
small businesses than the Gianyar district.  
 
5.3.4. Physical Infrastructure Facilities 
Physical infrastructure facilities such as roads, banks, electricity, telephone networks 
and market buildings are important for supporting small businesses. These 
infrastructure facilities will be discussed as follows: 
5.3.4.1. Roads 
As discussed in the Introduction, the majority of small businesses of Gianyar are 
concentrated in Tegallalang sub-district. This sub-district is located on north of the 
city of Gianyar (see Map of Gianyar, Figure 3.1). There are no exact numbers on 
how many small businesses exist in sub-district of Tegallalang. According to 
Diperindag, the number of small businesses was approximately 450. Nearly all of 
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Kandep (Kantor Departemen) is local office of the central government minister located in district 
area. 
234 
 
 
 
them were concentrated on woodcraft such as statues, wall decorations and toy 
animals. 
 
However, the district government of Gianyar has not improved asphalt roads in the 
location of Tegallalang sub-district. The road was narrow with no parking areas, 
tourists had difficulty in shopping for woodcraft in Tegallalang. The Tegallalang 
road has not yet been improved since decentralisation policy was implemented in 
2001.
134
 
 
In relation to the quality of roads throughout the region of Gianyar, during 2005 - 
2007 the number of good roads decreased from 419.83 km to 175.18 km, while the 
moderate roads increased from 139.99 km to 238.76 km. In 2007, there were still 
139.87 km of damaged roads. Further, in 2005 there were 124.90 km of seriously 
damaged roads (Table 5.9). As a result, transportation was difficult and expensive. 
Small business owners had difficulty in bringing their products to markets. Buyers 
also had difficulty visiting the handicraft villages such as Tegallalang and Ubud.   
 
Table 5.9 
Length of Roads by Conditions (Km) 
 
No. Condition of 
Road 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
 Good 280.64 419.83 194.28 175.18 
 Moderate 141.79 139.99 200.00 238.76 
 Damage 262.30 - 159.53 139.87 
 Serious damage - 124.90 - - 
      
  Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2008a, p. 192) 
 
5.3.4.2. Banks 
In 2003 the state banks had 22 Kantor (offices)
135
 in the region of Gianyar, and 
increased to 25 offices in 2007. However, the number of offices of 
commercial/private bank decreased from 21 in 2003 to 19 in 2007. The Institution 
for People’s Credit (LPD) increased from 255 in 2003 to 266 in 2007 (Table 5.10).  
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 Interview with Mr. A.W., Small Business Owner and Kelian Dinas, Banjar Bonjaka, Desa Sebatu, 
Tegallalang, 23 May 2009. 
135
Kantor or Office is under control of Gianyar Branch of State Bank.  
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The LPD operated at Banjar level (Association of Local Customary Community). As 
discussed before, small business owners preferred to borrow money from the LPDs 
because the administrative requirement was simple whereas the state and the private 
banks had complicated administrative requirements for borrowing money from them.  
 
Table 5.10 
Types of Financial Institutions 
 
Type of Banks 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
State Bank 22 24 25 25 25 
Private Bank 21 19 19 19 19 
District government’s 
Bank  
1 1 1  1 
BPR136 31 31 31 31 31 
LPD 255 255 266 266 266 
       Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2008b, p. 67).    
 
5.3.4.3. Electricity  
Electricity is another important element of infrastructure for developing the 
industrial sector because this sector uses electricity in the process of production. The 
state owned enterprise for electricity (PT PLN) has installed electricity in the 
Gianyar regions. However, during 2003-2007, the number of installed capacity did 
not significantly change and the number of customers only increased 9 percent from 
77,776 to 84,966 (Table 5.11). In 2007, 28 percent of electricity in Gianyar was used 
in business sector. 
 
Table 5.11 
The Number of Electricity Installed Capacity and Costumers, 2003-2007 
 
No. Year Total Number of 
Installed Capacity 
(MWH) 
Total number 
of Sold 
(MWH)  
Total Number of 
Customers 
 2003 180,465.00 135,769.00 77,776 
 2004 150,537.00 142,263.00 75,342 
 2005 186,108.00 167,769.00 82,910 
 2006 190,468.18 154,388.59 83,896 
 2007 190,468.18 154,388,59 84,966 
    Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar  (2008b, p. 46) 
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 BPR is smallholder credit bank at village level. 
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5.3.4.4. Telephone Networks 
During 2003-2007 telephone networks in Gianyar did not change significantly. The 
number of customers as well as the number of installed capacity and the number of 
using capacity decreased slightly during 2003 - 2007. The data suggests that the 
district government provided less telephone network facilities for local communities 
including small business owners (Table 5.12). The total number of customers 
decreased due to an increase in mobile phone usage. 
 
Table 5.12 
Telephone Networks, 2003-2007 
 
No. Year Total number of 
Installed Capacity 
Total number of 
Using Capacity 
Total number of 
Customers 
1. 2003 25,466 21,647 21,583 
2. 2004 25,647 21,960 21,835 
3. 2005 25,674 21,999 21,903 
4. 2006 25,206 21,796 21,762 
5. 2007 25,206 21,257 21,361 
     
     Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Gianyar (2008b, p. 62). 
 
 
5.3.4.5. Market Buildings 
Gianyar has many art market buildings such as, Sukawati, Ubud, Gelulung and 
Guwang market. The district government encouraged small business owners to open 
stalls at these markets or open art shops along street toward a tourism destination. 
However, the district government did not improve the roads towards these tourism 
destinations and did not improve infrastructure in local public art markets. 
 
The physical infrastructure in Sukowati Art Market, for instance, is poor. Many 
small businesses sold their products along walkways as market was overcapacity. In 
addition, the parking area in Sukawati and Ubud market were narrow. As a result, 
many tourists’ cars were parked beyond the parking area, along a narrow street. This 
indicates that the district government did not improve the market infrastructure and 
provide assistance to small businesses.  
 
It is seen that local government of Gianyar was less responsive in promoting market 
infrastructure for small businesses. There was evidence that many local public 
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market buildings lack infrastructure facilities including a lack of planning for stalls 
in the markets and the limited parking areas in the local public market. Beyond 
market infrastructure, the district government could develop markets by facilitating 
business exhibitions and network with buyers as will be discussed in the following 
section.  
 
5.3.5. Market Development for Small Businesses 
The local government of Gianyar has undertaken two ways to develop markets: 
Firstly the business exhibition; secondly by developing cooperation with other 
institutions with the aim to promote product of small businesses. All market 
development programs were financed by the central government: the Ministry of 
Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprise (Ministry of Cooperative and 
SMEs). The two developments will be discussed in the following section. 
 
Firstly, the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs provided funds to the Gianyar 
district government to finance small business owners who participated in business 
exhibitions. For instance, in 2007 the Gianyar district received 548.45 million rupiah 
from the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs to finance 62 small business owners 
who were involved in business exhibitions in Jakarta and Bali. Unfortunately, the 
district government of Gianyar did not allocate local budget to support the business 
exhibitions. This indicated that although Gianyar district adopted a decentralisation 
policy, the central government still played an important role in developing small 
businesses on a local level.  
 
Secondly, the district government of Gianyar developed cooperation with other 
institutions such as hotels and the central government with the aim to promote small 
businesses. For instance, the Gianyar district developed cooperation with many 
hotels to facilitate small businesses to open art shops in these hotels. The aim of the 
program was to promote products of small businesses. Moreover, the district 
government developed cooperation with the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs to 
establish a centre for Business Development Services (BDS) with the aim to improve 
products of small businesses. In 2007 there were five BDSs in Gianyar. The BDS 
could provide financial assistance and facilitate training for small businesses. The 
Gianyar district also established cooperation with the Foundation of Dharma Bakti 
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Astra with aim to establish the BDS. The next question is whether small businesses 
reap benefit from the district government’s support.  
 
Survey data shows that majority of small business owners did not know about 
district government’s support for developing market (73 percent). Only 27 percent 
recognized that the district government provided assistance for developing markets 
(Chart 5.4). This indicates that small business owners rarely communicated with 
local government bureaucrats and vise versa. The local government also provided 
less information to small businesses about assistance in developing markets such as 
access to business exhibitions. 
 
Chart 5.4 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Market Development 
(N=100) 
 
 
 
Source: Data obtained  by survey research, 2009. 
 
Based on interviews with small business owners, several small business owners 
noted that local government has not yet facilitated them to be involved in business 
exhibitions both in Bali and other cities outside of Bali. They paid for themselves 
when involved in business exhibitions. To date the local government has not 
facilitated the Kadinda to organize business exhibitions in Gianyar.    
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Based on the discussion above, it appears that the district government of Gianyar 
allocates only small financial assistance for supporting small business owners’ 
capital and training program. Additionally, the district government provides less 
support for the physical infrastructure facilities for small businesses such as roads,  
banks, telephone networks and market buildings. However, small business owners 
can survive without local government support. Thus, small businesses are relatively 
independent of the district government policies.   
 
5.4. Political Influence 
This section will answer the questions as proposed in Introduction: Firstly: can 
political parties help small businesses? Secondly: in what ways local politicians 
approach small business owners with the aim to obtain votes in election of district 
head and local legislative member? Thirdly: have business associations and small 
business owners involved themselves in the process of decision making or political 
parties as well as political activities? 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, political decentralisation can cause elected public 
officials to approach local communities with the aim to obtain political support. 
Further, political decentralisation opens an opportunity for local communities to 
participate in electing district head and local legislature members as well as 
participate in the process of decision making at district level.  
 
5.4.1. Political Influence of Politicians over Small Businesses 
Political decentralisation provides an opportunity for political party members to 
compete in obtaining political positions both in the executive body and local 
legislature. The political positions will provide benefit for local politicians and 
political parties. Thus, political party members need political support from local 
citizen and small businesses. The important question is then in what ways political 
parties approach small business owners to obtain political support. Are they capable 
of being close to the small businesses?  
 
Survey data showed that only 26 percent of respondents recognized that political 
decentralisation caused political parties to be closer to small business owners. In 
contrast, the majority of them, 40 percent said that political parties operated the same 
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fashion or that political parties were not close to small business owners. A further, 
26 percent of respondents viewed that political parties were exclusive in terms of 
voters. Five percent revealed that political parties exercise more power than before 
(Chart 5.5). This data interprets that in Gianyar, decentralisation policy could not 
encourage political parties to become close to small business owners. Although 
political parties had become more powerful, they communicated less with their 
constituents.  
 
Chart 5.5 
The Perception of Small Business Owners on Political Parties 
(N-100) 
 
 
        Source: Data obtained by survey questionnaire, 2009. 
 
The next important question concerns the extent to which political parties can help 
small businesses. Data obtained by survey research indicates that according to most 
small business owners, political parties did not do anything for small businesses. 
Small business owners had the view that political parties never helped small business 
owners in developing network with financial institutions (90 percent); political 
parties never helped small business owners in developing networks with markets (as 
much as 89 percent); political parties had never helped small business owners in 
facilitating trainings (91 percent); and 92 percent of respondents said that political 
parties never helped small businesses in providing legal aid (Table 5.13).  
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Table 5.13 
The Support of Political Parties for Small Businesses  
 
No. Various Kinds of Support Answer 
  Always Sometimes Not at 
all 
Total 
1. Developing network with 
financial institutions 
2 (2.0%) 8 (8.0%) 90 
(90.0%) 
100 
(100.0%) 
2. Developing network with 
the markets 
2 (2.0%) 9 (9.0%) 89 
(89.0%) 
100 
(100.0%) 
3. Facilitating trainings 1 (1.0%) 8 (8.0%) 91 
(91.0%) 
!00 (100.0%) 
4 Facilitating legal aids 1 (1.0%) 7 (7.0%) 92 
(92.0%) 
100 
(100.0%) 
   Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009.     
 
Nearly all political parties had no affiliation with local communities and they only 
approached local communities before the legislator elections for soliciting votes. 
After election, political parties did not interact with small business owners and local 
communities.
137
  According to a scholar from Bali Institute of Tourism Management, 
political parties never side with small businesses. The political parties have not done 
much for small businesses. They approached small businesses only before the 
election for local legislator members by providing money or material for the poor 
local communities. Political parties did not have sustainable programs for the 
empowerment of small businesses.
138
 
 
In general, the degree of political party support to small business was low. Majority 
of small business owners perceived that political parties did not do anything for them 
(68.0 percent) as presented in Table 5.14. Only 12 percent of respondents noted that 
political parties were responsive to needs of small business owners. It can be 
concluded that political parties have not yet assisted small businesses. Further 
question is whether or not local legislative members help small businesses.  
 
Most local legislators were not idealist politicians struggling to meet local people’s 
preferences; rather they struggled for their individual needs. The majority of 
legislators try to regain the money they spent during the campaigns. In contrast, most 
                                                 
137
 Summary from data obtained by interview: Interview with W.S., Kelian Dinas, Banjar Glagah, 14 
May 2009; Interview with K.K., Kelian Dinas, 14 May 2009; Interview with  K.G., Bedesa of 
DesaPakraman Kliki, 22 May 2009.  
138
 Interview with D.A.,  Head of Bali Institute of Tourism Management, 4 May 2009. 
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local communities thought pragmatically in electing local legislator based on the 
money they earned.    
Table 5.14 
The Degree of Political Parties’ Support 
to Small Business Owners 
 
No. Degree of  Political Party’s 
Support 
Frequency Percentage 
1. Very supportive 1 1.0 
2. Supportive 12 12.0 
3. Somewhat supportive 19 19.0 
4. Not at all 68 68.0 
 Total 100 100 
        Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009. 
 
Data obtained by interviews indicates local politicians generally influenced small 
business owners by providing money during political campaign for local legislature 
members (Case 5.3). Political parties did not have roots in local communities nor did 
they have an emotional connection with local communities. They did not use 
programs to influence local communities but used money and material as rewards. In 
the relationship between political parties and small business owners, it indicates that   
role of the personal was more dominant than the role of political parties in 
influencing voters. 
Case 5.3: Money Politics in Local legislature Member Election 
According to A.W., Kelian Dinas and Kelian Adat of Banjar of Bonjaka, 
during a political campaign there were seven candidates for local legislator 
who visited the Banjar. Each candidate attended Banjar meetings and 
provided financial assistance of about one million rupiah. For instance, the 
candidate from the PDI-P party provided one million rupiah, whereas the 
candidate from the Golkar party also provided one million rupiah.
139
 
 
Other cases show that the candidate for local legislator member provided money for 
Banjar of approximately one- two million rupiah. However, the candidate also 
provided money to individuals of about twenty five thousand rupiah to gain 
sympathy from constituents.
140
 Two candidates for local legislator visited the Banjar 
Gagah to provide financial assistance of about one million rupiah.
141
 
 
                                                 
139
 Interview with Mr. A.W.,  Kelian Dinas and Kelian Adat, 23 May 2009. 
140
 Interview with Mr. P.D., Banjar of Jasan, 23 May 2009.  
141
 Interview with Mr. W.S., Kelian  Dinas, Banjar Gagah, 14 May 2009. 
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Money politics is further evidence that political parties are not close to local 
communities and did not have affiliations to local communities. They bought votes 
from small business owners and local communities. In contrast, they were controlled 
by the headquarters of political parties using a centralised system. Local politicians 
also provided money to the central headquarters to obtain political position at local 
level. 
 
The Case of money politics indicates that political party members who will be 
candidates for local legislature need a lot of money to cover political campaign costs 
as political parties do not have enough funds. As a result, political parties preferred 
to recruit big business owners rather than small business owners as party cadres. 
Further, candidates for legislative members influenced voter behaviour by providing 
money or material. 
  
How do small business owners influence political parties to articulate their interest?  
This study indicate that about 21 percent of small business owners used funds to 
influence behaviour of political parties; about 17 percent used personal network 
relations with politicians to influence political parties. 21 percent commented that 
they used both funds and personal networks with politicians to influence political 
parties and only 12 percent used it for business associations (Table 5. 15).  
 
Table 5.15 
The Influence of Small Business to Political Party 
 
No. Form of Influences Frequency Percentage 
1. Providing funds 21 21.0 
2. Creating personal networks 17 17.0 
3. Using small business associations to 
influence political party 
12 12.0 
4. Developing opinion in mass media   7 7.0 
5. Mass mobilization 1 1.0 
6. Combined between no. 1 and 2 21 21.0 
7. Combined between 1 and 4 1 1.0 
8. Combined between no 2 and 4 7 7.0 
9. Combined among no. 1, 2 and 4 1 1.0 
10. Other 12 12.0 
 Total 100 100.0 
          Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009.      
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Based on the discussion above, it may be concluded that political decentralisation 
was not able to strengthen the relationships between political parties and small 
business owners. Most of small business owners perceived that political parties are 
not able to help them such as facilitating legal aids, developing network with 
financial institutions and markets. Politicians approached small business owners by 
providing money or material when they need political support in electing local 
legislative members and district head.  
 
5.4.2. Participation of Small Businesses   
Political decentralisation creates an opportunity for business associations and small 
business owners to participate in the process of decision-making as well as political 
activities. Political decentralisation also opens access for small business owners to 
participate in electing public officials. This section will discuss two aspects. Firstly, 
it discusses the participation of business association in the process of decision 
making at the district level. Secondly, it examines the participation of small business 
owners in political activities.   
 
5.4.2.1. Participation of Business Association  
As discussed in Chapter One, business associations have voices and potential power 
to influential local government policy (Pyke, 1992). In Chapter Three it was 
discussed that in Gianyar there are four business associations: the Business 
Association for Wood (Asosiasi Pengusaha Kayu), the Business Association for 
Silver (Asosiasi Pengusaha Perak), the Business Association for Fabric (Asosiasi 
Pengusaha Kain) and the Gianyar Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadinda). 
However, only Kadinda was active in supporting the business sector than other  
business associations. The important question is whether Kadinda was involved in 
the process of decision making at the district level and to what extent Kadinda can 
influence local policy. 
 
The Kadinda of Gianyar is headed by Ari Arsana since 2007, who is businessman 
and non-participant in politics. He is also the chairman of the Business Association 
for Wood (Asosiasi Pengusaha Kayu) and is not affiliated with local bureaucrats. 
The local government seldom invites him to discuss the business sector in Gianyar. 
According to the chairman of the Kadinda, if the local government had political will, 
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the local government could provide more opportunities for the Kadinda to be 
involved in the discussing business affairs at the district level. He argues that 
Kadinda is able to provide valuable inputs for local government in the decision 
making process. However, the local government never invited the Kadinda to 
discuss the trade and industry sector. 
 
As an example, in 2008 Kadinda informed the local government regarding a lack of 
wood supplies by small business owners of Gianyar but the local government never 
acted to solve this problem. In another case, since the decentralisation policy was 
implemented in 2001, small business owners of Gianyar now require complicated 
documents to purchase wood from other districts due to varying district 
regulations.
142
 The Kadinda suggested the district head of Gianyar to develop 
cooperation with other district governments to resolve this problem. However, the 
local government never responded to the input from the Kadinda. 
 
The Gianyar legislature also never invited the chairman of Kadinda to discuss draft 
local regulations on various business permits such as permits for business location, 
industry business permits, registration identification permits and trade business 
permits.
143
 The vice chairman of the local legislature also commented that until now 
there has been no public hearing with local citizens and business associations such as 
Kadinda to discuss draft local regulations.
144
 
 
Based on the discussion above, it is clear that Kadinda is not involved in the 
decision-making at the executive body and local legislature levels. Both executive 
and legislature of Gianyar have not opened the opportunities for business 
associations to participate in decision-making despite the district adopting a 
decentralisation policy. In the case of Gianyar, decentralisation could not increase 
popular participation and Kadinda has difficulty in influencing policy making at the 
local level. This suggests that political parties have not developed networking with 
business associations. As a result, business association have difficulty to lobby with 
political parties. This means that small business associations are not able to bargain 
                                                 
142
 Interview with Mr. A.A., Chairman of Kadinda of Gianyar, 24 April 2009. 
143
 Interview with Mr. A.A., Chairman of Kadinda of Gianyar, 24 April 2009. 
144
 Interview with Mr. R.K., Vice chairman of local legislature and chairman of Golkar party of 
Gianyar, 28 April 2009 
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with local authorities in local decision making. This is different from Bantul where 
business associations have opportunities to be involved in the process of decision- 
making because political parties developed networks with business associations. 
 
5.4.2.2. Participation of Small Business Owners 
As discussed in the previous section, business associations had difficulty to 
participate in the process of decision-making. The next important question is, the 
extent to which small business owners can individually participate in decision- 
making and political activities. 
 
The degree of political participation can be measured by indicators:  
(1) Become a member of political party;  
(2) Participate in political campaign;  
(3) Attend regular political party meetings;  
(4) Become a member of an executive committee of political party;  
(5) Provide a political donation or funds; and  
(6) Become candidate or member for local parliament.  
 
The survey data indicates that most small businesses (95.0 percent) are not members 
of political parties. There are only 5 percent of respondents said that they were 
affiliated to political parties (Chart 5.6). According to respondents, they could not 
benefit from any political party's membership. Despite many political parties 
appearing since 2001, small business owners generally remain uninterested. Data 
from interviews with small business owners substantiated this opinion (Case 5.4 and 
Case 5.5). 
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Chart 5.6 
Participation of Small Business Owners on Political Parties 
(N=100) 
 
 
       Source: Data obtained by survey questionnaire, 2009 
 
 
Case 5.4: Small Business Owners are not interested in Political Party 
membership 
 
Mr. P.D. is a business owner in woodcraft since 1993. He lives in Banjar 
Jasan, sub-district of Tegallalang. He employs 16 workers. Most of his 
products are exported for foreign markets, some for the domestic market. He 
said that he is not member of a political party and he would not become a 
member of political party as political parties do not do anything for his 
business. He also never provides funds to political parties.
145
 
 
Political decentralisation failed to encourage local small business owners to be 
political party membership. A small business owner said that he was not interested in 
political party (Case 5.5.). 
Case 5.5: Small Business was not Interest to be Political party Member 
Mr. N.S. was a small businessman and Kelian dinas. He started his business 
15 years ago and he was elected as kelian dinas in 2003. Most of his products 
were exported. He was also a dancer and gave performances in foreign 
countries. He was not a political party member although was previously 
aligned with PDI P party in the past.
146
 
 
During 2009 political campaign season, 72 percent of small business owners never 
participated in political campaign held by political parties; 90 percent of respondents 
                                                 
145
 Interview with Mr. P.D, 23 May 2010. 
146
 Interview with Mr. N.S., 23 May 2009. 
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never participated in a political party meeting and 97 percent also never became 
members of the executive committee of a political party; 97 percent of respondents 
never provided political donations to a political party (Table 5.16). It may be 
concluded that the degree of political participation of small business owners was 
low. The research findings was in accordance with data in Chart 5.6 above that most 
small businesses were not party members and that political parties failed to draw 
closer to local communities. 
Table 5.16 
  Political Participation of Small Businesses 
 
No. Indicator of Political 
Participation 
Answer 
Always Sometimes Never Total 
1. Participating in local 
election campaigns  
4 (4.0%) 24 (24.0%) 72 
(72.0%) 
100 
(100.0%) 
2. Regular participants in 
political party meetings 
3 (3.0%) 7 (7.0%) 90 
(90.0%) 
100 
(100.0%) 
3. Member of an executive 
committee in a political 
party 
0 (0.0%) 3 (3.0%) 97 
(97.0%) 
100 
(100.0%) 
4 Providing a political 
donation or funds  
0 (0.0%) 3 (3.0%) 97 
(97.0%) 
100 
(100.0%) 
5. Candidate or member for 
local parliament 
1 (1.0%) 3 (3.0%) 96 
(96.0%) 
100 
(100.0%) 
  Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2009  
 
Data obtained from surveys and interviews showed that political participation of 
small business owners in political party was low. Most small business owners were 
of the opinion that political parties could not provide assistance for their business. 
Therefore, they were not interested to be involved in political parties. As a result, 
small businesses had difficulty to use political parties in articulating their preferences 
in the process of decision-making. Decentralisation policy did not impact on 
increased political participation of small business in political parties. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
Based on the discussion above, it may be concluded that although local government 
supported reform of local regulation on small businesses, that regulation did not have 
much impact because majority of small business owners did not obey those 
regulations. The regulations on business permits are not effectively implemented 
because of economic and political reasons. As a result, although the number of small 
businesses increased, the district government’s revenue from small businesses did 
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not increase significantly. In the other words, district government could not use local 
regulation on levies to control small business owners.  
 
From the aspect of promotion policy for small businesses, the research finding shows 
that the district governments provided small financial and material assistance yet less 
of physical infrastructure for small business owners. This means, in promotion 
policy for small businesses, the relationship between local government and small 
business is characterised as an unsupportive relationship. 
  
However, facts show that small business owners could prosper as they are not only 
influenced by the district government but also influenced by markets. The majority 
of products of small businesses are exported to many countries. As a result, any 
increase in demand for small business products in countries such as Australia, the 
United States and European countries will increase the product of small businesses 
of Gianyar.   
 
The research finding in Bantul is like the previous studies conducted by scholars 
such as Trigilia (1986), Best (1990), Wilson (1995) and Patterson (1994), who argue 
that decentralisation policy could improve the relationship between political parties 
and local businessmen. However, the research findings in Gianyar suggest otherwise. 
In Bantul, political parties played an important role in business associations. The 
Chairman of the Bantul Handicraft Board comes from PDIP party, while the 
chairman of the chamber of commerce and industry come from the Golkar party 
members. However, in Gianyar, political decentralisation did not encourage political 
parties to be closer to small businessmen because politicians were not able to 
identify the interests of local small business and failed to articulate the small 
businesses’ interests. In addition, political parties did not use business associations to 
support their interests.  
 
 In respect to political decentralisation, the district government and local legislature 
opened less an opportunity for small business owners and business associations to 
participate in the process of decision-making. As a result, political decentralisation 
failed to involve small business owners and business associations in the process of 
decision making at the district level because business association have not yet 
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developed links with political parties. Thus, politically small businesses were not 
able to bargain with local authorities in local decision making.   
 
On one hand, political decentralisation was not able encourage political parties to be 
close to small business owners. On the other hand, political decentralisation also did 
not encourage small business owners to be involved in political activities. As 
political parties were not close to small business owners, local legislature candidates 
approached small business owners by providing money and materials with the aim to 
obtain political support. By providing money and materials they tried to buy votes 
through the head of local customary associations such as Bendesa (head of Desa 
Pakraman) and Kelian (head of Banjar). This suggests that both Bendesa and Kelian 
had power to make bargaining with local politicians with aim to obtain benefits for 
small businesses and citizens. Politically, local politicians used small businesses to 
support their interests, but they could not provide benefit for small businesses. This 
may be called an exploitative relationship.    
 
The next chapter examines comparison of the impact of decentralisation on the 
relationship between local government and small businesses in Bantul and Gianyar. 
By comparing the two different regions, this project will assess their similarities and 
differences of the impact of decentralisation policy.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1. Conclusion 
This thesis has assessed the impact of decentralisation policy on the relationship 
between local governments and small businesses in Bantul and Gianyar, Indonesia. 
This study began with the critical review of some literature on local government and 
decentralisation, noting that decentralisation policy can give local governments more 
power in administrative functions and fiscal policy, as well as in politics. 
Administrative decentralisation provides local governments with more discretionary 
functions to improve public service for small businesses. With fiscal 
decentralisation, local governments can have discretion to develop types of local 
taxes/levies and tax/levy rates for small businesses. Political decentralisation can 
enable small business owners to participate in the process of decision making and 
political activities as well as electing the district head and local legislature members. 
Political decentralisation, therefore, usually causes change of the relationship 
between politicians and local citizens. If so, local government can wield more or less 
power. 
 
The main issue of this research concern how the decentralisation policy changes the 
relationship between district government and small businesses. The impact of 
decentralisation on the relationship between local government and small businesses 
may be different between regions because of differences in social, economic and 
political conditions. The social factors such as high density population below the 
poverty line can be constraints for the local government in providing public service 
for small businesses. In contrast, local government with rich natural resources and a 
high income from the local taxes/levies could have financial capacity to provide 
public services for small businesses. Political decentralisation can provide an 
opportunity for small business to participate in the elections for district head and 
local legislative member as well as participate in the process of decision making. A 
large number of small business owners in Bantul and Gianyar can play an important 
role in implementing political decentralisation. 
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The research finding found that there are three variables which local officials 
actually determine priorities for local policy programs. Firstly is commitment of 
local government to small businesses. Secondly, market condition for small 
businesse. The market condition for small businesses in Gianyar is better than in 
Bantul. Therefore, the district government of Gianyar provide less assistance in 
developing small businesses. In contrast, the district government of Bantul strongly 
support small businesses. Thirdly is the process of determining annual local budget. 
If local business associations are involved in the process of determining annual 
budget, local government will provide financial assistance for small businesses such 
as in Bantul.  
 
The following briefly summarises key findings as discussed in the previous chapters.  
Brief comparison of these findings will be presented to demonstrate the core 
arguments.   
 
The analyses of the social, economic and political setting of Bantul and Gianyar 
shows that in some aspects such as the size of areas, the total population and 
potential natural resources are similar (Table 6.1. no.1). However, in other aspects 
such as economic structure, style of district head leadership, behaviour of local 
bureaucrats and social structure are different. Both Bantul and Gianyar have small 
areas with high density populations, which may provide positive contributions in 
implementing decentralisation policy. However, a large number of poor among the 
population (below poverty line) may cause financial burden for local governments 
because they have to allocate part of the district budget to help this disadvantaged 
group. 
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Table 6.1 
Comparison of Social, Economic and Political Background between  
Bantul and Gianyar 
 
No. Aspect Bantul Gianyar 
1. Geographic and 
Demographic setting 
 
  
1.1. Size of area  Small area. The district 
head easily provides public 
services for local 
populations in each sub-
district. This contributes in 
implementing 
decentralisation policy.   
 
Small area.  District head 
easily provides public 
services for populations in 
each sub-district in 
implementing 
decentralisation policy.   
 
1.2. Natural 
Resources  
Poor natural resources. The 
natural resources provide 
small benefit for the district 
government and less 
support in the 
implementation of 
decentralisation.   
Poor natural resources. The 
natural resources provide 
small benefit for the district 
government and less 
support in the 
implementation of 
decentralisation. 
 
1.3. The size of 
Population 
Small population. The 
district government easily 
provides public services. 
Small population. The 
district government easily 
provides public services. 
 
2. Structure of 
Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. GDRP Concentration on 
agricultural sector (24 
percent). 
Concentration on services: 
trade, hotel & restaurant 
sector (30 percent). 
 
2.2. The capacity of 
locally derived 
revenue (the 
PAD income) 
 
Average of 7 percent of 
total district government’s 
revenue 
Average of 14 percent of 
total district government’s 
revenue 
2.3.  Relations to the 
central 
government  
 
Bantul highly dependent on 
the central government 
grants  
Gianyar dependent on the 
central government grants  
2.4. Industrial sector Growth rate of industrial 
sector is low 
Growth rate of industrial 
sector is low 
3. Political Institutions 
 
  
3.1.  Local 
Legislature 
Local legislative members 
consist of nationalist and 
religion parties. 
 
Local legislative members 
consist of nationalist 
parties. 
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Largest number of seats in 
local legislature is occupied 
by PDI-P party (24 
percent). 
Largest number of seats in 
local legislature is occupied 
by PDI-P party (40 
percent). 
 
Performance of legislature 
has not yet changed since 
the implementation of 
decentralisation.  
Performance of legislature 
has not yet changed since 
the implementation of 
decentralisation. 
 
3.2. Political parties 
 
The PDI-P party and 
Golkar party develop 
networks with business 
associations. 
 
 
Political parties do not 
develop networks with 
business associations. 
4. Local Bureaucracy 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Local  
bureaucrats 
Behaviour of local 
bureaucrats has changed to 
be responsive in providing 
public services for small 
businesses. 
 
Behaviour of local 
bureaucrats has not yet 
changed in providing public 
services for small 
businesses. 
4.2. District head The relationship between 
district head and small 
businesses is harmonious in 
term of district head is 
responsive to the needs of 
small business owners. 
 
District head strongly 
promote small businesses. 
District head is not 
responsive to the needs of 
small business owners  
 
 
 
 
District head offers less 
promotion of small 
businesses.   
5. Community Structure  
 
 
5.1. Business 
associations  
Business associations 
develop link with political 
parties 
Business associations have 
no link with political 
parties 
 
5.2. Neighbour 
associations 
Politicians influence small 
business owners through 
hamlet or local community 
associations or and 
neighbourhood associations 
(RT).   
 
Politicians influence small 
business owners through 
Bendesa (head of Desa 
Pakraman and Kelian (head 
of Banjar).  
 
Bantul and Gianyar have poor natural resources that provide small financial capacity. 
Further, the small financial capacity reduced support of the implementation of the 
decentralisation policy and they faced difficulties to improve public services such as 
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providing physical infrastructures, training and market development for small 
businesses (Table 6.1. no.1).  
 
The economic structure between Bantul and Gianyar is different. Bantul is supported 
by agricultural sector, while Gianyar is supported by trades, hotels and restaurant 
sectors. Locally derived revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah, PAD) is very small, 7 
percent in Bantul and 14 percent in Gianyar because both local tax and levy incomes 
are small (Table 6.1. no.2). As a result, they have difficulty to implement 
decentralised functions and increase financial and technological assistance for small 
businesses. Furthermore, these regions are dependent on the central government 
grants. Without central government grants, these regions have difficulty in 
implementing decentralisation policy. In addition, the growth rate of the industrial 
sector in these districts is very slow, thus this sector is unlikely to increase district 
government revenues. I argue that both Bantul and Gianyar have financial 
constraints in implementing decentralisation policy. The flow on effect is their 
difficulty improving public services for small businesses such as providing financial 
and technological assistances as well as facilitating market development. Therefore, 
both Bantul and Gianyar faced difficulty to implement administrative 
decentralisation.  
 
Furthermore, the implementation of political decentralisation in both the districts did 
not improve the performance of political parties and local legislature. Although 
decentralisation policy has driven the emergence of political parties in local 
legislature, the performance of this legislature did not increase because of low 
performance of local legislature members. There is difference in composition of 
local legislature members between Bantul and Gianyar. Local legislature members of 
Bantul consist of nationalist and Islamic parties, but in Gianyar, only nationalist 
parties exist (Table 6.1. no.3). Although there are many factions in the Bantul 
legislature, the district head is able to control them. In Bantul, decentralisation has 
driven small business associations to be involved in local decision-making. In 
contrast, decentralisation policy has not yet driven the local legislature of Gianyar to 
open opportunities for business associations to be involved in the process of decision 
making. As a result, business associations in Bantul are able to bargain with local 
government in local decision-making, but not in Gianyar (Table 6.3).     
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Political decentralisation causes local politicians to (highly) compete in pursuing 
public positions both in executive and legislature. As a result, they use many ways to 
approach small business owners as well as local citizens such as by providing money 
and materials through local community associations. In Bantul they used the head of 
hamlets (Dukuh) and the head of neighbourhood associations (Ketua Rukun 
Tetangga or RT), while in Gianyar they used notable persons such as the Bendesa or 
the head of Desa Pakraman (customary village) and the Kelian or the head of Banjar 
(association of local customary community) (Table 6.1. no.5). Additionally, local 
politicians directly distributed the money to constituents individually with the aim to 
influence voter behaviour. Research findings show that most of small business 
owners commented that political parties are not able to help them. This suggests that 
the relationship between politicians and small business is characterised by an 
exploitative relationship because local politicians use small businesses to support 
their political positions, but they do not respond the needs and interests of small 
businesses (Table 6.3).     
 
It is important to note that political decentralisation has caused the relationship 
between the district head of Bantul and small businesses to significantly change. The 
behaviour of the district head changed from authoritarian leadership to democratic 
leadership. In addition, the district head is closer to small business owners compared 
to previous arrangements (1974-2000). Following the change in the district head 
leadership, the behaviour of local bureaucrats has shifted by being more responsive 
to the needs of small businesses. In other words, the relationship between district 
head and small business is characterised by a supportive relationship (Table 6.3). 
 
However, in Gianyar, the behaviour of local bureaucrats did not change in providing 
public services because the district head was not able to drive the changes. Most of 
small business owners commented that style of district head leadership has not 
significantly changed under the decentralisation era and was not responsive to the 
interests of small businesses (Table 6.1. no. 4).  
 
In Chapter Four and Five, it was shown that local governments have limited 
authority to issue business permits because the central government still held 
authority for issuing some business licenses. In general, throughout the 
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decentralisation era, types of business permits that were held by local governments 
are the same as previously, such as building location licenses, building establishment 
licenses, industry business licenses, company registration location, advertisement 
licenses and disturbance licenses. However, district governments have tried to 
improve the system of business permits.  
 
Decentralisation has driven local governments to carry out local institutional and 
regulation reforms to improve public service for the business sector. For institutional 
reform, local government of Bantul and Gianyar has developed local institutions for 
integrated permits services with the aim to improve public services for business 
sector. In relation to local regulation, both local governments improved local 
regulation on the business sector so as to become transparent and accountable. This 
suggests that the Bantul and Gianyar district are responsive to promotes small 
businesses. Based on the regulation and institutional aspect, the relationship between 
local governments and small businesses is characterised by a supportive relationship.  
 
In the case of Bantul and Gianyar, small businesses are relatively independent from 
the local government regulations in terms of tax and levy regulations. The district 
governments are not able to control small businesses by using the local regulations. 
The local regulation on local levies could not be effectively implemented by local 
governments because of political and social reasons as discussed in Chapter Four and 
Five. It could be interpreted that politically, small businesses were used by local 
authorities, as a large number of small business owners and workers could be a 
potential source for political votes. The politicization of small businesses also 
occurred in many countries such Japan (Patterson, 1994), Italy (Trigilia, 1986) and 
Germany (Schmitz & Musyck, 1994). In Japan, as an example, politicians were able 
to influence bureaucrats in providing financial assistance to small businesses based 
on political support obtained from them. In Germany, Christian Democrat party 
influenced the local government in policy making on industrial districts.  
 
Bantul differs from Gianyar in terms of protection policy for small businesses. The 
district government of Bantul developed a policy to protect small businesses from 
big capitalists by enacting district head decree no. 503/5439, in 2008. The protection 
policy is driven by small businesses having the power to bargain with district head 
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and the style of district head leadership. According to this policy, supermarkets were 
not allowed to operate in Bantul regions. In contrast, the Gianyar district did not 
have a policy to protect small businesses because business associations and small 
businesses are not able to make a bargain with district government (Table 6.2. no.1). 
Thus, the Bantul district strongly supports small businesses but the Gianyar district 
does not.  
 
In relation to promotion policy for small businesses, the findings of the thesis shows 
that Bantul has given much help to small businesses through providing financial 
assistance and material. In the case of Gianyar, the local government provided a 
small financial and material assistance to small business owners, but their businesses 
could develop well because their businesses were more influenced by markets than 
local government assistance (Table 6.2. no.2). This suggests that, unlike Gianyar, the 
district government of Bantul strongly promotes small businesses such as to protect 
tradional market and develop Centre for Employment Training.  
 
Another aspect of promotion policy for small businesses is market development. The 
Bantul district was more active in developing markets for small businesses than 
Gianyar. The Bantul district, for example, built local public market buildings to 
replace the old with the aim to promote small businesses. The district government 
also developed the Gabusan Art Market building as centre for selling small business 
products and as a place for small business exhibitions. By improving market 
buildings, local people are interested to shop at these markets, thus small businesses 
could develop. Local government and small business also share the cost of business 
exhibition. Further, the important issue in developing small businesses is whether 
political decentralisation could create opportunities for small businesses and business 
associations to participate in the process of decision making.    
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Table 6.2 
Regulation, Promotion Policy and Political Influence to Small Business  
In Bantul and Gianyar 
 
No. Aspect   Proposed Policy Objectives Bantul Gianyar 
 
1. Regulation    
1.1. Business License 
 
 
To provide more power to local 
governments in business licenses 
 
Limited discretional policy 
 
Limited discretional policy 
1.2.  Local tax and levy on small 
business 
1. Increased district revenue Levy cannot increase district 
revenue 
 
Levy cannot increase district 
revenue 
 
2. Increased control of district 
government over small businesses 
Local tax/levy cannot be used to 
control small businesses 
 
Local tax/levy cannot be used to 
control small businesses 
3. Increased allocation of public 
resources to small businesses 
Yes No 
1.3. Protection 
 
To protect and develop small businesses Yes, district head’s decree to 
protect small businesses  
No 
2. Promotion Policy 
 
   
2.1. Financial assistance To increase capital for small businesses Yes, district government provides 
financial assistance and subsidy 
Yes, district government 
provides small financial 
assistance  
2.2. Training 
 
 
To increase skill and management of 
small business owners 
 
Yes. Using district government 
budget & grants from the central 
government 
 
Yes, using the central 
government grants 
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2.3. Material assistance 
 
To facilitate material input and improve 
quality of products 
Yes, district government 
facilitates raw materials. 
 
No 
 
2.4. Physical infrastructure 
facilities 
To facilitate the process of production 
and develop  market 
Yes, district government improves 
road and market buildings 
No 
3. Political Influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Political influence of 
politicians over small business 
owners 
To obtain political support  in election 
for district head and local legislature 
members 
 
Yes, through Dukuh (head of 
hamlet and Ketua RT (head of 
neighbourhood associations).  
Yes, through Bendesa (head of 
customary village) and Kelian 
(head of association of local 
customary community).  
3.2. Participation of small 
businesses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1. Participation of 
business associations in 
the process of decision 
making. 
 
 
Decisions are in accordance with the 
needs and interests of business sector  
Limited opportunity because only 
Dekranas was involved because 
this association has links with 
district government. 
 
No, local government did not 
provide opportunity for business 
associations to participate 
3.2.2. Participation of small 
business owners in 
political activities and 
in the process of 
decision making 
 
 
 
Increased the dynamics of local politics 
and political representative   
Low. Small business owners were 
not interested in political 
activities. 
 
Low. Small business owners 
were not interested in political 
activities 
Decisions at district level are in 
accordance with interests and needs of 
small business owners 
 
Middle. Small business owners 
asked the district head to protect 
them. 
Low. Small business owners fail 
to ask assistances to district 
government when they face lack 
of raw material input.  
 
 
 
 
  
Under political decentralisation, on one hand, political parties are not able to be 
closely aligned to small business owners. On the other hand, small business owners 
are not interested in being political party members. Thus, politicians had difficulty 
for obtaining political support from small business owners. In general, they tried to 
influence a voter’s behaviour typically small businesses owners by providing money 
or material such as foods, T-shirts and fertilizers. Small business owners were 
politicised by politicians in both Bantul and Gianyar. However, there is a different 
way in influencing voter behaviour between Bantul and Gianyar. In Bantul, 
politicians use official local community associations such as the hamlet (Pedukuhan) 
and RT to influence voter behaviour. In Gianyar, they use local customary 
associations such as Desa Pakraman and Banjar to do so (Table 6.2. no.3). It 
indicates that political decentralisation could not increase political participation of 
small business owners in political activities because political parties do not provide 
benefit small businesses.  
 
In the case of Bantul, political decentralisation has caused political parties to develop 
networks with business associations such as the PDI-P party developed a network 
with Dekranas (Bantul National Handcrafts Board), whereas the Golkar party with 
Kadinda (Gianyar Chamber of Industry and Trade). Therefore, in Bantul politicians 
can use business associations to support their political interests. In contrast, in 
Gianyar business associations do not have networks with political parties, thus they 
have difficulties in articulating their interests (Table 6.1. no.5). Business associations 
have no opportunities to be involved in the process of decision-making at the district 
level. As a result they have no opportunity bargain with district government in local 
decision-making (Table 6.3). 
 
Based on the discussion above and Table 6.2, the relationship between local 
government and small business will be summarised in Table 6.3. There are three 
types of possibility of the relationship as discussed in Chapter One such as 
supportive, bargaining and exploitative relationship. In short, based on the regulation 
aspect, in both Bantul and Gianyar the relationship between local government and 
small business is characterised as a supportive and bargaining relationship. From 
aspect of policy to promote small businesses, in Bantul the characteristic of the 
relationship is strong supportive and bargaining, but in Gianyar is less supportive 
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with no bargaining. Finally, based on the political aspect, in Bantul the relationship 
between local government and small business is called a supportive, bargaining and 
exploitative relationship. However, in Gianyar it is a less supportive, weak 
bargaining and exploitative relationship (Table 6.3).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6.3 
 Typology of Relationship between Local Government and Small Business  
in Bantul and Gianyar 
 
 Bantul Gianyar 
 Type of Relationship Type of Relationship 
Aspect Supportive Bargaining Exploitative Supportive Bargaining Exploitative 
 
Regulation Yes, Strong supportive: 
1. Simple procedure for 
obtaining business licenses 
2. Light tax/levy on small 
businesses 
3. District head’s decree to 
protect small businesses. 
 
Yes, 
Local government does 
not fines to small 
business which have no 
business licenses 
No, 
Most of small 
business owners 
perceive that local 
levies are not heavy. 
Yes, moderate supportive: 
1. Simple procedure for 
obtaining business 
licenses 
2. Light tax/levy on small 
businesses 
Yes, 
Local government does 
not fines to local 
business who have no 
business licenses 
 
No, 
Most of small 
business owners 
perceive that local 
levies are not heavy. 
Promotion Yes, 
Local government provides:  
 Financial assistance,  
 Training and technological 
assistances  
 Infrastructure facilities to 
small businesses.  
 
Yes, 
There is a sharing of the 
cost of organizing the 
exhibition business 
between small business 
owners and local 
government. 
 
 
 
 
No, 
Local government 
gives loan with low 
interest. 
Less supportive, 
Local government provides 
less financial assistance, 
training & technological 
assistance and infrastructure 
facilities.  
No, 
Business associations 
are not involved in 
financing business 
exhibition 
No, 
1. Local government 
gives small  loan 
with low interest. 
2. Local government 
gives small 
finanacial 
assistance to 
Institution for 
People’s Credit 
(LPDs).  
Politics Yes, 
District head and local 
bureaucrats are able to respond 
the needs and interests of small 
business owners 
Yes, 
Business associations 
have a network with 
political parties and can 
influence policy makers 
to produce policy in 
accordance with the 
interests of small 
businesses. 
Yes, 
Politicians use 
small business 
owners to support 
their political 
positions, but they 
less respond the 
needs and interests 
of small businesses. 
  
Les supportive, 
District head and local 
bureaucrats less respond the 
needs and interests of small 
businesses  
Weak, 
Business associations 
have no link with 
political parties and are 
not involved in local 
decision making  
Yes, 
Politicians use small 
business owners to 
support their political 
positions, but they 
less respond the needs 
and interests of small 
businesses. 
  
6.2. Implications 
Based on the discussion above, this thesis makes two major contributions, one 
practical and one theoretical. On a practical level, it provides three important 
findings. Firstly, the findings imply that the implementation of decentralisation is not 
based on the real capacity of local governments. Regions with poor resources and 
low incomes from local taxes and levies such as Bantul and Gianyar have difficulty 
in implementing decentralisation policy. The district governments that adopt 
decentralisation policy are still dependent on central government grants. I suggest 
that degree of administrative decentralisation among regions should be based on the 
capacity of each local government. The number of decentralised functions that are 
given to the local governments may be different among regions, refers to an 
asymmetric administrative decentralisation as discussed in Chapter One (Bird, 2003, 
p. 9). This is important consideration due to the differences in capacity of natural 
resources and social culture among regions in Indonesia. Besides asymmetric 
administrative decentralisation, there are also asymmetric fiscal decentralisation 
(Garcia-Mila & McGuire, 2002) and asymmetric political decentralisation (Chien, 
2008; 2010). 
 
In practice, asymmetric decentralisation has been adopted in many countries such as 
Canada (Ladduwahetty, 1995), India (Pandid, 1997),  China (Chien, 2008, 2010), 
and Spain (Garcia-Mila & McGuire, 2002). For instance, Canada as unitary 
federation provides special decentralisation to Quebec in order to use French 
language as official language although other states in Canada use English language 
(Ladduwahetty, 1995). Quebec also has status as a self-governing political 
community (Chevrier, 1996). Based on the experience of the implementation of 
decentralisation in Quebec, the Indonesian government could also adopt asymateric 
decentralisation to solve conflict between the central government and local 
government.   
 
In other cases, Jammu and Kashmir in India also obtain special decentralisation from 
India with the aim to overcome conflict with the federal government. Both Jammu 
and Kashmir were given authority to develop their constitution. The Indian 
government provided particular decentralisation to these regions because of political 
and religious reasons. The third case is China where sub-national governments 
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economically have been granted greater autonomy with huge decentralised fiscal and 
administrative power, but politically, it is still a state under Communist Party 
domination. Local officials are not elected locally but are assigned by the party  in its 
asymmetric political decentralisation (Chien, 2008, 2010). In Indonesia, I have 
shown that political decentralisation causes money politics in election for district 
heads. As an alternative way to overcome money politics, district heads may not be 
elected by local people but are assigned by central government.  
 
Another form of asymmetric decentralisation is asymmetric fiscal decentralisation, 
as adopted in Spain and discussed in Chapter One. In Spain, fiscal authority is 
devolved to local governments based on their different capacities. As an example, 
Basque and Namara regions in Spain are given authority to raise taxes locally. The 
major taxes such as income, corporate, wealth, inheritance and wealth transfer are 
fully administered by the local governments (Garcia-Mila & McGuire, 2002).   
 
The cases of Canada and India are examples of decentralisation driven by 
compromises between national and sub-national government to resolve conflict. The 
capacity of local government is not a major consideration in delegating power from 
the national government to sub-national governments. It is important to note that 
political consideration is the main variable in implementing decentralisation policy 
both in India and Canada. In my opinion, this has two implications. Firstly, if the 
sub-national government has financial resources, it could well implement 
decentralisation policy. Secondly, if the sub-national government does not have 
enough financial resources, it will constrain implementing decentralisation policy.  
 
Decentralisation policy driven by compromises between national and sub-national 
government to resolve conflict was not only occurs in Canada and India, but also in 
Indonesia. For instance, the Indonesian central government provided special 
decentralisation to the provinces of Papua in 2001 and Aceh in 2006 with the aim to 
resolve conflict between the central government and local communities. By enacting 
Law No. 21/2001 the central government provided special autonomy to Papua, while 
based on  Law No. 11/2006 Aceh obtained special autonomy from the central 
government.         
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Based on the Law 32/2004, however, the main purpose of decentralisation policy in 
Indonesia is to develop local democracy and to empower sub-national governments. 
Yet the local resource capacity of each local government is different. The local 
governments in Indonesia generally face lack of financial resources to implement 
decentralisation policy. Therefore, the central government delivers subsidies in form 
of special grants (DAK) and general grants (DAU). I suggest that the implementation 
of decentralisation should be based on the real capacity of each local government. 
The scope and type of decentralised function to each region is not the same. This 
may be called asymmetric decentralisation with the aim to both develop local 
democracy and empower local government.  
 
Based on the development experience of many countries with asymmetric 
decentralisation, the Indonesian government should not provide the same 
decentralised functions to a variety of sub-national governments whose capacity 
differs. The scope and type of decentralised functions should be based on the 
capacity of each sub-national government. The same scope and type of decentralised 
functions could create financial burdens for poor local governments if they are not 
able to implement them. Therefore, asymmetric decentralisation is a reasonable 
alternative to be adopted in the implementation of decentralisation policy in 
Indonesia.  
 
The second practical, finding of this thesis show that local governments have limited 
support to help small businesses due to the local governments’ financial constraints. 
The finding also indicates that the central government (The Ministry of Cooperatives 
and SMEs
147
) provides a variety of assistance such as financial assistance, 
technological assistance and training programs to small businesses through district 
governments. Therefore, it is important to develop coordination between the central 
and local governments in providing public services. For an example, central 
government formulates policy and initiates programs, whereas local governments. 
based on receiving direction from the central government, respond by designing 
locally based programs which vary between different local governments (Aoyama, 
2000, p. 55).  Additionally, the central government should question the district 
                                                 
147
 SMEs are small and medium Enterprises. 
  
 
267 
government on the type of assistances provided by the central government. The 
district governments are closer to small businesses and better understand the needs of 
small businesses than the central government. At local level, coordination is needed 
among local agencies such as Dinas Koperasi and UKM (Local Agency for 
Cooperative and Small & Medium Businesses), Diperindag (Local Agency for 
Industry and Trade) and Badan Perijinan Terpadu (Local Board for Integrated 
Permit Services). Thereby, local government can provide better services for small 
businesses. One type of services for small businesses is training program.     
 
The third practical finding of the thesis show that training programs for small 
business owners has not been effectively implemented by local governments in 
Bantul and Gianyar due to a lack of facilities. Although there are UPTs (Unit 
Pelayanan Teknis or Unit for Technical Services), the UPTs do not work effectively. 
It is presumed that local governments can encourage the UPTs to provide more 
training programs to small businesses with the aim to increase the managerial skills 
of small businesses owners and workers. As discussed in Chapter One,  small 
businesses conduct less training for employees and managers than large businesses 
because they faced financial constraints (Bannock, 2005, p. 147), thus local 
governments are obliged to fill the gap.  
 
As with the practical findings, this thesis has also made three important contributions 
on the theoretical level. Firstly, administrative decentralisation theoretically can 
encourage the capacity building of local bureaucracy as discussed in Chapter One. 
However, findings have shown that administrative decentralisation did not always 
maintain local capacity building at district level. The case of Bantul has shown that 
creating a local capacity building of local bureaucracy was influenced by the style of 
district head leadership. The district head of Bantul was able to encourage local 
capacity building, whereas the district head of Gianyar failed in developing a local 
capacity building. The style of district head leadership in Bantul was democratic and 
close to local small businesses. The district head of Bantul developed a policy to 
protect small businesses against large capitalists. In addition, the district head 
introduced a scheme to protect farmers by buying agricultural products (rice, chilli, 
shallot, corn) during the harvest season when the prices of these products dropped. 
Then, the district government sold these products when the prices became normal. 
  
 
268 
From these examples, the district head intended to develop capacity of local 
bureaucrats in providing services for local citizens. In contrast, the district head of 
Gianyar was not close to small businesses and able to increase capacity of local 
bureaucrats. Therefore, local bureaucrats of Gianyar have not yet significantly 
changed during the decentralisation era. It can be concluded that administrative 
decentralisation could drive a local capacity building if it is supported by strong local 
leader.   
 
Secondly, the thesis finding has shown that political decentralisation could not 
automatically increase participation of local citizens as discussed in Chapter One. 
The participation of local citizens could increase if local government and local 
legislature provide an opportunity for them and develop institutional mechanisms for 
local citizens to be involved in the process of governance (Hentic & Bernier, 1999). 
In the case of Bantul, the district head opened greater opportunities for local citizens 
to articulate their interests. The local government also developed an institutional 
mechanism for local citizens to participate through “plengkung gading” program.148  
In contrast, the district head of Gianyar could not develop the mechanism for local 
citizens to articulate their interests.    
 
Thirdly, political decentralisation may lead political parties to become aligned with 
local citizens as politicians tried to obtain political support. However, the findings 
show, political decentralisation fails to encourage political parties to be closer to 
small business owners and local citizens because of the low quality of party cadres. 
In addition, small business owners are not interested to be political party members 
and involved in political parties. This thesis argues that political parties have not yet 
provided benefit to small business owners such as developing networking with 
financial institutions and markets as well as facilitating training and legal aids. 
Political decentralisation cannot increase political participation of small business 
owners unless political parties are able to provide some benefits for small business 
owners. The case of small businesses in Germany, as an example, small business 
owners are close to a Christian Democrat party as this party  assists  them through 
                                                 
148
Plengkung gading is television program with the aim to increase participation local citizen in local 
development. In this program, the district head introduced variety of programs to local citizens with 
the hope to receive inputs and criticism from local citizens. 
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their influence in policy making on the industrial district (Schmitz & Musyck, 1994). 
Thus, if political parties are able to carry out their functions, such as to identify the 
interests of local small business owners in policy making, they may obtain political 
support.      
 
6.3. Concluding Remarks 
Based on the study in Bantul and Gianyar, I suggest the devolution of power from 
central government to local governments should be revisited based on the capacity of 
each local government. Asymmetric administrative decentralisation may be the 
reasonable alternative in implementing decentralisation in Indonesia. In fiscal terms, 
asymmetric decentralisation may be manifested in differential central taxation, in 
differential revenue responsibilities and differential central government grants.  
Uniformity of functions and discretionary fiscal policy among different regions can 
create poorly managed public services for small businesses.   
 
Although local governments have carried out local institutional reform in responding 
to increased functions and responsibilities as a result of decentralisation, they only 
have been able to provide small financial assistance to small businesses due to the 
limited financial resources. Therefore, the implementation of decentralisation is 
accompanied by the central government grants.  Additionally, the local governments 
do not effectively implement local regulation on levies and cannot control small 
businesses. They are relatively independent from the local government regulations. 
This research is limited to two local governments. However, findings from Bantul 
and Gianyar should be developed in order to conduct research in other places of 
Indonesia. 
 
In Bantul decentralisation policy has generated a positive relationship between 
political parties and local business, while in Gianyar decentralisation did not improve 
the unfriendly relationship between political parties and local businessmen. It may 
have been due to differences of the degree and nature of patrimonialism in local 
politics of two regions. The political patrimonialism system in Bantul is 
characterised by strong leader of local government head, while in Gianyar, local 
government leader is characterised by moderate leader. This is an important issue for 
further research.  
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This thesis highlights the impact of decentralisation from local governments and 
small business owners’ viewpoint. To date there are few studies focus on the politics 
behind small businesses in Indonesia. This study can enrich our understanding of 
small businesses. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
 
Content: 
1. Interview guide for local bureaucrats 
2. Interview guide for local parliament members 
3. Interview guide for political parties’ elite 
4. Interview guide for owner of small business 
5. Interview guide for scholars 
6. Interview guide journalists 
 
 
 
 
The questions will be translated into Indonesia Language (Bahasa Indonesia)  
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR LOCAL BUREAUCTRATS 
 
1. How do local bureaucrats view small business: Do they view small business 
as an economic source for local government, or do they view small business 
as partner in local economic development?  
2. If the local bureaucrats view small business as economic source, what kind of 
policies will be created by local government?   
3. If the local bureaucrats view small business as partners in local development, 
what kind of policies will be developed by local government? 
4. To what extent has the behaviour of local bureaucrats changed during the 
decentralisation period? 
5. To what extent have the local policies on small business changed during 
decentralisation era compared the previous period? 
6. If the local policies have changed, please explain what kind of new policies 
have been introduced?  
7. Do these policies on small business give more benefit for small business or 
have they created constraints for developing small business? 
8. Please explain what kind of benefit for local bureaucrats in implementing 
decentralisation? 
9. Please explain what kind of constraints are faced by the local bureaucrats in 
implementing decentralisation?   
10. What kind of political, social and economic support has been given by the 
local government to small businesses? 
11. To what extent were the owners of small business involved in local decision- 
making process? 
12.  In what ways were the owners of small business involved in the decision- 
making process?  
13. How did the owners of small businesses respond to the opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process?  
14.  Have the behaviour of small business owners change during decentralisation 
period compared to the previous period? 
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15. If they have changed, what are the new behaviours of small business owners? 
How did the local bureaucrats respond to it? 
 
 
===Finish=== 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR LOCAL PARLIAMENT MEMBERS 
 
1. How many of the local parliament members have business backgrounds? 
2. In the committee on trade and industry in the local parliament, how many of 
them have business backgrounds?  
3. How does the local parliament view small business in the decentralisation 
era? : Do they view small business as an economic source for local 
government or do they view small business as partners in local economic 
development?  
4. How many regulations on small business have been introduced during the 
decentralisation era?  
5. To what extent do the small business owners obtain benefit from the new 
regulations? What kind of benefits do they obtain? 
6. How did the members of local parliament respond to small business people’s 
interests? 
7. Has the local parliament provided more access for small business owners to 
participate in the decision-making process? If they have, to what extent were 
small business owners involved in the decision-making process? 
8. How did the small business owners respond to it? 
9. What kinds of constraints are faced by small business owners to participate in 
the decision-making process? 
10. How did local parliaments facilitate development of small business owners? 
11. Have small business owners reported their problems to the local parliament? 
 
 
===Finish=== 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLITICAL PARTIES’ ELITE 
 
1. To what extent have political parties influenced constituents at the grassroots 
level? 
2. Do political parties view small business people as potential voters? If the 
answer is yes, how did political parties’ elite respond to it? 
3. Do political parties have data and information about small business people?    
4. Do political parties have programs to support small business people? If the 
answer yes, what kind of programs do they have? 
5. To what extent did political parties facilitate small business people to 
network with bank institutions and or markets?   
6. To what extent have political parties develop networks with small business 
associations or small business cooperatives?  What kind of networks did they 
develop? 
7. Have small business owners asked political parties to solve their problems? If 
the answer yes, please explain. 
8. To what extent have small business owners been involved in political parties’ 
activities? Please give examples. 
9. How did small business owners respond to it? 
10. To what extent did political parties influence small business owners in 
general elections and elections for heads of districts?       
11. How many small business owners have been involved with the boards of 
political parties? 
12. Have political parties received financial support from small business owners? 
Did they receive it regularly or only occasionally? 
 
 
===Finish=== 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR OWNER OF SMALL BUSINESS 
 
1. When did you start to operate your business? 
2. How many workers support your business? 
3. Have you been involved in small business associations or small business 
cooperatives?  
4. Are you a member of a board of a small business association or a small 
business cooperative? 
5. Are you a member of a political party? If yes, what party are you involved 
with? 
6. Do you think that local government policies on small business are fair and 
just? Would you like to explain it? 
7. Who received more benefit from decentralisation politics in Indonesia? 
Please chose one from: small business owners, bureaucrats, or politicians. 
Explain why they received more benefit compared with others?  
8. To what extent does local government respond to small businesses’ interest?  
9. If the small business owners have problems, to whom can they ask for help? 
Would you like to explain it?  
10. Have small business people been involved in local decision-making? In what 
ways have they been involved in the decision-making process?  
11. Have small business owners been involved in activities held by political 
parties?  What kind of activities? 
12. According to you, to what extent do small business owners use political 
parties in articulate their interests?  
13. How do small business owners develop networks with local bureaucracy to 
influence local decision making process? 
14. Who are the main actors among small business owners who play an 
important role in negotiating with local government or political parties? 
Please explain what their roles are? 
15. What extent do small business associations or small business cooperatives 
become mediators in relationships between small business owners and local 
government?  
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SCHOLARS 
 
1. Who gets more benefit in implementing decentralisation in Indonesia: local 
bureaucrats, the elite of political parties or small business owners 
2. According to you, to what extent has the business climate changed during 
decentralisation in Indonesia? 
3.  Does the new business climate give advantages to small business?   Or does 
it give more advantages for local bureaucracies or politicians? 
4. According to you, to what extent does local government respond to small 
business’s interest? 
5. To what extent has the behaviour of local bureaucrats changed during the 
decentralisation era?  
6. To what extent and in what ways do political parties influence small business 
people in general elections and elections for head of district? 
7. To what extent and in what ways do small business owners use political 
parties to further their interests? 
 
 
===Finish=== 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS 
 
1. Who got more benefit among local bureaucrats, elite of political parties and 
small business owners in implementing decentralisation in Indonesia?   
2. According to you, to what extent has the business climate changed during 
decentralisation in Indonesia? 
3.  Does the new business climate give advantages for small business?   Or does 
it more advantages for local bureaucracies or politicians? 
4. According to you, to what extent does local government respond to small 
business’s interest? 
5. To what extent did behaviour of local bureaucrats change during the 
decentralisation era?  
6. To what extent and in what ways do political parties influence small business 
people in general elections and elections for head of district? 
7. To what extent and in what ways do small business owners use political 
parties to articulate their interest? 
 
 
===Finish=== 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 
SURVEY OF SMALL BUSINESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These questions will be addressed to the owner of small businesses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These questions will be translated into Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia)  
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PART 1 
Respondents Identity 
 
 
No. :  
Name of respondent :  
Address :                                          
Phone number :  
 
 
PART 2 
Characteristic of Small Business 
 
1. How many employees work for your business? 
(A) 1 – 5 workers 
(B) 6 – 10 workers 
(C) 11 – 15 workers 
(D) 16 – 19 workers 
(E) More than 19 workers  
  
2. What is your business's net assets worth? (Excluding land and buildings). 
(A) < 50 million rupiah 
(B) 51 – 100 million rupiah 
(C) 101 -150 million rupiah 
(D) 151 – 200 million rupiah 
(E) > 200 million rupiah 
 
3. How long have you been operating your business? 
(A) less than 1 year 
(B) Between 12 months and 23 months 
(C) Between 24 months and  35 months 
(D) Between 36 months and 47 months 
(E) More than 47 months  
 
4. Are you a member of a small business association or small business cooperative? 
(A) Yes 
(B) No 
 
5. Do you have any political affiliation? 
(A) Yes 
(B) No 
 
6. If you answer yes to questions 5, please mention, which party you are affiliated 
with ……….. 
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PART 3 
The Views of Local Small Businesses toward  
Local government bureaucrats  
 
7. Do you know about your local government policies on small business?  
(A) Yes 
(B) No 
 
8. If you answer yes to question 7, please provide examples of these policies: 
(A) …………… 
(B) …………… 
(C) …………… 
(D) …………… 
(E) …………… 
 
9. What do you think is the impact of decentralisation on local business climate? 
(A) Local business climate has become better 
(B) Local business climate is the same as it was before 
(C) Local business climate has become worse 
(D) I don’t know 
 
10. What do you think about local regulations, for instance: the procedures for 
obtaining business licenses or industry licenses during decentralisation era? 
(A) Generally, local regulations tend to be simple 
(B) Local regulations are the same as in previous periods 
(C) Local regulations tend to be complex 
(D) I don’t know  
 
11. What do you think about local taxes or fees on small business? 
(A) Generally, the local tax is relatively cheaper 
(B) The local tax is reasonable 
(C) The local tax is expensive 
(D) The local tax is very expensive 
 
12. What do you think about the impact of decentralisation on local 
bureaucrats?  
(A) Local bureaucrats are improving  
(B) No impact 
(C) Local bureaucrats are getting the worse 
(D) I don’t know  
 
13. What do you think about impact of elections of the heads of district by the local 
people? 
(A) The head of district is more responsive to the needs of small business 
(B) Behaviour of the head of district is the same as when they were not 
elected directly 
(C) The head of district is less responsive 
(D) The head of district is increasingly powerful 
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14. To what extent do local public services support small business during 
decentralisation era? 
(A) Local public services are more responsive to the needs of small 
business 
(B) Local public services are the same as it was before  
(C) Local public services are less responsive compared to before  
(D) I don’t know 
 
15. In what ways were small business people able to influence local bureaucracies? 
(it is possible to choose more than one answer) 
(A) By providing funds  
(B) By creating personal network 
(C) By facilitating a small business association 
(D) By communicating opinions in mass media   
(E) By supporting mass mobilization  
   
16. What do you think about the local government’s support for local 
small business? 
          
No. Various kinds of Support Answer 
  Very 
supportive 
Supportive Not at all 
16.1. Financial support (Financial 
aid, subsidies, favourable 
business taxes, low interest 
loan, and government contracts)  
   
16.2. Facilitating material for 
operation (Facilitating the 
supply/allocation of raw 
materials, investment guidance, 
favourable supply of gas and 
electricity, building 
infrastructures - road, bridge, 
port facilities) 
   
16.3. Facilitating training (Support 
for in-house education, 
government job training) 
   
16.4 Market promotion (Information 
of marketing opportunities, 
promotion of local business, 
and facilitating market entry) 
   
16.5. Other…….    
 
 
17. What do you think about the support of small business associations or small 
business cooperatives in promoting business, negotiating with the local 
government, and developing networks with financial institutions and market? 
 
 
 
  
 
294 
No. Various Kinds of 
Activities 
Answer 
  Very 
supportive  
 
Supportive 
Less 
supportive 
Not 
at all 
17.1. Promoting business     
17.2. Negotiating with the local 
government 
    
17.3. Developing network with 
financial institutions 
    
17.4 Developing network with 
the market 
    
17.5. Other …….     
 
18. To what extent have small business people been involved in local decision-
making processes? 
(A) They have never been involved 
(B) Sometimes they have been involved in the decision making-processes  
(C) They have always been involved in the decision-making processes 
   
 
PART 4 
The Views of local small business toward  
Political party  
 
19. What do you think about the impact of decentralisation on political parties? 
(A) Political parties are closer to the grass roots level, including to small 
businesses 
(B) The behaviour of political parties are the same as in previous periods  
(C) Political parties are more exclusive and far from grass roots level 
(D) Political parties have become increasing powerful 
 
20. To what extent have small business people been involved in political activities? 
 
No. Various Kinds of Activities Answer 
  Always Sometimes Never 
20.1. Participating in local election 
campaigns  
   
20.2. Regular participants in political 
party meetings 
   
20.3. Member of a political party    
20.4. Member of an executive 
committee in a political party 
   
20.5 Providing a political donation or 
funds  
   
20.6. Candidate or member for local 
parliament 
   
20.7. Other ……………..    
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21. In your opinion, what form has the support of political parties for small business 
taken? 
 
No. Various Kinds of Facilities Answer 
  Always Sometimes Not at all 
21.1. Developing networks with 
financial institutions 
   
21.2. Developing networks with the 
markets 
   
21.3. Facilitating training    
21.4 Facilitating legal aid     
21.5. Other………….    
 
22. Generally, do you think that political parties are supportive of your business? 
(A) Very supportive  
(B) Supportive 
(C) Less supportive or somewhat supportive 
(D) Not at all 
 
23. How have small business people been able to influence political parties so that 
they will support their business? (it is possible to have more than one choice) 
(A) By providing funds  
(B) By creating personal networks 
(C) By supporting small business associations to influence political 
parties 
(D) By developing opinion in mass media   
(E) By mass mobilization  
 
24. How do political parties influence small business people in elections for district 
heads? (it is possible to have more than one choice) 
(A) By providing funds  
(B) By creating personal network 
(C) By facilitating for individual small businesses  
(D) By facilitating for small business associations 
(E) LessBy mass mobilization 
  
25. How are political parties able to influence small business people in the elections 
for local parliament members? (It is possible to choose more than one answer) 
(A) By providing funds 
(B) By creating personal networks 
(C) By facilitating on behalf of individual small business people 
(D) By facilitating on behalf of small business associations or small 
business cooperatives 
(E) By mass mobilization 
 
26. To what extent have political parties created more access for small business 
people to be involved since decentralisation has been implemented? 
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(A) Political parties have increased their access 
(B) Not all political parties  have more access 
(C) All political parties are the same as previous period 
(D) Political parties tend to be more closed 
(E) Political parties have become increasingly powerful 
 
27. If your business has problems, to whom do you usually go to ask for help? 
(A) Political parties 
(B) Local bureaucrats 
(C) Local business associations or local business cooperatives 
(D) Non government organisations 
(E) Mass media 
(F) Other …………….. 
 
 
 
===End of questions=== 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
LIST OF NAME OF INTERVIEWEES OF BANTUL 
No
. 
Abbreviation Position Date of Interview 
1. I.S. District head 25 June 2009 
2.  Vice district head  
3. G.R. Secretary of Local Government  15 June 2009 
4. Y Head of Diperindagkop 3 June 2009 
5. T.S. Secretary of Bappeda 2 June 2009 
6. H Head of Dinas Perijinan 9 July 2009 
7. A.D. Head of Dinas Keuangan dan Aset 
Daerah 
17 June 2009 
8. S.S. Head of Dinas Tenaga Kerja 13 June 2009 
9. S Head of Department of Law  
10. J.P Chairman of Local Legislature and 
Chairman of Bantul branch PDI-P 
party 
24 June 2009 
11. A Secretary of PDI-P Party 26 June 2009 
12. A.S. Chairman of Bantul branch, 
Golkar party 
10 June 2009 
13. S.B. Chairman of Kadinda, Local 
legislative member  and Golkar 
party member 
15 June 2009 
14. G.S. Chairman of Bantul branch, 
Democratic Party 
20 June 2009 
15. H Chairman of Bantul branch, PAN 
party 
10 June 2009 
16. Sm Head of B Committee of  Local 
Legislature 
15 June 2009 
17. A.R. Chairman of Bantul branch, PKB 
party 
24 June 2009 
18. A.Sr. Head of Research and 
Development of PKS party and 
local legislative member 
10 June 2009 
19. W.U. Expert in Local Autonomy and 
Senior Lecturer of Faculty of 
Social and Political Sciences, 
GadjahMada University.   
18 June 2009 
20. P Expert in District Government 
Affairs and the Dean of Faculty of 
Social and Political Sciences, 
13 July 2009 
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GadjahMada University 
21. Sy. Chairman of Dekranas 11 June 2009 
22. T Chairman of Gabusan Art Market 11 June 2009 
23. S.A Chairman of Bantul Craft 
Association 
16 June 2009 
24. A.T Chairman of ASMINDO 
(Furniture Industry and Handicraft 
Association) 
19 June 2009 
25. T.R. Chairman of Satya Bawana Small 
Business Cooperative 
11 June 2009 
26. E.R. Head of ASEPHI (Exporter and 
Handicraft Association) 
19 June 2009 
27. Y.K. Chairman of APIKRI (Foundation 
of Indonesian People’s Handicraft 
Development) 
16 June 2009 
28. B.S. Journalist of Daily Kompas 7 June 2009 
29. N.H. Journalist of Daily Kedaulatan 
Rakyat 
8 June 2009 
30. Slm. Head of RT 9 July 2009 
31. S.H. Small business owner and 
Candidate for Local legislature 
member  
9 July 2009 
32. Pm Small business owner 1 July 2009 
33. Pj Small business owner 7 July 2009 
34. E.R. Small business owner 23 June 2009 
35. Sh. Head of Hamlet of Tirto 7 July 2009 
36. MU Small business owner 23 June 2009 
37. W Small business owner 14 July 2009 
38. N Head Hamlet of Kasongan 9 July 2009 
39. S.W. Small business owner 7 July 2009 
40. E.S. Small business owner  
41. Pm. Head of Hamlet of Karangasem 9 July 2009 
42. Sn Small business owner 9 July 2009 
43. Sg. Chairman of Karya Sejahtera 
Mandiri Business Association 
7 July 2009 
44. Ar. Chairman of Manding UPT 7 July 2009 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
LIST OF NAME OF INTERVIEWEES OF GIANYAR 
No
. 
Abbreviation Position Date of Interview 
 
1. A.S. District head of Gianyar 23 April 2009 
2. D.S. Vice District head 28 April 2009 
 
3. B.N. Head of Bappeda 30 April 2009 
4. B.M. Local legislature member 23 May 2009 
5. R.K. Vice Chairman of Local 
legislature  
28 April 2009 
6. A.B. Former of District head and 
Chairman of Gianyar PDI-P party 
 
7. C.B. Head of Diskop and UKM 29 April 2009 
 
8. S Head of Diperindag 23 April 2009 
9. D.M. Secreatary of Dispenda 29 April 2009 
 
10. D.J. Head of Department of Law  28 April 2009 
11. P.S. Head of Section of Economic 
Affairs, Bappeda 
22 April 2009 
12. S.E. Staff of Badan Pelayanan 
Perijinan Terpadu 
28 April 2009 
13. W.St. Head of Diskop and UKM, 
Province of Bali  
11 May 2009 
14. A.A. Chairman of Gianyar Chamber of 
Industry and Trade and Chairman 
of Business Association for Wood 
24 April 2009 
15. D.A. Director of Bali International 
Institute of Tourism Management 
4 May 2009 
16. S Editor of Daily Bisnis Bali  1 May 2009 
17. S.A. Editor Pelaksana, Daily Bisnis 
Bali 
1 May 2009 
18. W.M. Senior Lecturer in Faculty of 
Economic, University of Udayana 
1 May 2009 
19. A.P. Small Business owner and Kelian 
Adat of Banjar Kendran 
23 May 2009 
20. M.A. Head of Section of Business 
Development, Diskop and UKM 
30 April 2009 
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21. A.W. Small business owner and  Kelian 
Dinas and Kelian Adat of Banjar 
Bonjaka 
23 May 2009 
22. M.R. UPTD staff 22 April 2009 
23. K.K. Kelian Dinas of Banjar Sapat 14 May 2009 
24. N.S. Small business owner, Kelian 
Dinas and Kelian Adat, Banjar 
Pujung Kaja 
23 May 2009 
25. P.D Small business owner and 
Bendesa, Banjar Jasan 
23 May 2009 
26. W.S. Kelian Dinas, Banjar Glagah 14 May 2009 
27.    
28. K.G. Bendesa of Desa Pakraman Kliki 22 May 2009 
29. S Secretary of B Committee, Local 
legislature 
4 May 2009 
30. W.P. Bendesa of Tegallalang 22 May 2009 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
LIST OF NAME OF RESPONDENTS OF BANTUL 
No. Acronym Telephone/Mobile Phone 
Number  
 
1. Sury 0818260171 
2. Tg 081328749722 
3. Pyt 0274-7370517 
4. I.W  0274-7112524 
5. Ro 0274-370968 / 08122791377 
6. Y.A.P 0274-6463645 
7. C.Pt. 08882518937 
8. Kik - 
9. E.R 0274-7408189 
10. E,D 0274-78522440 / 0811286172 
11. Srtm 081392183383 
12. Utg 0274-7485966 
13. A,M 08562920504 
14. Pnd 0274-370516 
15. T.A.K. 0274-370523 
16. T.E.S. 0274-7408612 
17. A.S 0274-370517 
18. Tri - 
19. El - 
20. T.M 0274-6461410 
21. Cah.P - 
22. Pu 08122952241 
23. Bog 081802638722 
24. Pwt - 
25. Srj 0274-6461408 
26. Pj 0274-370514 
27. N. A. 08164228292 
28. M.W. - 
29. M. M. 085743728586 
30. R.Set 08122706823 
31.  A.H.  085643406522 
32. Um - 
33. Muh. Is 08562865296 
34. Str 0274-6466419 
35. A.I. 0818262046 
36. D. Utm 0274-6462585 
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37. C.L. 0274-6462579/0816689013 
38. D.E. 0274-7489372/08122964542 
39. Mus 081328349340 
40. Ner No. 0274-445689 / 0818293178 
41. Mar 08122753492 
42. A.S. Y. 081578637399 
43. T.W. 081578755533 
44. Wir. 7113577 
45. E.S. 0274-414910 
46. Ro.Y. 08122780848 
47. Sjn - 
48. S.R. 0274-6460956 
49. Sn. 0274-6460916 
50. Srj - 
51. Str - 
52. D.T. - 
53. Bj 0274-7440317 
54. Barm - 
55. Rus 0274-368453 
56. A.P. 0274-6462787 / 081578628900 
57. J.Sb 0274-368462 
58. Swd 0274-368437 
59. Sby 0274-368438 
60. Jok Sud - 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
LIST OF NAME OF RESPONDENTS OF GIANYAR 
No. 
 
Acronym Telephone/Mobile Phone 
Number 
1. Ra Ud 08123981564 
2. Mad Sm 081558331137 
3. Ke Su 0361-976280 
4 Ay Pi 0361-977894 
5 Mad  Ad 0361-7454927 
6 Way Gal 0361-978833 
7 Way Ag Wa 0361-970123 
8 Mad Kel 0361-973037 
9 Way Suw. 0361-980808 
10 Mad Pit 0361-7400294 
11 N Way M. 0361-901953 
12 N Way S Jay 0361-901253 
13 Ny Nai 0361-901943 
14 Mad Reg 0816574370 
15 Put In 0361-901732 
16 Kom Ar 0361-974249 
17 Wun Wir 0361-901069 
18 Jro Mang I J 0361-901581 
19 N Ra 0361-976272 
20 Kt. Wi 0361-980874 
21 I Way Kar 0361-980784 
22 Gus Ay R A. 08123960357 
23 L Yoh Sut 08133422664 
24 J. Ny Sik 0361-8512394 
25 Ge Ar 0817552470 
26 Mad Bud 081338225115 
27 Ny Wik 0361-901353 
28 A. A. Pu 081338030437 
29 Way Sab 0361-942374 
30 Pu Suk 0361-901184 
31 Way Bud 0361-901011 
32 Mad Ta 0361-901733 
33 D.W. Kom 0361-902232 
34 Mad Sur 081338517713 
35 Wyn Me 0361-901771 
36. Mad Mul 0361-901766 
37. Kad As 085238729990 
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38. Wid As 0361-901903 
39.  In Suk 08123942091 
40. Ni Mad Mang 0361-901446 
41. Ket Mer 0361-981070 
42. Way Rup Sug 0361-901606 
43. I Way Sub 0361-901010 
44. I Mad Sud 0361-901831 
45. I Way Mus 085237190035 
46. Ni Way Mo 0361-901011 
47. Wik 0361-901131 
48. Ay S.Rat 0361-901692 
49. Mad Sut 085237042877 
50. A Aut 08123923004 
51. I Kom Rat Kus 081236000349 
52. I Mad Dan 08123804504 
54. Tik 0361-978135 
55. Put Rad 0361-976046 
56 Ni Way Sun 0361-976646 
57 I Kom Mud 081566526 
58 Dwi 0361-901567 
59 Nyom Bun 081338718313 
60 I Mad Pas 0361-901965 
61 I Way Raj - 
62 Ni Nyom Lu 0361-7895297 
63 I Ay Prad 0361-7981254 
64 Dew Put Rat 0361-980980 
65 I WayMas 0361-901132 
66 I Way Sud 081916691140 
67 I Mad Sak - 
68 I Ket Sup 081338760902 
69 I Mad Blon 0361-901122 
70 Rud 0361-902117 
71 Way Sua 0361-901121 
72 Way Gan 0361-901022 
73 I Way Dam 0361-901123 
74 I Put Sud 0361-901186 
75 Ni Made Murni 0361-980946 
76 Ni Way Rus 0361-980898 
77 I Way Si 085237316556 
78 Dew K. A. 0361-980720 
79 Ni Lu Sut 081337551122 
80 Cah 0361-7901384 
81 Ni N. Mun 0361-980881 
82 I Way Sue 0361-980884 
83 I Mad Suk 081337810089 
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84 I Nyo Su 08123639361 
85 Dew Put A.  085237530902 
86 Way Ar 08155757690 
87 Mad Su 081338440457 
88 I Way Par 0361-901137 
89 Ni Mad Mar 081337696859 
90 Cok Bag T. 0361-976433 
91 I Nyo Kar 081558142481 
92 I K. Mud 085737032823 
93 I Nyo Sar 08124626429 
94 I Mad Ag Win 085238118110 
95 Wayn Ba 081337197091 
96 Way Sum - 
97 I Mad Sua 081338710228 
98 Nyo Mur - 
99 Komg 0361-7469090 
100. P.Wayn Sem - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
